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7be relationship between China and South Korea during the years 1971 to 
1990 is of fundamental importance to the future development of the Asian-Pacific 
region. After a long period of neglect. this relationship Is now being studied anew: as 
a dynamic centre of world economic power, as a theatre for world political events, 
and as a potential crisis zone. Sino-South Korea relations play a vital role in the 
political and economic development of the entire region. with concomitant 
repercussions for the global economy and the international security order. 
In the past relations between China and Korea have been detennined by three 
major factors: geographical proximity, the shared traditional culture of 
Confucianism. and the Korean War and the subsequent Cold War. 7be rapid 
evolving domestic situations within both countries. as well as changes in the 
international environment. have led. during the last two decades. to signifIcant 
developments In the relationship. As allies China and South Korea would 
undoubtedly be the deciding factor in any major regional conflict., as enemies any 
serious hostilities would leave both severely debilitated. But armed conflict apart, 
the degree of political confrontation and the extent to which their divergent Interests 
can be reconciled are of global import. 7be changing postures which the two 
countries have taken towards each other during the 1970's and 1980's warrant a 
fresh and detailed exan-dnation of their relations. 
The dissertaUon argues that for both China and South Korea economic. 
political and strategic interests are closely interwoven. 7be order of discussion is not 
intended to give precedence to the economic relationship and over political and 
Strategic issues. but rather to suggest how priorities have shifted as the intricate 
pattern of relations has developed: in the VD70s the relationship was dominated by 
the international environment: in the first half of the 1980's. incidental political 
issues shaped relations, and in the late 1980's the emphasis shifted to the dynamics 
of economic interdependence between China and South Korea. 
I 
7bis paper takes a balanced approach, paying equal attention to both politico- 
strategic and economic aspects. The first chapter examines the style and legacies of 
the historical background. dealing with basic roots ofthe relations between China 
and Korea. 7be rest of the chapters highlight the politico-strategic and economic 
relations between China and South Korea during 1971-1990, this part being 
divided into four time segments: cautious responses. 1971-November 1978; 
encouraging developments. December 1978-1984; defacto recognition. 1985-1987; 
beyond the Cold War, 1988-1990. 
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7he most important country to South Korea (Hereafter S. Korea). in terms of 
her livelihood, political values, and security, on balance would have to be China(l). 
7be relationship between China and S. Korea Is also of crucial importance to the, 
future development of Northeast Asia(2). 
While several scholars have analyzed aspects of the changing relations 
between China and S. Korea. there has not been a comprehensive review of the 
reasons for its fundamental transformation during the 1980's. 
This examination highlights the relationship between China and S. Korea on a 
year-by-year basis for the period between 1971 and 1990. Two basic methodological 
approaches are employed: a chronological analysis is made, which attempts to 
assess how priorities have shifted in the intricate pattern of relations. revealing the 
significance of the changes of the past two decades from the context of general 
situations. The other strand in the analysis seeks to place the foreign policies of 
China and S. Korea within a broader international sphere. delineating the underlying 
principles governing the two countries' policies towards each other. and examining 
how regional and global influences constrained or encouraged their relations. 
The comple. -cities of bilateral and multilateral relations are fo=dable. 
resulting from the position of both China and S. Korea as significant regional powers 
In Northeast Asia, which is, moreover, an area of considerable economic. political 
and strategic significance. and the site of major rtvalry between superpowers. Ibis 
analysis seeks to unravel these factors. and also to highlight the salient features of 
the cooperation and conflict which developed between the two countries on various 
issues which arose during the period under consideration. 
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7be dissertation argues that for both China and S. Korea economic and 
politico-strategic aspects of relations are closely interwoven. with a clear reciprocal 
interaction between them: closer economic ties leading to closer political ties leading 
to further economic relations. and so on. Notwithstanding this circle of cause and 
effect it was generally economic factors which precipitated each new advance. with 
growing interdependence testing the limits of political openness. 
7be initial chapter will be devoted to the historical background of relations 
between China and S. Korea, providing a comprehensive analysis of the constraints 
posed by the legacy of the past to the improvement of the relationship. Subsequent 
chapters will discuss the politico-strategic and economic changes, that, China and 
S. Korea have undergone since the early 1970's which have not only revealed. but 
also increased. the complexity of the relationship between these two important 
Northeast Asian powers. 
S. Korea during her peak growth in the 1960's and 1970's has provided 
something for a role model for China In recent years. China has been encouraged by 
the complementary economic partnership formed. S. Korea has moved towards a 
higher political proftle. but has not found It easy to manage politico-strategic Issues 
with China. 7be Chinese-S. Korean agenda has been determined by such 
perspectives: S. Korea is a significant econornic power which depends on external 
support and/or cooperation for its security, whereas China is assured of continued 
national independence but relies heavily on external Investment to reallse essential 
modernisation. 
7broughout the dissertation there is an attempt to avoid undue emphasis on 
either the S. Korean or the Chinese perspective, yet the two countries' inumate 
images of each other are quite distinctive, and are helpful in understanding the kind 
of perceptions which have operated between them. as well as the likely scope of 
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future relations(3). Many existing analyses of current relations between China and 
S. Korean tend to centre on the Chinese viewpoint, the S. Korea angle being less fully 
explored. The conduct of the two countries themselves is influenced by their own 
"attitude" towards each other at any given time, and their "policy" towards each 
other depends also upon the unique Korean perspective(4). 
No matter how important the subject matter may be the value of this research 
work must depend to a considerable degree on the nature of its methodology and the 
discipline of its data. and therein lies a stumbling block. - The nature and quality of 
the available data impose severe constraints on the kinds of analyses that can be 
performed. and it is therefore possible that this will limit the degree of objectivity 
and insight which can be attained. 
This dissertation is based on reading of scattered primary sources. although 
some'secondary sources have been employed. particularly in studying the North 
Korean (Hereafter N. Korean) factor in relations between China and S. Korea. Some of 
the materials disseminated by Peking and Pyongyang do not stand up to close 
scrutiny as being uniformly authentic and reliable. Although newspapers and 
journals from the two countries throw considerable light on a wide range of 
propaganda objectives. they have proven to be of instructive use for a subject of 
scholarly inquiry by comparison with the numerous works on an empirical analysis. 
This includes Information distributed through their own newspapers. which reflect 
national Interests, rather than making a critical review of the facts. 
In the case of the People's Republic of China (Hereafter PRC). one must rely 
largely on evidence emanating from the regime itself - notably Its own publications. 
e. g. the Renmin Ribao (People's DaJW Mereafter RMRB) and the Belling' (Peldng) 
Review Mereafter 13PJ, which are completely controlled by the government and the 
communist party. All RMRB and IM publications in China pertinent to the Korean 
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pmblern were followed, and these materials were compared with statements 
emanating from N. Korea. Pyongyang's public reaction to the Korean problem found 
in the Worker: &j2WjX and j! Xongvan_d Times exactly paralleled the reaction from 
Peking. Serving as they do the multiple functions of indoctrination, internal'and 
external propaganda, and obscure communication, these'publications leave a great 
deal to be desired from the stand-point of objectivity. reliability. ' and information. it 
is further necessary to caution against equating the two principal sources' images 
with any standardised Chinese perceptions of relations between China and S. Korea; 
whereas BE serves as a source for foreign observers in Peking and abroad, RMRB is 
primarily a domestic medium of communication. It must otherwise be taken as a 
contradiction that RMRB was exercised in castigating S. Korea and lauding the 
"traditional friendship between China and N. Korea". while IDE noted the -dedicated 
economic relations between China and S. Korea. 
7be situation as regards S. Korea is only slightly better. Although markedly 
more accessible to the outside world than the PRC. S. Korea has thus far fallen 
appreciably short of being an open society(5). Not only has there typically been 
censorship of varying rigour throughout its brief history, but successive S. Korean 
regimes have also manipulated the contents of their own publications for 
propaganda and other purposes. mainly using daily newspapers, and applying 
considerable skill in making such adjustments(6). 7bree notable instances of such 
manipulation may be mentioned. S. Korean newspapers offered very limited coverage 
of Chinese affairs in the period Immediately following the declaration of June 23 
1973 by President Park Chung Hee. In the early 1980's. however. more information 
on the improving relations with China began to appear in S. Korean newspapers, 
reflecting President Chun Doo Hwan's desire to strengthen perceptions of his 
government's legitimacy. Again In December 1987-April 1988. all S. Korean 
newspapers carried extensive coverage of the development of relations between 
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China and S. Korea, precisely when President Roh Tae-Woo launched his New 
Northern Diplomacy towards the Communist countries. 
7bc use of original language materials to track the changing relations between 
China and S. Korea permits comparison over time and facilitates a cumulative 
understanding. Relatively few monographic studies have employed this approach to 
date. United States Government and quasi-official British publications such as 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service (Hereafter FBISI and British Brogjaaj= 
Corp. /Summ= of World Broadcasts/Far East (Hereafter BBC/SWB/FFJ have been 
invaluable as a source of primary documents, including central directives and 
background briefing materials dealing with issues between Seoul and Peking. The 
informed commentaries of the Hong Kong publication Far Eastern Economic Reide 
(Hereafter FEE were also most useful. being a reflection of public and private 
views held by both the Chinese and the S. Koreans. 
Most of the developments in relations between China and S. Korea took place 
behind-the-scenes so that it Is an Important analytical problem to explore the 
linkage between the leadership's intentions and the actual relations between Peking 
and Seoul. So far as trading relations are concerned. estimates made of trade 
volumes are often unreliable. Whatever the nature of the trade. the flow from 
S. Korea to China is exaggerated by S. Korean government subsidy. and from China 
to S. Korea it is continually understated in order to avoid provoking N. Korean anger. 
7bere is no way to establish with any degree of certainty the true volumes traded 
between the two countries, though it Is clear that these have grown rapidly during 
the period under study, stating from a tiny base. and - fluctuating significantly 
around the middle of the period. 7be dearth of pertinent evidence suggested that an 
attempt should be made to gather more. by empirical examination. 
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In conducting this empirical examination. the author had several interviews 
with people who. because of personal sensitivity, refused to be idenUfled. 7be 
interviewees, were selected on the basis of their official positions and experience. as 
well as their accessibility. Several S. Korean and Hong Kong Chinese officials and 
businessmen provided ideas which assisted in the understanding of policy-making 
processes in relations between China and S. Korea(7). 
In transliterating Chinese and Korean into English, I have followed a mixed 
practice. While the titles of books and articles have been rendered in accordance 
with the McCune-Reischauer system and the Pin-yin system respectively, as a general 
rule. personal names are spelled according to the preferences of the individuals 
concerned. and place names follow common usage. Both Chinese and S. Korean 
personal names almost always consist of a one-syllable surname, which precedes a 
two-syllable personal name. 
For Chinese. the Pin-yin system of romanisatIon adopted by the PRC will be 
used throughout. except for such widely recognised English names as Peking, 
Kuomintang. Canton. Taiwan, and the Yellow River. but the fIrst time a particular 
name appears the former spelling will usually be added in parentheses as JU To 
avoid excessive confusion. this dissertation will use the familiar English names of 
both people and places such as Chiang Kai-shek. Hong Kong, Tibet. Manchuria and 
the philosopher Confucius, rather than employing the names currently used in 
China (Jiang JIeshl. Xlanggang. Xizang, Dongbei. and Kongzi). 
For Korean, the romanisation of N. Korean names, both of people and places. 
foUows the practice of the "JýZonaang Times". whereas for S. Korean namer. and 
general terms the McCurte-Reischauer system has been used. Exceptions were made. 
however. where the idiosyncratic spelling of names was known, as found on their 
business cards for cxample. or for those persons not known by this author 
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personally. where the spelling most frequently used In the English press or 
periodicals has been repeated here. 
Notes 
Throughout this dissertation. I shall use the terms China. Hong Kong. 
N. Korea, S. Korea. Taiwan. US. and USSR. as shorthand for their full names - the People's Republic of China (PRC). the British Crown Colony of Hong Kong 
(Hong Kong), the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). the Republic 
of Korea (ROK). the Republic of China (ROM the United States of America 
(USA), and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). respectively. These 
relations are referred to as "Chinese-S. Korean" by both Chinese and 
S. Koreans. Throughout this work the common usage of Chinese-S. Korean will 
be used without any political statement implied. What the Chinese refer to as 
"Korea7 includes both North Korea (N. Korea) and S. Korea. On the other hand. 
what the Koreans refer to as "China" includes both Communist China and 
Nationalist Taiwan but. after 1949. It signified the PRC. 
(2) Northeast Asia is used here to refer to the PRC. Taiwan, Korea, Japan. the 
Soviet Far East. and Siberia. 
(3) There are many cases in which it is Important to distinguish between "image" 
and "perceptlorV though the two tenns are usually used interchangeably. In 
this work. I believe David Shambaugh's distinction between these terms is 
suitable for this framework. David Shambaugh. Beautiful Imperiallst: - China 
Precelves America. 1972-1990 (Princeton. New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press. 1991). p. 4. He defined it as follows: "'linage' will be used to describe 
categories of spccfflc articulated 'perceptions'. The image is a mental construct 
that categorises and orders disparate pieces of Information and helps to shape 
an articulated response (perception). " Quoting from Allen S. Whiting: "'Image' 
refers to the preconceived stereotype of a nation. state. or people that is 
derived from a selective interpretation of history, experience. and self-image... 
'Perception' refers to the selective cognition of statements. actions. or events 
attributed to the opposite party as framed and deftned by the preexisting 
image. To use a figure of speech widely found in the literature, 'image' 
provides the frame and the lenses through which the external world is seen or 
perceived. " Allen S. Whiting. China Eyes Japan (Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 1989). p. 19. 
(4) Given the differences between China and Korea in terms of size, culture. 
population. and history. use of the term "attitude" and "policy" in this work 
connotes the whole set of relations between them, rather than merely the 
International relations or foreign relations between the different nation-states. 
which. as has been often argued. are quite distinct. 
(5) In some Instances, foreign policy documents In S. Korea may be handled 
separately under special controls, to mInIniJse the possibility of their failing 
into hands of the N. Korean government. 
(6) The author. currently holding the rank of Lieutenant Commander (Hereafter 
LCDR) in the S. Korean Navy. has spent two years between July 1986-August 
1988, immediately prior to taking up this research work in Bristol. as a Watch 
Office in the Joint Intelligence Indication and Warning Centre in the Combined 
Forces Command United States/Republic of Korea (Hereafter CFC US/ROK) in 
Seoul. This furnished an opportunity to scrutinise and compare materials 
carried by most of S. Korea's daily newspapers with FBIS sources unclassified 
within CFC J-2. Particular attention was given to documents issued between 
July 1986 and August 1988. S. Korean newspapers routinely reprinted foreign 
newspapers' releases belatedly. long delays sometimes marking their 
appearance. The more strident S. Korea's hope for improved relations with 
China. the more likely such reports were to be specifically attributed to 
S. Korean sources. Together with the exaggerations typical of many daily 
newspapers. and mis-emphasis by means of leading headlines, this allowed a 
substantial degree of manipulation. 
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(7) Some interviews. however. failed to materiallse because the prospective 
interviewees feared to be compromised in their present roles by publication of 
their views in this dissertation. 7be interviews were conducted from March 
1989 through 1990. Each interview lasted no longer than one to two hours. 
Interviewees have proven to be of little use for research on foreign affairs. 
Infrastructure officials and businessmen from both sides are too far removed, 
physically and professionally. from the decision-making process in relations 
between China and S. Korea to have much Interest in or information on the 
subject. For example, a Chinese research fellow at Bristol University who was 
interviewed by the author acknowledged that China. in particular the Northern 
provinces. preferred cooperation with S. Korea via the Yellow Sea, trading 
technology and goods, rather than engaging in incfflcient and incompatible 
trade with N. Korea. However. the need to make media material genuinely 
accountable has meant that his remarks were neither quoted directly nor 
attributed any references. 
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How complex is the relationship between China and S. Korea? To answer this 
question it Is necessary to analyse the historical associations between the two 
countries, dating back two thousand years. Memories of the past have as often been a 
liability as an asset In relationships between the two countries. A critical analysis of the 
historical perspectives could explain the reason why the relationship between China 
and S. Korea Is changing from one marked by tensions and confrontatIon to a more 
cordial relationship. giving rise to the future possibility of friendship between the two 
naUons. 
1.1 Background 
. 7be history of the relationship between China and Korea has been weU 
documented. Its immense landmass. its large population and its wealth of natural 
resources as well as its deep cultural foundations have placed it In a position of 
superiority vts-a-vis Korea In Northeast Asia. Hence. the relationship between China 
and Korea can be viewed as one based on paternalism, with Korea serving China and 
the latter recognising a duty towards the former in much the way that an elder brother 
may recognise a duty towards a younger brother. China was seen as a great power by 
Korea (Dae kuld whereas Korea's relationship with China was referred to as shih-ta, that 
is a small country serving a large one(l). 7bus. Korea was defined as part of the 
Chinese "sphere of economic and political influence", "little China7and "fine example of 
alliances". and meant that Korea was Influenced. first and foremost. by Chinese 
culture(2). 
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In practical terms, this meant that- Koreans followed the Chinese pattern of 
cultural and economic development in terms of distribution of land, absorption of 
Chinese culture. i. e. Buddhism. and the Chinese political system. i. e. Confucianism. 
Although Korea maintained its own cultural Identity. the Koreans had not developed a 
written language of their own, but borrowed the Chinese system of writing. producing 
books and documents in Chinese. Hence, it can be seen that China and Korea have a 
long history of socio-cultural and economic exchange. 
Furthermore. China and Korea have maintained healthy trade relations over 
much of the past two thousand years. Both countries needed to trade to obtain 
commodities produced or controlled by the other. and trade was therefore based on 
mutual self-interest. Trading places were set up both in the capitals and in the 
provinces: and gold. shells and iron were often used as money'to barter. although 
Chinese coins began to circulate, particularly in the metropolitan areas frequented by 
the Chinese. In the ninth century. a Korean merchant. Chang Po-go, built up'a 
commercial empire using Chong-hae-jin (an island off the South coast, now known as 
Wandon) as his main base. He provided transportation to government oMcWs wishing 
to travel Ao the Chinese court. Ibis. coupled with the establishment of trading 
communities on the southern coast of the Shandong peninsula and on the lower region 
of the Huai River. ensured that trade between China and Korea flourished via the Yellow 
Sea lines(3). 
Although trade between the two countries declined sharply with the death of 
Chang Po-go, Chinese and Korean merchants. continued to trade throughout the 
various dynastic periods. Trade even Increased with the Liao In Manchuria, and the 
river ports of Yesong River began to play an important role. Guest houses were built 
and trade offices were established in the capital and the provinces for diplomats and 
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merchants, fmm China and Korea. Korea's main export Items were gold and, silver 
utensils. raw copper. ginseng, -hemp cloth. paper, inkstone. and, felt. China exported 
tea. lacquerware. books. dyestuffs, and medicines. Although both China and Korea were 
technologically Influenced by the West in the eighteenth century. it was only with China 
that Korea maintained foreign trade: sustaining a vitally important economic 
relationships between the two countries(4). 
Although China has been a major power on the Korean peninsula, the relations 
between China and Korea has not always been viewed as that of junior partner to great 
power. 'Mere have been two currents upsetting this simplistic description of the two 
countries' affairs. First, the Chinese have often set limits in their own influence insofar 
as they have generally preferred to behave as if China was the only place of real 
consequence. with outlying areas being seen as having much less significance. for 
example as cultural or military buffer-zones. The "Great Wall" of China can be seen as 
the physical manifestation of this sentiment - the so-called "Middle Kingdom"(5). 
Second, the proudly nationalistic Koreans resisted the prospect of Chinese conquest 
and their consequent assimilation Into the Chinese cultural and political system. At the 
same time, the Korean sense of national identity and independence led to strained 
relations between the two countries. The Koreans have made a determined. though 
sometimes tortuous, effort to pursue their own distinctive self-consciousness amidst the 
subtle. but at times forceful pressure for Integration or assimilation into the dominant 
Han Chinese culture. 7bis effort has been further complicated by a combination of 
other factors, notably by the historical circumstances surrounding specific acts of 
Korean resistance, by the changing relations between China and Korea and above all by 
China's fluctuating domestic politics. While China was politically divided and plunged 
into internal conflict, with dynasties rising and falling In rapid succession, Korea. faced 
with the Chinese threat to Its national identity. retained a strong sense of unity and 
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adopted a policy of military expansionism towards China. 7be superior-inferior power 
view of the Chinese-Korean relationship is therefore less than entirely accurate. 
Despite, during the long period of her history, Korea was frequently invaded by, or 
under the domination of China. Korea Is now proud of its rich cultural legacy which is 
often uniquely Korean. The Korean people maintained a remarkable homogeneity as 
well as their national characteristics and independence. - 
Throughout her history China has been primarily concerned with the security of 
her northeastern borders, which she repeatedly defended against barbarian Incursions. 
She was reluctant to be drawn Into any fighting against Korea along these borders. To 
understand the complexity of the relationship between China and Korea it is necessary 
to consider China's two-layered territorial concept as some sort of basic Chinese 
foreign-policy orientation towards Korea. Owen Lattimore in his influential book, III= 
Asian Frontiers of China. argued that this was represented by the "Great Wall" which 
stood as a demarcation between China and Korea and reflected a pattern of ritual 
relations in which Korea accepted a sort of Chinese suzerainty: the inner, region 
included areas such as mainland China, Inner Mongolia. and Tibet which were under 
the direct rule of China, while the outer territory Included Its neighbouilng countries 
such as Korea, Annam. Manchuria. Outer Mongolia. and the countries in the Himalayas 
including Nepal(6). Furthermore, the Chinese had a very highly developed sense of their 
own identity as a distinct ethnic group. the "Han". which led them to view the Korean- 
Chao: dan race as barbarians(7). This xenophobia Is reflected in the Chinese name for 
Korea--dong-L "eastern barbarians". which. when written in Chinese characters. can be 
translated by the derogatory term "radical dog". 
Although China limited her territory to the inside of the Wall. Korea was not 
content to accept the position of junior partner in a tributary relationship. For example, 
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during a period of instability in the Han dynasty. Koguryo expanded its ten1tory by 
annexing the Chinese Commanderies. one by one. finally taking Lo-lang. Koguryo also 
attacked Liaodong. emerging as one of the strongest kingdoms in the region, extending 
Its western border to Manchuria. During the rule of two Koguryo kings, Kwangaeto and 
Changsu. the Koguryo territory expanded to reach the Liao River area. It was for that 
reason that two subsequent Chinese dynasties attempted offensive expeditions against 
Koguryo. In A. D. 644, after the Sui dynasty was overthrown, the Tang rulers Tal-tsung 
and Kao-tsung made numerous offensive military expeditions against Koguryo. The 
battles resulting such as that Ansi-song fortress. became sources of national pride in 
Korean history. Moreover some of the Koguryo generals, for example UlchiMun-Dok and 
Yon Kae-so-mun, were described by the Chinese as being the most Invincible generals 
in history. Clearly China viewed Koguryo as a potent rival for the control of 
Manchuria(8). 
Finding it Impossible to destroy Koguryo's power on her northern border by direct 
attack, China formed an alliance with the Silla kingdom, who cooperated with the 
highly civillsed Tang dynasty to avoid attack by the Korguyo and Paekche. 
Subsequently, Korea lost the opportunity to maintain her traditional privilege in 
Manchuria. which had been colonised by the Koguryo. 7his motivated the Koreans to 
free Manchuria from Chinese influence. For example. in A. D. 943 the King of Koryo, 
Wangkon, the founder of Koryo dynasty, decided to recapture the northern Korean 
peninsula for his successor. which was often referred to as "Bukjin Chung-chaelr 
(March North Policyl. 7bis was a source of national pride as part of Korea's historical 
struggle against an arrogant China(9). After two "Utary expeditions to Manchuria 
during the Koryo in the 10th century and Yi dynasty in the 14th century. Korean 
persistence was rewarded when General Choi Young took advantage of the weakness of 
the disintegrating Ming dynasty to restore Manchuria to Korea. ý It was these 
14 
. expeditions' that made It necessary for China to deploy large numbers of troops along 
the "Great Wall" to defend her territory. and which enabled Korea to recover her lost 
territorA 10). 
Considering the problems of compromise between China and Korea that created 
by culturally-rooted Chinese desire to distinguish the civilised from the barbarous. and 
to exclude the latter, and therefore constitutes for them a concrete expression of 
Chiras controvertial foreign policy. a climate of rtvalry developed between China and 
Korea over the possession of Manchuria. which became known as the "Palestine of East 
Asia. " created some of scholars appear to dissent from the present demarcation line 
between China and Korea. In recent scholarly arguments, put forward by Yoon Rae- 
hyeun and Kim Sung-hun, It was pointed out that the line of the Yalu River has not 
always marked the border between China and Korea. They insisted that the castle of 
"Pyongyang" was not the location of the capital of N. Korea but that the capital was 
located somewhere In the vicinity of "Liao River"(1 1). Evidence supporting these 
arguments has recently surfaced through two general references describing the 
demographic distribution of the Chinese and Koreans in Northeast Asia. in which the 
Han-Chinese were placed as residing near the inner area of the Wall near the Huanghe 
and ChangjIang Rivers, while the barbarian-Chaoxian race lived In the northeast areas 
of Jilin. Heilongjiang and LAaoning(12). 
By the late Imperial China period the geographical proximity of Korea to China as 
a land bridge between continental and ocean made Korea's relationship to China more 
complex. Korean peninsula possessed great strategic geopolitical signIfIcance. China 
viewed Korea as essential to her national security because of its geopolitical location. 
Korea Is a peninsula with an area of 85.286 square miles. some 600 miles long and 150 
miles wide. Its boundary with Manchuria along the Yalu and Tumen Rivers in the North 
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East measures approximately 850 miles. Some 75 miles south of the Russian naval port 
of Vladivostok, Korea forms a border with Russia (one of China! s most recent rtvals) for 
a distance of about 11 miles. Japan, which was one of China's closest competitors for 
the Korean peninsula. is separated from the Southern areas only by the Sea of Japan 
[the Eastern Sea]. 
The rivalry between the two major powers of China and Japan often erupted into 
conflict threatening both China! s physical security and her traditional supremacy over 
Korea. Twice during the period of the Korean Yi dynasty, Japan invaded Korea as a 
prelude to the invasion of China. China reacted Immediately by dispatching troops to 
aid Korea. In 1894-95 China fought Japan when the Japanese attempted to take 
control of the Korean peninsula. 7bus. as long as the Chinese needed to keep Korea 
within the sphere of Chinese influence. and to neutralise and contain other powers' 
interests In the area. China! s policy towards Korea can be summarised by the words of 
a well-known Chinese politician. Lee Hong Zhang: "Korea was the wall protecting 
China's three eastern provinces. " Korea! s geopolitical value to China was expressed in 
Chinese as the "lips (Korea) protecting the teeth (China)"(13). 
7be struggle with Western imperialism ultimately persuaded China to relinquish 
its superior position in relations with Korea. forging a new basis for a SLno-Korean bond 
in the struggle against hegemony war on the Korean peninsula. 7bus It was that China 
officially declared that "Korea, though a dependent of China. is completely autonomous 
in'her policies, religion. prohibition. and laws. China has never interfered [with] it"(14). 
This Indicates that the Chinese leaders were trying to use diplomatic means to 
consolidate their national security In this historic declaration regarding Korea's 
independence. While China failed to maintain Its high profile relationship with Korea. 
the threat from Western imperialism and colonialism provided the main Chinese 
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motivation for influencing Korea to remain on friendly terms with China. and to 
maintain her role as a buffer state., 
in the closing years of the nineteenth century China lost her superiority over the 
Korean peninsula and the traditional Confucian patron-client relationship between the 
two countries came to an end. Relations between China and Korea became more 
complex and multilateral. The fact that Western Imperialism. and also China herself. 
were competing for influence in the Korean peninsula enabled Korea to play one off 
against the other as a means of maintaining her security. In the late nineteenth 
century, when various factions in the Y1 dynasty wanted closer ties with Western 
Imperialist powers In order to strengthen the nation. China was reluctant to share Its 
privileges in Korea with Western imperWists(i 5). 
Conversely. the Chinese have also Invoked the memory of their past geopolitical 
intercourse with Korea whenever bilateral relations between China and Korea were 
threatened by the West When World War 11 plunged both countries into conflict with 
Japan and the West, Korea and China shared a common experience of Japanese 
colonialism. Ibis shared experience meant that closer links were forged between Korea 
and China. particularly with the two Chinese factions who were most vocal in their 
protests against the Japanese. Such Sino-Korean convergence animated China's 
struggle against Japan. and resulted In a greater degree of mutual understanding and 
friendship between the Chinese and Koreans. in contrast to the Japanese, under whose 
colonial rule Korea had been since 1910, both the Chinese Nationalist government. the 
Kuomintang (Hereafter KMTj, and the Chinese Conununist Party (Hereafter CCP) 
appeared ready to allow Korea to maintain its individuality and to share a partnership 
of equality with them. 
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After the failure of the 1919 Independence Movement against Japanese rule in 
Korea many nationalists fled to Manchuria. There they established a number of Korean 
military units In order to conduct small-scale attacks against the Japanese army and 
police. and also to carry armed resistance across the Tumen and Yalu rivers into Korea 
proper. When the Japanese government adopted a 15-year plan to transfer 300.000 
Korean rural households to Manchuria In the early 1930's, a large number of Korean 
peasants. the so-called "Chosen minority, " went to Manchuria to avoid economic 
hardship at home and seeking new opportunities on the bustling Manchurian frontier 
which was seen as a land of opportunity, where Koreans enjoyed a privileged position 
over the native Chinese(16). The KMT. and the CCP both rendered assistance to the 
exiled "Provisional Government of the Republic of Great Korea (Hereafter KPG)". They 
also helped the troops of the "Korean Liberation Army in ChirW In their struggle against 
Japan In Manchuria, which became a logistical link in the Japanese invasion of China 
in the 1930's(17). It was. however. to the CCP that the Koreans gmvitated In their 
struggle against the Japanese, and Korea became involved with the Far Eastern Bureau 
of the Comintern in Shanghai. The CCP trained Korean Communists and sent them 
back to Korea. Several cells of Korean communists left Korea for China, mainly"to 
Manchuria. because of Japanese surveillance In Korea. Those who returned to their 
resistance movements formed a united front against Japanese colonialism. For 
instance. several thousand young Koreans joined the Northeast Anti-Japanese United 
Army (Hereafter NEAJUA) (Dongbet kangri Itaryun in Chinese) organised by the CCP In 
1935(18). According to Edgar Snow's Interview with Mao Zedong. Mao clearly excluded 
Korea from China's lost territories and expressed an Interest In Korean independence as 
follows: 
"It is the immediate task of China to regain all our lost territories, not 
merely to defend our sovereignty south of the Great Wall. 7bis means that 
Manchuria must be regained. We do not. however, include Korea, formerly a 
Chinese colony, but when we have re-established the independence of the lost 
is 
territories of China. and if Koreans wish to break away from the chains of 
Japanese imperialism. we will extend them our enthusiastic ý help in their 
struggle for independence"(19). 
The question of Korea was largely ignored at the meeting of the allies In Cairo. on 
December 1.1943. but China forced the US and the USSR to agree that "in due course 
Korea shall become free and Independent! '(20). 7be phrase "in due course" was 
presumed by China to mean, "when Korea is liberated from Japan". so that Korea would 
once again act as a buffer zone for China. which China regarded as essential to her 
national security; but China wanted no foreign influences involved. Suffice it to say that 
China's basic objective was to prevent the Internationallsation of the Korean conflict. as 
had happened before in 1894-95 and 1904-05(2 1). 
1.2 China and the Korean War 
Despite the early expectations, the defeat of Japanese militarism did not place 
China In a favourable position with regard to the Korean peninsula. The power vacuum 
in the Korean peninsula was filled instead by America and Russia, who were 
responsible for accepting the Japanese terms of surrender which called for a temporary 
demarcation of Korea at the 38th parallel. The Soviet occupation of the North resulted 
in a neater. more coherent system to Chinese eyes than that which was developed 
under American aegis in the South. In practice. Communist China was Initially more 
preoccupied with the struggle for Taiwan than with building up relations with Korea. 
'Me relationship with Korea appears to have mainly revolved around the expression of 
ideological sympathy, which can be frequently found between Communist regimes. 
7be reason why the Chinese Communist leaders did in fact come to favour the 
north of the Korean peninsula over the southern part was the closeness between the 
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Yanan faction of N. Korea and factions In Manchuria and other parts of China. In the 
early postwar period, Indigenous Communists vied in Manchuria with ChIna7s Koreans 
who had long been allies of the Yanan Chinese. Several Koreans who joined the CCP- 
sponsored North China Korean Volunteer Army and participated in the NEAJUA and 
the Long March returned to N. Korea and obtained -high military or administrative 
positions. After World War 11. the China-Korea border was closed what was perhaps 
intended as a temporary exclusion became a permanent ideological divide. Many 
Koreans In China were in a state of confusion. and a large majority decided to remain in 
Manchuria for a variety of reasons(22). 7be CCP manoeuvred to expand its sphere of 
influence amongst the Koreans separated from their families In Korea. in particular to 
those whose family ties were with the north of the Korean peninsula. In contrast. China 
viewed S. Korea, which was under American military rule. as being in a colonial or serni- 
colonial stage. needing to struggle against US and Japanese imperialism. Instead the 
US Military Government in S-Korea thwarted several attempts at the setting up of a 
S. Korean government. i. e.. the People's Republic of S. Korea. the S. Korean Interim 
Government and the S. Korean Interim Legislative Assembly. 7be US insisted that. 
although the eventual goal was integration into the free world, Korea was not yet ready 
to enjoy that freedom and independence. and needed to be under the tutelage of the 
Allied Powers for a considerable time in order to establish democratic political 
institutions(23). 
The nation was in turmoil: suddenly free from the tight control of the Japanese 
colonialists, but without a clear direction and badly split between two domestic forces. 
7bis was before the Korean War, which Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings describe as 
essentially a phase--marked by massive outside Intervention--in a civil war fought 
between a revolutionary nationalist movement, which had its mots in a tough anti. 
colonial struggle. and a conservative movement tied to the status quo, in particular to 
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an "unequal land system": this conservative force having been restored to power under 
the US occupation(24). 'After widespread disappointment and anger over land reforms 
there was a wave of strikes and demonstrations all over S. Korea In September and 
October 1946. The people'in favour of Communist reforms were opposed to the US 
military government. and demanded reforms in the political, economic and social 
systems. There was also the Yosu rebellion of October 1948. which was inspired by left- 
wing actMsts. resulting In the annihilation of a large number of villages. 
When the Republic of Korea (Hereafter ROK) was established in Aprfl 1949 in the 
southern half of the Korean peninsula, Chinese communist leaders asserted that there 
was a need to intensify the guerIlla campaigns In S. Korea because they believed the 
ROK was an American puppet government. although its objective was in fact the 
establishment of an independent state. Such campaigns. it was stated by the Chinese 
media. should come from an indigenous liberation movement and be based on the 
Chinese People's Committees. In referring to this. one Chinese official asserted that: "... 
S. Korea. etc. had a great people's struggle within them. correctly and justly striving for 
Liberation"(25). In effect, China's attitude towards S. Korea was dominated, ideologically. 
by Proletarian Internationalism. On November 14.1949. RMRB argued that "... The 
Korean people wanted independence and unity/liberty from the United States yoke"(26). 
Later. Liu Shao-chl's 1949 address in Peking to the Trade Union Conference of Asian 
and Austronesian Countries affirmed that: 
'"Ibe movement of the Korean people against Syngman Rhee. puppet of 
American imperialism, and the establishment of a unilled people's democratic 
Republic of Korea cannot be haltcd"(27). 
It was in fact the KNIT. rather than Communist China. which moved most 
positively towards improving their relations with S. Korea. 'Ibe KNIT established a 
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consulate in Seoul in 1947 and. after officially recognising the Korean government on 
January 4.1949. opened an Embassy and appointed Shao Yu-11n as the first 
ambassador to Seoul in the same year. Soon after, President Chiang Kai-shek visited 
Chinhae. the S. Korean Naval Base. for talks with President Syngman Rhee on 6 August 
1949; the need for friendly ties between the two countries was stressed. and both 
countries pledged to maintain a united anti-communist front(28). After the Communist 
conquest of the Chinese mainland and the establishment of the People's Republic of 
China (Hereafter PRC) In October 1949, the S. Korean government, refused to recognise 
the cidstence of the PRC. 
77he Korean War was critical In contributing to hardening of the relationship 
between China and S. Korea. At the start of the Korean War in 1950. the traditionalists 
argued that the PRC was largely responsible for the start of the conflict. 7bey believed 
that the Chinese transferred 12,000 Korean troops. who had taken part In the People's 
Liberation Army (Hereafter PLA) 164th Army, back to N. Korea. This. they believed. was 
a result of Mao's mysterlous visit to Moscow to negotiate the Sino-Soviet treaty in 
February 1950. However. it Is hard to believe that China was behind N. Korea's plan to 
invade the South as, prior to the early 1950's. China and N. Korea failed to exchange 
ambassadors, or negotiate formal and public treaties, nor had any of the usual 
channels of diplomatic communications been established. Up until 1953, there had 
been no economic or cultural agreement between China and N. Korea(29). Neither does 
it appear that Peking provided Pyongyang with military assistance. It is likely that 
Chinaýs economic problems and military diflIculties precluded any support for N. Korea 
except on an ideological basis. and China viewed the relationship of N. Korea to S. Korea 
in the same way as she viewed her own relationship with Talwan(30). Although it 
appears that China! s multiple weaknesses limited her support for N. Korea. so that the 
Chinese Communists did not directly encourage Kim 11-sung to attack S. Korea. the 
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Chinese attitude towards the Korean War was nevertheless rooted in their traditional 
obsession with "barbarians". I 
It was clear to China that the Korean War was caused by a "Chiang-Rhee 
conspiracy" which promoted an antl-communist league in the Pacific with the aim of 
forming a regional defence body of anti-communist nations modelled on the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Hereafter NATO). China claimed that "the attack by the 
puppet Korean government of Syng-man Rhee. on the Korean Democratic People's 
Republic (Hereafter DPRIQ, at the instigation of the US government, was a premeditated 
move by America to Invade Taiwan. Vietnam and the Philippines"(31). Despite the 
weakness of S. Koreaýs armed forces compared to the armed forces of the North, 
S. Korean President Rhee called for a "March North" on 12 October 1949. and S. Korea 
allied herself with Taiwan(32). Furthermore. Nationalist China. in addition to 
conducting a military operation against the mainland, offered to send more than 30,000 
troops to S. Korea In order to encourage American economic and military support by 
exaggerating or distorting the "relations of military co-operatiorV between China and 
N. Korea(33). 
ChIna! s main concerns in the Korean War were deterrence. and the defence of 
China from a US threat as American troops approached the Chinese border. The Korean 
War was to be a test as to whether the newly established PRC was to be regarded as a 
power capable of bargaining for her rights and of retaining her integrity. in fact. the US 
Ignored repeated private and public warnings that China would not sit idly by if US 
forces crossed the 3M Parallel. Intervention by the PRC In the Korean War might have 
been motivated. In part. by a real fear that the security of their new regime would be 
endangered. and that there would be a serious threat to Manchuria(34). 
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By the end of August. Shijie zhi-shi [World Knowledge] offered convincing 
evidence of Peking's growing interest In the Korean War. expressing its concern about 
the US military action as follows: 
The barbarous action of American Imperialism and its hangers-on in 
invading Korea not only menaces peace in Asia and the world in general but 
seriously threatens the security of China in particular.... It is impossible to solve 
the Korean problem without the participation of its closest neighbour, China.... 
North Korea! s friends are our friends. North Korea's enemy Is our enemy. North 
Korea's defence is our defence. North Korea's victory is our victory(35). 
Manchuria revealed her own concern and this heightened Peking's concem(36). 
American occupation forces in N. Korea represented a threat to Manchuria, the most 
valuable industrial province in China. 7be Yalu hydroelectric dams supplied electricity 
for Manchuria's industrial programme and the PRC regarded this area as one of their 
pilot zones, in which sweeping industrial change would take place. China's concern was 
most clearly expressed by Zhou Enlal In his report to the Standing Committee of the 
Political Consultative Congress. deltvered on October, 24.1950. dealing with the 
implications of the Korean War for China's security interests. In Zhou's view the 
struggle in Korea was inextricably linked to security* 
".... If Korea suffered defeat. our Northeast wjU accordingly be in jeopardy. 
If American Imperialism extends Its aggression to the Yalu. how can we carry out 
our production tasks? (37)" 
Finally. when the American government brought their troops to the doorstep of 
Manchuria on 15 October 1950, the entry of the Chinese People's volunteers (Hereafter 
CPV) Into the Korean War clearly indicated China's commitment to keepW Invaders at 
bay. The following slogan was taken up: "resisting America, aiding Korea[North), and 
defending our fatherland"(38). China possibly thought that d1spatchW troops to Korea 
with the aim of uniting Korea would relieve her own weak position and she would then 
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be in an offensive position rather than a defensive one vLs-a-vis the US. China would 
then have regained her traditional influence in Korea(39). 'It was the first time that 
Chinese forces' crossed the border to engage in combat with the armed - forces'of a 
Westem super-powir. 
7be Americans. - however, were anxious to avoid an escalation of war into a global 
conflict. and Chinese fear's concerning America's intention to extend the war into 
Manchuria were allayed. 7berefore, what John Gittings had termed Mao's 'Xorea 
gamble" paid off. the War was contained within the peninsula, the N. Korean regime was 
saved. and the nightmare of a menacing American military presence on the Yalu 
receded(40). The Chinese Insisted that the status quo should be maintained. and that 
Korea should be reinstated as a buffer zone between China and the US. In this vein. 
when the Soviet Ambassador to the UN made proposals for a cease-flre. RMRB declared 
two days later that the Chinese people fully endorsed the Soviet suggestion for a 
peaceful settlement of the Korean question(41). According to Hao Yufan and Zhai 
Zhihal. the Korean War was not welcomed by the PRC. and China! s decision to be 
involved In the Korean War was made in a risky and uncertain situation with a'very 
complicated historical background(42). 
China's objective In intervening in the War was to retain Korea as a buffer zone 
between China and foreign Invaders. Following the signing of the armistice, as Mao 
reviewed the history of the War. he was still concerned about the US military threat and 
with what had been accomplished: 
For us the present situation is different from that In the winter of 1950. 
Were the US aggressors then on the other side of the 38th Parallel? No. They 
were not. They were on the other side of the Yalu and Tumen Rivers. Did we 
have any experience in fighting the US aggressors? No. we did not. Did we then 
know much about the US troops? No. we did not. Now. all this has changed(43). 
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On the other hand, S. Korea's anti-communist movement had failed to achieve its 
objective of the reunifcation of the peninsula; the failure was seen to be the result of 
masstve Chinese intervention. President Rhee saw the war as an opportunity to reunif y 
Korea on his terms and. therefore, he adopted anti-Chinese policies. Moreover. although 
the S. Korean Government abided by the terms of the armistice agreement. no 
representative of the S. Korean Government had signed the agreement. 7bis has been 
described as S. Korea! s greatest mistake. as an opportunity to hold face-to-face talks 
with the PRC was missed. I- 
1.3 The Ideological Struggle after the Korean War 
7be outbreak of the Korean War and the subsequent entry of the CPV heralded a 
considerable intensification of the ideological struggle in relations between China 
and S. Korea. Moreover. the Cold War in Northeast Asia represented a further source of 
conflict between China and S. Korea. The Korean War taught both China and S. Korea 
two lessons; the dangers of obsession with antagonistic ideologies, and the necessity of 
standing by their allies. 7bese lessons subsequently dominated their relations with each 
other, influencing China to formallse its alliance with N. Korea in 1961. likewise S. Korea 
with the United States in 1953(44). 
The Korean War brought China and S. Korea into the Cold War and to the 
forefront of the East-West confrontation. One of the key factors in the situation between 
China and S. Korea was the question of ideology pertaining to national security. rather 
than simply the perception of national interest. It dominated both ChIna! s and S. Korea's 
foreign policy. For instance, China! s attitude to the question of ideology is what J. D. 
Armstrong called the "adaptation of Ideology. " i. e., her ideology was moulded to help her 
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survive in a highly competitive international system(45). At the same time. S. Korea's 
foreign policy was coloured by a monolithic anti-communist policy, referred to as the 
"ideological crusade" and conducted on her behalf by the US. Thus, S. Korea displayed a 
strong ideological commitment to anti-communisin and one scholar referred to her as "a 
child of the Cold War"(46). 
7be Geneva Conference on Korean Unification. from Aprll 26 to June 15 1954, did 
not produce any agreement. largely because the contending sides, China and S. Korea, 
had different views about the role of the UN in the, political settlement of the dispute. 
The S. Koreans, backed by the US. insisted on using the international organisatIon to 
supervise the post-war election In Korea. To the Chinese. however. the UN was not an 
Imparti, al force because it had been used by the US to condemn China as an "aggressor" 
in Korea. China rejected UN authority over collective security In Korea. stressing the 
international role of neutral countries(47). 
After the Korean session of the Conference failed due to these differences. 
President Rhee was instrumental In starting "the Asian PacifIc Anti-Communist League" 
(Hereafter APACL)(48). The proposal for the formation of this organisation was first 
mentioned in a joint statement issued by President Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek in 
Taiwan on November 27,1953. They propagated the idea of a "militaq alliance" 
between the USSR. the PRC and N. Korea In order to give their ideas a logical basis(49). ' 
China tried to manipulate the Geneva Conference to its advantage, putting 
Increasing stress on the doctrIne of "peaceful Cowdstence". and attempting to Improve 
China's international standing by diplomatic means. It provided China with a good 
opportunity to enhance its International prestige and Increase its influence in Asia by 
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playing the role of peacemaker, and this led to China playing a major role in the 
region(50). 
After Geneva China was eager to block all of S. Korea! s efforts to unify the country 
through free elections. Furthermore, Peking repeatedly tried to exert pressure on the US 
and other countries which fought under the UN's mandate in defence of S. Korea, to 
withdraw their troops as well as their political and econornic support for S. Korea(51). 
Chinese leaders. then. concentrated their efforts on increasing their influence in 
N. Korea. High-ranking leaders of the two countries met frequently for talks and 
exchanges of ideas. and these meetings were given high-profile coverage by Chinese 
media. Mes between China and N. Korea became closer. while. at the same time. as 
much as possible was being done to subvert the South. 7bis was clearly an important 
landmark in establishing hostilities between China and S. Korea(52). 
ChIna! s strong ties with N. Korea led the new S. Korean military government to 
adopt an anti-communist policy as a national priority after the military coup. 7be first 
officW pronouncement by the leaders of the mihtaxyjunta. known as "Six Revolutionary 
Pledges". contained strong anti-communist policies(53). 
The antagonism between China and S. Korea escalated and their relationship 
deteriorated. The result of certain incidents was that opportunities for conununication 
were missed. For irýstance. when two Chinese pilots of a AN-21 plane landed in S. Korea 
in 1961 with the aim of defecting to Taiwan, Seoul talked to Taipei and Inunediately 
sent the crew and the plane to Taiwan. This was used to encourage the anti-communist 
propaganda campaign(54). 
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Moreover, differences between China and the USSR over'N. Korea grew wider in 
the wake of the Sino-Soviet dispute from the mid 1950's to the late 1960's. This led 
China to foster closer links with N. Korea such as signing a treaty of "Friendship, 
Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance" on July 11.196 1. While Peking did not specify the 
conditions of its treaty with Pyongyang. . as compared with Soviet-N. Korean treaty of 
alliance on July 6.1961. it was clear that China had a much stronger desire to 
maintain its ties with N. Korea than had the USSR. and the treaty between Moscow and 
N. Korea was less speciflc(55). As a result. China recognised N. Korea as being unique in 
the communist world in that Pyongyang was a party in two'treaties. 'one with Peking 
and the other with Moscow. which are still in effect(56). 
Two of China's foreign policies in the 1960's played a key role in determining the 
S. Korean government's anti-communist/anti-Chinese policies: 1) the Chinese role in the 
Vietnam war, which was based on the Maoist Revolutionary Model, and influenced by 
disagreements between Moscow and Peking about "united actiore in Vietnam: 2) 
China's continued support of the North's aim to reunify the peninsula by any means. 
These policies contributed to S. Korea's hostility towards China. and led the former to 
develop closer bonds with Taiwan than before. 
President Park has always defended his decision to send S. Korean troops to South 
Vietnarn. which he claimed was indirectly relevant to national security. He said:, 
"It is Communist China which supports and incites the North 
Vietnamese guerrillas behind the scenes. We all wen know that it was also 
Conununist China that supported and incited the North Korean Communists. 
Communist China Is playing with f1re in South Vietnam. just as she did in Korea 
15 years ago"(57). 
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Ha-young Kim quoted President Park as saying that "he was preoccupied by the 
recun-ing memory of Chinese intervention in the Korean War in 1950"(58). As long as 
S. Korea justified Its military activities In terms of a moral obligation to the free world's 
collective security. then a negative image of China was not only an ideological necessity 
but also a weapon that could be used to demonstrate how dangerous communism in 
China was. 
7berefore. when China carried out her first nuclear test in October 1964. 
emerging as a nuclear power in Asia. the S. Korean government came under the 
psychological pressure of a nuclear threat from China. In 1965 and 1966 nuclear tests 
in China employed air delivery systems, and In consequence most of S. Korea! s 
territories were affected by nuclear fall-out from the tests in radioactive rain covering 
the Korean peninsula(59). President Park. who was seriously concerned about the 
threat from the PRC. stated: 
"Due to the nuclear capability of Red China, the entire Asian region is 
subject to the growing communist threats. ... Sorne Communist elements in 
Asia ... may attempt infiltration to spread the influence of the Communism. As a 
nation which is near Communist China, the ROK should work out a fleldble 
policy to cope with any possible new trends which may influence her 
security"(60). 
At the same time. President Park gradually strengthened S. Koreaýs ties with 
Taiwan under the auspices of defending the security of Asian countries against China. 
After his state visit to Taiwan In February 1966, President Park took the initiative In 
sponsoring the "First Ministerial Meeting for the Asian and Pacific Council (Hereafter 
ASPAC). " S. Korea considered ASPAC to be a likely foundation on which to build a 
regional collective defence system against the PRC. Therefore. ASPAC decided to found 
an organisation called "the Cultural and Social Centre" and "the World Anti-Communist 
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League" (Hcraftcr WACL), the aim of which was to spread S. Korcan Influence over the 
Asian-Pacific(61). 
Additionally. when the PRC provided assistance for N. Korea's guerrilla campaigns 
against S. Korea. Seoul stepped up its anti-communist/anti-Chinese campaign. In 1965 
there were 88 Intensive guerilla activities from the North; and the number of violent 
incidents rose. from 784 In 1967 to 985 in 1968(62). During the 1960's Pyongyang sent 
large numbers of guerillas and commandos. either by land or by sea, across the 
Demilitarised Zone (Hereafter DMZ) to S. Korea. And, in 1968. a commando group 
consisting of 31 men was deployed to assassinate President Park. S. Korea claimed that 
Peking provided N. Korea with the means to infiltrate S. Korea's western coastline. using 
their espionage agents from Haeju. Furthermore. they insisted. most of the weapons 
that N. Korea! s guerillas carried were produced by the Chinese(63). 
S. KoreXs anU-Communist/anti-Chinese policy and Chinese support of N. Korea's 
hard-line policy led S. Korea to adopt the so-called "Hallstein Doctrine". which meant 
that S. Korea would automatically break off diplomatic relations with any nation that 
established formal diplomatic ties with the North. 7bus, S. Korea broke off diplomatic 
relations with Mauritania in 1964, and with the Congo in May 1965(64). 
At the same time. being preoccupied with Sino-N. Korean cooperation against her, 
S. Korea strengthened her military capability in the content of her partnership with the 
US. S. Korea spent a large proportion of her budget. as well as a large percentage of 
foreign aid from the US. In modernising her armed forces. President Park pointed out 
that "Nations who have a strategic interest in this part of the world, should have some 
role in its security"(65). For example. expenditure on the military accounted for about 
29% of total government expenditure from 1960 to 1968(66). Hawk 1, a mobile, surface- 
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to-air missile system. and Nike-Hercules. a mobile or fIxed-site. surface-to-air or 
surface-to-surface guided missile system with nuclear warhead capability. had been 
programmed for Fiscal Year 1963, and achieved operational status in 1965 and July 
1966 respectively(67). Strikingly. Seoul decided to accept the introduction of the US's 
tactical nuclear weapons. According to 7be Economist, - President Park offered the US 
Cheju island. 50 miles off the south-western coast as a military base. if Washington 
decided to withdraw its nuclear weapons from Okinawa in the wake of America's 
concern about Sino-Soviet nuclear confrontation(68). 
S. Korea's military power, combined with the US presence. was recognised by the 
Chinese not only as a threat to China but also as a strong regional military power to be 
reckoned with In Northeast Asia. According to the London-based International InstItute 
for Strategic Studies (Hereafter IISS). S. Korea's formidable armed forces--600,000 
strong in a nation of only twenty-two million in the late 1960's--posed a threat to other 
countries, apart from N. Korea(69). 
1.4 Conclusions 
Despite growing contact between China and Korea and Korea! s adopUon and 
absorption of Chinese cultural and economic concepts. historically. the relationship 
between the two countries has almost always been one of conflict rather than 
cooperation. 7bis is due not only to rivalry over Manchuria but also to China's poorly 
developed territorial concepts. Bilateral relations between China and Korea have been 
story of mutual distrust and animosity. 
Furthermore the involvement of the major powers on the Korean peninsula. due 
to Korea's geopolitical position. posed a threat to China. further complicating the 
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relationship between the two countries. China regarded Korea as a buffer zone essential 
to Chinese national security, as was evident during the Korean War. China! s decision to 
intervene in the Korean War was determined by a blend of geopolitical and ideological 
considerations. the Chinese leaders perceiving Korea as one of their three most 
vulnerable fronts (the others being Indo-China and Taiwan). 
7be outcome of the Korean War deepened and institutionallsed the confmntaUon 
between China and S. Korea; a deep-rooted suspicion and n-Astrust giving rise to a 
hostile atmosphere between the two countries. Suffice. it to say that the legacy of the 
Korean War and the ensuing Cold War exercised a deeply destructive influence upon 
the relationship between China and S. Korea. 
33 
Notes 
(1) Lien-sheng Yang. "Historical Notes on the Chinese World Order, " In John King 
Fairbank. ed., 77ie Chbiese World Order (Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard University 
Press), p. 27. 
(2) Frederick M. Nelson. Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia (Baton Rouge. 
Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1946). Frederick Foo Chien, 77ie 
opening of Korea (Hamden. Conn.: Shoe String Press, 1967); Hae-Jong Chun 
'Sino-Korean Tributary Relations in the Ching period!. in John King FaIrbank. ed.. 
77ie Chinese World Order. pp. 90-111. Gerald Segal described it as one of the most 
enduring of patron-client relations in the Chinese sphere of influence. Gerald 
Segal, Rethinking the Pac& (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1990). p. 118. 
(3) Andrew C. Naham, Korea: Tradition & Transfomiation (Seoul: Hollym. 1988). p. 35 
(4) Ibid. 
(5) Owen Lattimore, *Origins of the Great Wall of China: A Frontier Concept in Theory 
and Practice. ' In Studies in Prontter History: Collected Papers 1928-1958 (London: 
Oxford University Press. 1962). pp. 112 and 198; Gari Ledyard. -Yin and Yang in 
the China-Manchuria-Korea Tilangle. ' in Morris Rossabl, ed., China Among 
Equals (Berkeley. University of California Press. 1983). pp. 313-353. For the role 
of history In studies defending China. see Chapter 2. In Gerald Segal. Defending 
China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985). 
(6) Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China (London: Oxford Untversity Press. 
1940). ch. 2; Arthur Waldron. 71te Great Wall of ChUuL From History to Myth 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). pp. 30-31. 
(7) One of the most succinct descriptions of the origins of the "Harf' can be found in 
Wolfram Eberhard. A History of China, 4th Rev.. ed.. (Berkele5r. University of 
California Press, 1967), pp. 4-12; Lien-sheng Yang. "Historical Notes on the 
Chinese World Order, " in John King Fairbank. ed.. The Chinese World Order 
(Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard Untversity Press). p. 27. 
(8) Gregory Henderson. Korea the Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard 
University Press. 1968). pp. 13-18. 
(9) Han Woo-Keun, '17w History of Korea (Seoul: Eul-Yoo Publishing Company. 1971). 
p. 125. 
(10) Grover Clark, Vie Great Wall Crumbles (New York: The Macmillan Company, 
1935): C. P. Fitzgerald, 7he Chinese View of Lheir Place in the World (London: 
Oxford University Press. 1964); Arthur Waldron, Me Great Wait of Chinw 1ý7rorrt 
History to Myth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1990). 
(11) Rae-hyeun Yoon, Hankuk Sha [A History of Korea] (Seoul: Tongnamusa. 1988). p. 
12: 'Jungkukul wonsisidae 17be Origin of Chinese History], ' In Haksulctuilse 
[Academic Studies at Dankuk University], no. 7.1982. pp. 516-, Hankuk Abo, 
February 16.1988. p. 8. 
(12) Beijing Foreign Language College, ed.. Han-yMg ci-dian [A Chinese-Engltsh 
Dtcttonaryl (Beijing. China: Shang-wu yin-shu-guan. 1986); Zheng yunshan and 
Zang welting. ed.. Zhong-wai-shu-diJf-shf-shuo-ztu 17lie Handbook of Geography in 
China andforeign countrtes/ (Shanhal. China: Ren-min-chu-ban-she. 1984). 
(13) Quoted from Donald S. Zagoria. 'rhe Sino-Soviet conflict and the Korean 
peninsula, * In Asiatic Research Centre. ed.. 71riangular Relations of Mainland 
China. Ow SovWt Union and North Korea (Seoul: Korea University, 1977). p. 143. 
(14) Quoted in Frederick Foo Chien. 77ie Opening of Korea, p. 16. According to Chien, 
the origin of this statement by China's Foreign Ofnce (Tsung-11 Yamen) is probably 
to be found in answers the Foreign OMce gave to Minister Williams of the United 
States and Minister Rutherford Alcock of England regarding their request for the 
Foreign Office to ask Korea why the national of their two countries had been 
mistreated. 
34 
(15) Chun-tu Hsueh. 'Korea in China's foreign policy. ' in Chun-tu Hsueh. ed., 
Dimensions of ChUWs Foreign Relations (New York: Praeger. 1977). p. 127. 
(16) Japan adopted this policy for two reasons: 1) to secure Korean manpower for its 
imperialist ambitions In Manchuria and 2) to take over farmland in Korea. See 
Park Yong-sok. HantmirVok torignip undongsa yongu [A Study qf the History of the 
Korean Peoples Independence Movementl (Seoul: 11chogak. 1982). p. 78. For the 
Chosen minority in China. see Chae-Jin Lee. China's Korean Minoruty: The Politics 
ofEdvdc Education (London: Westview Press. 1986). 
(17) Dae-Sook Suh, The Korean Communist Movement. 1918-1948 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press., 1967). pp. 216-220; Robert A. Scalapino and Chong- 
Sik Lee. Communism in Korea (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972). pp. 
235-236, George M. McCune and Arthur L Grey. Korea Today (Cambridge. Mass.: 
Harvard University Press. 1950). pp. I 1- 13. 
(18) For the NEAJUA, see Zhou Erfu, SonghuaJtang shangdefengyun [Events along the 
Sungari River] (Hong Kong: Zhongguo chubanshe. 1947). pp. 29-34: Dae-Sook 
Suh. 7he Korean Communist Movement. 1918-1948. pp. 69-70; Andrew C. Nahm, 
Korea: Transition & Transforniatton (Seoul: Hollym. 1988). pp. 267-28 1. 
(19) Edgar Snow. Red Star Over China, Revised & Enlarged Edition (Middlesex, 
England: Penguin, 1978). pp. 505-506. 
(20) Daine S. Clemens. Yalta (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1970). For a recent 
debate. see Erik Van Ree, Socialism in one ZDne: StaWfs policy in Korea: 1945- 
1947 (Oxford: BERG. 1989). 
(21) Soon Sung Cho, Korea in World Politics, 1940-1950: An Evaluation of American 
Responsibility (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967). 
(22) There are perhaps no ideological reasons why they remained in China. However. 
there are several reasons; those who had their sources of livelihood in China and 
therefore decided to stay in China. those who wished to leave. but could not; and 
those who made no conscious decision. but hesitated to take any action because 
of inertia or misunderstanding; those who were attracted to the CCP's promises to 
redistribute farmland to tillers and to guarantee ethnic equality. See Chae-JLn 
Lee. Chinds Korean MLnoruty: 7he Politics of Ethnic Education. pp. 51-52. 
(23) 7Tte Times. July 27,1949; Hak-Joon Kim. 'ChInXs Non-Involvment In the Origins 
of the Korean Wan A Critical Reassessment of the Traditionalist and Revisionist 
Literature. ' in James Cotton and Ian Neary. The Korean War in History 
(Manchester, England: Manchester University Press. 1989); George M. McCune. 
Korea Today, pp. 4-5. 
(24) Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings. Korea: the Unknown War (Viking: Pantheon. 
1988). 
(25) Quoted from Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: 77te decision to enter the 
Korean War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960). p. 31. Bruce Cumings, 
Child of Conjlict: The Korean-American Relationship. 1943-1953 (Seattle: 
Washington University Press, 1983), p. 39; Bruce Curnings, The Origins of the 
Korean War. Liberation & the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981). p. 287; Robert A. 
Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee. Communism in Korea. pp. 273-288,299-311. For a 
failure of the land reform. see Henderson. Korea: 7he Politics of the Vortex p. 156; 
W. D. Reeve. 7he Republic of Korea. pp. 105-106, Melvin Gurtov and Dyong-Moo 
Hwang. China Under 7hreat., 7he Politics of Struggle and Dolomacy (London: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press. 1980). p. 216: W. D. Reeve, 7he Republic of 
Korea: A Political and Economic Study (London: Oxford University Press, 1963). p. 
32. 
(26) 7he People's Daily (Remin ribao), 14 November. 1949, p. 2. 
(27) For a detailed discussion on this subject. see Kim Chang-sun. Puk-hans47-o-nyon 
sa [Fifteen Year History of North Korea] (Seoul: Chimungak. 196 1), pp. 92 -96. 
35 
(28) Republic of Korea, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Han-guk oe-gyoui i-sirn-nyon 
JTwenty Years of South Korean Diplomacy] (Seoul, Korea: Oemu-bu. Oe-gyo 
Yongu-won (The Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security], 1979). pp. 34- 
35., 
(29) US. Department of State. North Korea: A Case of Study in the Techniques of 
Takeover, Department of State Publication 7119, Far Eastern Series, no. 103 
(Washington. D. C.: US Government Printing Office. 1961). pp. 115-116. 
(30) For traditionalist's view. see Kim Chum Kon. Hankuk Churgeong-sa 17he Korean 
War] (Seoul: Kwangmyong Publishing, 1973). pp. 59-61, David Rees. Korea: 71ýe 
limited War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964); Bruce Curnings, Vie Origins of 
the Korean War and Child of ConjUct; Joseph C. Coulden. Korea: 7he Untold Story 
of the War (New York. N. Y.: Times Books. 1982); James Cotton and Ian Neary. 71w 
Korean War in History. For revisionist's point. see Allen Whiting. China Cross the 
Yalu: Melvin Gurtov and Byoong-Moo Hwang, China Under 77ireat Gerald Segal, 
Defending China; Hak-Joon Kim. 'Chftia! s Non-involvment in the Origin of the 
Korean War. ' In James Cotton and Ian Neary. ed.. 77w Korean War In History. 
(31) Quoted from Kim Chang-soon, Pu-han so-o-nyon sa. p. 58. 
(32) S. Korea! s Defence Minister Sung-Mo Shin stated "If we had our own way. we 
would. 11n sure. have started up already. But we had to wait until they (the 
Americans) are ready. " Furthermore. one of the most anti-communist military 
offlcers asserted that "If we are trying to recapture the North. we will have our 
breakfast in Haeju and have our lunch In Pyongyang. Finally. we will enjoy our 
dinner in Shinuju. " See Dong-a Ilbo. 12 October 1949. p. 2. For a discussion of 
allegations that S. Korea provoked the war by its attack on Haeju (a strategic 
position five kilometres north of the 38th Parallel) on 25 June. 1950, see 
Karunakar Gupta. 'How Did the Korean War Begin? ' 77w China guarterly, 
(Hereafter CQ). no. 52.1972: John Gittings, -Ibe War Before Vietnam, ' Gavan 
McCormack and Mark Selden. ed.. Korea North and South; 7lie Deepening Crisis 
(I., ondon: Monthly Review Press. 1978). p. 63; Robert R. Simmons. 77w Strained 
Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang. Moscow and the Politics of the Korean Civil War (New 
York. Free Press, 1975). pp. 110-115; Bruce Curnings. Child of Corl/lict. p. 28. 
(33) Simon Long. Taiwan: Chinas Last Frontier (London: Macmillan. 1991). p. 115. 
(34) Panikkar had always been pro-Peking and could not be viewed as an impartial 
observer but should rather be considered as a Communist Chinese propagandist. 
see Ok-Joon Kim. 'Jonggong ui Hankukchuryongkae0kaeUungkoa Ybin Pusuk rrhe 
Implications of the Chinese Intervention of the Korean Warl'. (Unpublished, MA 
Diss.. Seoul: Korea University, 1985). p. 67. Margaret Carlyle, ed.. Royal Institute 
of International Affairs (Hereafter RILAJ. Documents on International Affairs, 1949- 
1950, pp. 663-664; K. M. Panikkar. In two Chinas (London: George Allen and 
Unwin. 1955). pp. 108.109-110. 
(35) Shijie zhi-shi tWorld knowledgel. August 26.1950. as cited in Allen S. Whiting. 
China Crosses the Yd4 pp. 84-85. 
(36) Allen S. Whiting. China Crosses the Yalu. pp. 68-71: Gerald Segal. DejendLng 
China, P. 100. 
(37) For the text of Zhou's report. see Zhou Erdai xuaryt [Selected works of Zhou Enlall, 
vol. 2 (Peking: People's Publishing House. 1984). pp. 50-54. 
(38) I. F. Stone. 71te Hidden History of ffie Korean War (New York: Monthly Review 
Press, 1969): -Hwang Byong-Moo. Misperception & 7he Or(gin of the Koreart War 
(Seoul: Kyungnarn University Press, 1986); Richard Vrhelan. Drawing the line: 7he 
Korean War (London: Little, Brown and Company. 1990). 
(39) Gerald Segal. Defending China. p. I 10. 
(40) John Gittings, 77w World and China, 1922-1972 (New York: Harper and Row. 
1974). p. 183. 
(41) 771e People's Daily, (Renmin Ribao), June 2 5.195 1, p. 1. 
36 
(42) Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihal. 'China! s Decision to enter the Korean War. History 
Revisited. ' CQ. no. 12 1. March 1990. p. 114.1 
(43) Mao Tse-tung [Mao Zedong]. 'Our Great Victory in the War to resist u. S. 
Aggression and Aid Korea and Our Future Tasks. ' September 12.1953, in 
Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung. vol. 5 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press. 1977). 
pp. 117-118. 
(44) For a full text of US-ROK mutual defence treaty, October 1.1953 and Chinese- 
N. Korean treaty of alliance. July 11.1961. see Harold C. Hinton, Korea underNew 
leadership: 7? w Mh Republic (New York: Praeger. 1983). 
(45) J. D. Armstrong. Revolutionary Diplomacy: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United 
Front DoctrIne (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1977). pp. 11-12; Jean- 
Luc Domenach. "Ideological Reform. " in Gerald Segal. Chinese Politics and Foreign 
Policy Reform (London: Kegan Paul International for RIIA, 1990). pp. 26-27. 
(46) Charles K. Armstrong. 'South Korea's Northern Policy. ' 77w Pac& Review, vol. 3, 
no. 1.1990, p. 35. 
(47) Ronald C. Keith. Diplomacy of2hou Enlai (London: Macmillan, 1989). p. 6 1. 
(48) Republic of Korea, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Hanguk oegyo ut Lsimnyon rrwenty 
Years of South Korean Diplomacyl. pp. 34-36. 
(49) Dong-a ILbo. 27 November. 1953. p. 1; RIIA. Survey of IntemationaL Affairs. 1953 
(London: Oxford University Press for RIIA. 1954), p. 25; W. D. Reeve. The Republic 
ofKorea: A Political and Economic Study. p. 60. 
(50) Kuo-kang Shao. *Zhou Enlal's Diploamcy and the NeutrallsatIon of Indo-China. 
1954-1955. ' Cg. no. 107, September. 1986. p. 483-504. 
(51) A Doak Barnett. Communist China and Asix Challenge to American Policy (New 
York: Harper & Brothers for the Council on Foreign Relations. 1960). pp. 287- 
290. 
(52) Chin 0. Chung. Pyongyang between Peking and Moscow: North Koreans 
Involvment in the Sino-Sovtet Dispute. 1958-1978 (University. Alabama: The 
University of Alabama Press. 1978). especially. ch I&2. 
(53) When Major-General Park Chung Hee took control in S. Korea on 16 May 196 1. he 
immediately announced his government's antl-Communist position and pro- 
American policy. It promulgated the "Anti-Communist Law. " Han-Kyo Kim. ed.. 
Reunification of Korea: 50 basic Documents (Washington, D. C.: Institute for Asian 
Studies. 1972). p. 49. For the full text of "Six Revolutionary Pledges, " see Dong-a 
Ift. May 17.1961. P. 2; Chung Hee Park. Kukga ut Kik Minkokjoonghung kua 
Kukga Keomseol [Our Nations Path: Ideology of Social Reconstruction] (Seoul. 
Korea: Dong-A Publishing Co.. 1962). p. 164. 
(54) Dong-a Ilbo, August 23,196 1. p. 1: Republic of Korea. Ministry of Affairs, Hanguk 
oegyo ui Lsirnnyon [Twenty Years of South Korean Diplomacy], pp. 40-4 1. 
(55) Harold C. Hinton. Chinese Policy Towards Korea. ' in Young C. Kim. ed.. MoJor 
Powers and Korea (Silver Spring. Maryland: Research Institute on Korean Affairs. 
1973). p. 19; Robert A. Scalapino. 7he Politics of Development: Perspectives on 
Twentieth-Century Asia (London; Harvard University Press. 1989). pp. 54-55. 
(56) James Cotton, 'Sino-Soviet Relations and Korea, ' 7Tte Pac& Review, vol. 1. no. 3. 
1988. p. 296. 
(57) Mq1or Speeches by Korea's Park Chung Hee (Seoul. Korea: Hollyrn Corp.. 1970). p. 
238.1 
(58) Ha-yong Kirn, Churiggongchongchiron lChinese Politics and Foreign Policy] (Seoul: 
Pakyong-sa, 1985). p. 374. 
(59) Harry Gelber. Nuclear Weapons and Chinese policy, P. 36: William Bunge. Nuclear 
War Atlas (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988). p. 40; the editorial Commentary in 
Hankuk Ilbo. 16 November 1966, p. 1. 
(60) "Self-reliant Defense and Economic Construction, " press conference on January 
10.1969, In Major Speeches by Koreans Park Chung Hee, p. 212. 
37 
(61) This meeting: was attended by delegates from nine nations--Australla, Taiwan. 
Japan, S. Korea. Malaysia, New Zealand. the Philippines. Thailand, Vietnam, and 
an observer from Laos. See Tong-Won Lee. *ASPAC. A Dynamic for Regional Co- 
operation. ' Korean Quarterly. Winter. 1968-1969, pp. 359-367. Seung-Hugn Rhee. 
'Achievements of the ASPAC Ministerial Meeting in Seoul: Prospects of the Asian 
and Pacific Community. ' George P. Jan. International Politics of Asia (Belmont. 
Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co.. 1969). pp. 350-362. 
(62) Jong-chun Baek. Probe for Korean Reurty1cation: ConjUct and Security (Seoul: 
Research Centre for Peace and Uniflcatlon of Korea. 1988). p. 182; Rinn-sup 
Shinn. 'Foreign and reunification policies. ' Problems'of Communisrn. January- 
February 1973. pp. 12-61. 
(63) Yongkil Chung. *Puk-hanui Dae-chung-kong mik Sol-yon Oye-kyo. ' (North Korean 
policy towards China and the Soviet Union], An-bo-yon-gu ISecurity study]. 10. 
1978. p. 34. 
(64) Republic of Korea. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Han-guk oe-gyo sam-sib-nyon. 
1948-1978 (Seoul: Oemu-bu Oe-gyo Yon-gu-won. 1979). 
(65) US Congress. House of Representatives, the SubcomnUttee on International 
Organizations, Investigation of Koreans-American Relations, Part 4.95th Congress. 
Ist Sess.. June 22.1977 (Washington. D. C.: US Government Printing Ofrice. 
1977). p. 37; Soon Sung Cho. 'North'and South Korea: Stepped-up aggression 
and the search for new security. ' Asian Survey (Hereafter AS). vol. 9, no. 1. January 
1969. p. 30. 
(66) Republic of Korea. Secretariat. Office of the President. Hanguk Kyongle W Ojewa 
onul (Seoul: Secretariat, Offlce of president, 1975). p. 347; Korean Annual 
(Hereafter KA). 1977 (Seoul: Hapdong News Agency, 1977). p. 110. 
(67) Quoted from US Senate. 'United States Security Agreements and Commitments 
Abroad. ' Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations. 91st Congress 
(Washington, D. C.: US Government Printing Office. 197 1). p. 165 1. 
(68) 77ie Economist July 19,1969. p. 38. 
(69) For details. see International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Military 
Balance. 1966-1967,1969-1970. For the S. Korean point of view, see Hankuk Ilbo, 
April 14,1969, p. 1. 
38 
During this period the dogmatism which had heretofore characterised 
relations between China and S. Korea was abandoned in favour of a pragmatic 
approach more in line with actual national Interests. A number of factors need to be 
considered In order to explain this change. Even though China and S. Korea, still 
remained hostile - for S. Korea, Taiwan had always been the sole legitimate 
government of China. for the PRC. N. Korea represented the whole Korean peninsula 
after the still simmering Cold War - ideological barriers to foreign relations between 
China and S. Korea were being lowered. From this time hostile attitudes showed 
signs of thawing. following on from Sino-US rapprochement. 
Moreover. since the early 1970's foreign policy adopted by the S. Korean 
government allowed greater flexibility in the choice of trading partners. leading to 
secret trade initiatives with China. 7bis took the form of indirect secret trade despite 
the fact that trade between Peking and Seoul was offlcially non-eidstent up to 1978. 
7bey clearly regarded each other as future econornic partners. 
2.1 Politico-Strategic Relations 
When Chinese and American Interests in the Korean peninsula began for the 
first time to coincide in the early 1970's, this changing context affected S. Korea's 
ideology-oriented foreign policy that had previously precluded improved relations 
with China. Since neither country wished either of the two Koreas to establish 
hegemony over the peninsula. this had repercussions In relations between China 
and S. Korea. 7bey made significant headway towards the opening of closer 
relationships: seeking to ensure their national security and. to some extent, to 
maximise control over their own fates. Even though there was disagreement on the 
cause of tension and the means of alleviating it, the demand for change in both 
0 
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China and S. Korea made the leaders evaluate the advantages of the road to 
reconciliation. 
The Changing Perception of Security in Northeast Asia 
7be beginning of the 1970's was the age of Realpolitilc It was thought that the 
polarisation of the post-World-War-11 era, characterised by American and Soviet 
domination. had drawn to a close. Instead. there emerged a balance of power among 
the four major players In Northeast Asia--the US. Japan, China, and the USSR Ibis 
created a system of limited, rather than total security of any . one state in the region. 
In particular the diffusion of power In Northeast Asia was due to: 1) the relative 
decline of the US in Asia and the rise of the USSR as a military power. 2) the rise of 
Japan's vast economic power as the basis for renewed military capability and their 
burgeoning influence on Korea. 3) the ending of China's Isolation, which propagated 
her regional influence In Northeast Asla(l). 
By the early 1970's, Peking had begun to place greater reliance on diplomatic 
persuasion to compensate for the yawning gap between Its theoretical perception of 
International relations and the actual reality of world affalrs(2). Beginning in the 
early 1970's, the effective direction of foreign policy-making passed from Mao and 
Lin Blao (leftist leaders who distrusted relations with the non-Communist world and 
sought China's self-suMciency) to Premier Zhou En-lai and Deng Yjaoping. 7bese 
more moderate leaders were patient and pragmatic. and were prepared to deal with 
capitalist countries in order to cope with the problems caused by the Great Lcap 
Forward and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution(3). 7be reassessment in 
China's perception of the International situation was to a signiflcant extent the 
result of the emerging moderate leadership. According to Immanuel C. Y. Hsu. the 
Mao-Zhou Diplomatic Grand Design was the only governing principle of foreign 
policy(4). 7be desire for a de facto peaceful environment was highly eMcactous in 
40 
that it greatly enhanced ChIna! s international status, winning her a permanent seat 
In the UN. as a great power. 
Thus Peking appeared to have lost Its bid for ideological leadership of the 
Socialist bloc. Chinas growing accessibility to the outside world in the early 1970's 
was mottvated primarily by strategic concern about the USSR(5). 
In these circumstances. as throughout Koreaýs history. S. Korea had ample 
reason to fear a moderate degree of conflict or competition among the major powers. 
A prominent strategist on S. Korea pointed out that her leaders pictured threats to 
national security In terms of a breakdown of the international balance of power. 
Dramatic changes among the major powers of Northeast Asia were bound to have a 
profound impact on S. Korea's national security(6). Thus. S. Korea was deeply 
suspicious of the viability of detente in Northeast Asla(7). For example, President 
Park Chung Hee was worried about the hazards of "the games that big powers play" 
and "yesterday's adversary can be today's friend, and today's enemy can become 
tomorrow's negotiating partner". He pointed out that detente had set in motion a 
process of "prodigious change in the existing power balance among the big powers 
surrounding the Korean peninsula, " and such change was likely to seriously 
undermine S. Koreaýs national security: 
"A multipolar world is certainly not a simple international 
erwironment. Unlike the Cold War days when dependence on the power of an 
ally was possible, we now have only ourselves to rely on. and at the same 
time we must carefully watch the moves of the United States, Japan, China, 
the Soviet Union, and many other countries as well. 7bis requires a high 
level of adaptability and crcativity"(8). 
S. Korea was startled by the contents of the resulting Shanghai Communique of 
February 28,1972. and even more so by the normallsation of relations between 
China and Japan in September 1972, which represented the culmination of Tokyo's 
commercial approach towards China Peking after the signing of the first unofficial 
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trade agreement in June 1952. Furthermore, S. Korea regarded Nixon as one of the 
most militant anti-communist leaders of the 1950's, and as an ardent supporter of 
the Cold War policy during the 1960's. It became doubtful whether S. Korea could 
sustain the same anti-communist stance that had been characteristic of her rigid 
policies during the 1950's and 1960's(9). When the hostility between China and the 
US showed signs of thawing in the early 1970's. as a result of Nixon's Peking visit. 
S. Korean leaders felt that the international situation was similar to that of the early 
19th century. It led many Koreans to remember that, in the Taft-Katsura 
Memorandum, America had given consent for the Japanese seizure of Korea In 
exchange for the Philippines, and that the US had refused to help Korea preserve 
her independence(IO). Moreover, as Morton Abramowitz described it "not all of these 
changes are a function of events In Korea but they all Intirnately affect Korea7(1 1). 
Likewise, when the Nixon Doctrine, the so-called 'You're on your own but do it 
my way" principle. was expressed as an intention to pull US troops out of S. Korea. 
the S. Korean leadership was troubled(12). Although the US's and China's concern 
over Korea was reflected in the Shanghal Conimunique Issued by President Nixon 
and Premier Zhou En-Lai on 28 February 1972, the S. Korean leaders were disturbed 
by the ambiguous phrasing of clauses relating to the Korean problem(13). There 
were two relevant statements. The Chinese declared: 
"China firmly supports the eight-point progranune for the peaceful 
unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea on April 12.1971. and the stand for the abolition 
of the "U. N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. " 
7be US declared: 
0 
'rhe United States will maintain Its close ties with and support for 
the Republic of Korea: the United States will support efforts of the Republic 
of Korea to seek a reLwmtlon of tension and increased communication in the 
Korean peninsul! "(14). 
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Lee Dong Won. chairman of S. Korea's National Assembly's Foreign Affairs 
ComnUttec stated in February 1972: "We are afraid that there might be some tacit 
agreements in the US-China summit talks that were not officlafly revealed"(15). The 
anxiety of losing allied support. and the fear of great power collusion. compelled 
S. Korea to consider whether-as was widely felt., though generally unstated--her 
foreign policy had been a failure(16). In effect. the early 1970's witnessed significant 
security changes In the International system. prompting S. Korea to reallse that its 
primary foreign policy objective was rooted not in ideology. but In perceived national 
Interest. 
S. Korea was uncertain whether to deliberately end the era of hostile 
confrontation with China and go on to develop a new stage of reconciliation. 
Recognising that the old diplomacy was outmoded. S. Korea, began to seek low-cost. 
low-risk relations with China. 
A Turn Towards Change 
77he first signs of change in S. Korea's attitude towards China were seen in the 
process of foreign policy making. S. Korea's bureaucratic-authoritarian system had 
made long-lasting imprints upon her own foreign policy. 7be decision-making 
process had become highly personallsed and totally dominated by the president. 
Information and ideas concerning foreign policy would flow only vertically. Usually, 
only a handful of institutions with strategic access to the president played any 
significant role. 7bey included the National Security Planning Agency (Hereafter 
NSPA formerly the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, KCLQ and top personnel in 
the presidential secretariat. Even the Ministry of Foreign Affairs lacked the power to 
formulate important foreign policies. Instead. its role was often downgraded to one of 
doing paper work for the decisions made at the presidential Blue House. 
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7be iniM changes in foreign policy making came In January 1971.7bis 
occurred. according to Youngnok Koo, as a result of the American initiative of July 
21.1969 which relaxed restrictions on travel to and trade with the PRC. Awareness 
of the PRC's role in the region as the status quo power prompted S. Korea's 
leadership to set up a study group in January 1971 (the Institute of Foreign Affairs. 
now the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security). which was affiliated to 
the Mhiistry of Foreign Affairs (Hereafter MOFA). 7be resulting report was entitled 
Me Impact of Communist Chinas Emergence In the World Arena on Korea's 
Policy"(17). This study group recommended the S. Korean leadership to adopt a 
flexible position towards the PRC and to modify its UN-centred policy. It was 
exceptional in that independent scholars and specialists took part in foreign policy 
formulation: most of S. Korea's foreign policies having previously been managed by 
the staff of the presidential office. together with a few scholars chosen by the 
government(18). 
President Park announced at a New Year's news conference in 1971 that 
S. Korea would willingly Improve relations with those "non-hostile" communist 
countries who recognised the sovereignty or S. Korea, and who stopped aid to 
N. Korea(19). This led S. Korea into extensive contact with communist countries. 
mainly In Eastern Europe. In September of that year a "semi-governmental 
delegaUorV. led by the president of the Korea Trade Promotion Corporation 
(Hereafter KOTRA). visited Yugoslavia and Rumania: the first time that S. Korean 
citizens had visited a Communist country with government approval(20). 
After the PRC's admission to the UN Security Council In October 1971, 
S. Korean leaders had recognized that their fixed position on Korean qucstions in the 
UN General Assembly might not be tenable in the future(2 1). The decreasing support 
for the UN objective in Korea. and the dissolution of the United Nations Commission 
for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (Hereafter UNCURIQ, forced S. Korea 
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to acquire a new image of China. For example'. the PRC's pro-N. Korea stance on the 
Korean question was clearly reflected in the voting pattern of the UN General 
Assembly. 7bus a resolution endorsing S. Korea's stance got only 53.0% of the UN 
vote in 1972, compared with 57.1% for a similar resolution In 1969(22). 
During Nixorfs visit to Peking he granted concessions on the Taiwan issue 
which influenced S. Korea to show a greater flexibility in policy towards China. 
American rapprochement with China left S. Korea as one of the few states of any 
Importance still maintaining diplomatic relations with Taiwan. and she wanted to 
avoid sharing the same fate as Taiwan. Furthermore. Sino-American rapprochement 
showed that China had committed herself to maintaining a peaceful international 
environment. and the PRC was no longer considered by the UN as theaggressor. in 
particular in the Korean War(23). As long as UNCURK existed, ' and the UN 
resolution branding the PRC as an aggressor stood. Peking felt a disgrace which 
would be taken away only by the dissolution of UNCUM China's Foreign Minister 
Qlao Guan-Hua said to the General Assembly on 15 November 197 1: 
7be Chinese Government and People.... firmly support [North Koreasj 
just demand that all the illegal resolutions adopted by the United Nations on 
the Korean questions be annulled. and the United Nations Commission for 
the UnifIcation and Rehabilitation of Korea be dissolved(24). 
President Park hinted at a change of principle In foreign policy in May 1972, 
stating "We will give a cooperative hand to any country to cultivate world peace on 
the basis of equality and reciprocity. unless they are aggressive. even if their social 
structures are different from ours"(25). 7bis was the first public declaration that 
Seoul would no longer stick to the Hallstein Doctrine. thus allowing the possibility of 
enhanced relations with ChLna. Subsequently, S. Korea revised its guide-lines for 
diplomats, ordering them to pursue overt Improvements with non-hostile communist 
countries, In preparation for further intemational developments(26). 
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Almost simultaneously. at the 7th ministerial meeting in Seoul in June 1972, 
Australia and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Hereafter 
ASEAN). S. Korean allies In the Vietnam War, expressed a general willingness to 
establish a new non-political all-Astan regional body to replace the obsolete anU- 
communism-preoccupied ASPAC. 7bis move forward by Foreign Minister Kim Young 
Shik was a complete break with S. Korea! s traditional policy towards communist 
countries(27). 
7be Sino-American rapprochement gave China a stronger position in the region 
and S. Korea became aware that the Chinese perception of their mutual relationship 
was changing(28). It seems that the Chinese leaders regarded Improved relations 
with S. Korea as a necessary by-product of the Sino-American rapprochement if they 
were to achieve a reduction of tensions with other former adversaries. During his 
visit to Peking in 1972. President Nixon disclaimed any intention of threatening 
China. In response. the Chinese leaders assured him. "Neither do we threaten Japan 
nor S. Korea7(29). The Chinese began to take a position which demonstrated both 
moderation and flexibility towards S. Korea. For example. when the South and North 
Korean governments declared a joint communique on July 4.1972. the Chinese 
government was prompt in endorsing it. calling the outcome "a good beginning"(30). 
Peking expressed "enthusiastic welcome" for the declaration, and thereafter added 
"Independent" to their formulas for the Korean question. as well as modifying their 
standard formula used in all comments and editorials to "peaceful unification"(31). 
Seoul's Declaration of Openness 
For S. Korea to approach China in the same manner as the US did In 1971 
S. Korea needcd to oMcWly change her stance towards China. In the "June 23rd 
Declaration" of 1973 President Park expressed a readiness to reduce tensions with 
socialist countries, specifically with China. He declared a willingness to trade with 
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any friendly communist country. vowing to end the era of confrontation and 
hostilities between S. Korea and Communist countries. He made clear the change in 
foreign policy towards communist countries when he declared a "SpecW statement 
regarding foreign policy for peace and unification. " Two of the seven points contained 
in the special statement were the following: 
6.7be ROK will open its door to all the nations of the world on the 
basis of the principles of reciprocity and equality. At the same time. we urge 
those countries whose ideologies and social institutions are different from 
ours to open their doors likewise to us. 
7. Peace and good-neighbourliness are the firm bases of the foreign 
policy of the ROK. It is reaffirmed that we will continue to further strengthen 
the ties of friendship existing between friendly nations and our country(32). 
7be S. Korean declaration was intended to Impress both the Chinese leaders 
and Its own domestic populace. who required psychological reassurance. 7be time 
was ripe for a sea change in S. Korean attitudes towards China. and the declaration 
was a most effecUve means to express this need. 
Prior to the declaration. there had been few people in S. Korea with specialist 
knowledge of the PRC. but now many people were able to learn much more about 
that country. Before this. any practical debate relating to the PRC. except at the 
academic level. was taboo in S. Korean politics. Now, channels of communication 
with the PRC. both within society and in govenimental departments. were to be 
widened. For instance. the S. Korean press became increasingly favourable during 
1972. when covering China. One of the popular newspapers. Hankuk 11bo. carried 
eight artIcles relevant to communist countries in July in contmst to one article In 
July the previous yearj33). 7be S. Korean papers even ceased publishing only 
negative or critical articles and editorials about the PRC, and canted straight news 
reports. It reflected a reappraisal of the nature of relations between China and 
S. Korea. 
UN'IVEFýSriY 
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Likewise in Chinese arUcles on S. Korea. the response to S. Korea's declaration 
of openness on June 23,1973 was clearly positive. 'although they began by referring 
to the "Park Chung-hee puppet regime of American imperialism in Asia" and "a 
country of oppressive military-bureaucratic: dictatorship". before progressing to the 
"S. Korean authorities"(34). S. Korea's open door policy of 1973. In the wake of Sino- 
American rapprochement permitted the possibility of a thaw in Chinese\S. Korean 
relations. It was apparent that ý both China and S. Korea were doing their best to 
encourage the improvement of relaUons. 
Cooperation and Possible Conflict 
When disputes between China and S. Korca arose both countries showed a 
willingness to negotiate by an Infonnal. voluntary, and conciliatory procedure. 
For example sensitive disputes arose between China and S. Korea relating to 
overlapping cWms for off-shore oil and fisheries. The resolution of these Issues 
demonstrated their common desire to avoid a climate likely to cause political conflict 
between their countries. 
S. Korea has long been captivated by dreams of off-shore od development. For 
S. Korea. self-sufficiency in energy resources would not only have an inunediate 
economic advantage but would also contribute to its larger political, psychological, 
and military struggles against N. Korea. S. Korea, therefore, from the late 1960's. 
began to develop off-shore oil resources by granting concession to foreign companies 
such as Gulf. Shell and Texaco. 
At first. China made Lttle effort to Interfere with the seismic survey ships that 
crossed the Yellow Sea. But from 1971, survey and drilling operations In the Yellow 
Sea were complicated by jurisdictional conflicts with China. China conveyed its 
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ctispleasure over the boundaries set by S. Korea by sending lightly armed fishing 
vessels into the vicinity of the survey operaUons(35). 
Legislation governing sea boundaries concerned in S. Korean concessions to 
Western oilmen sowed the seeds of trouble by invoking dUTerent principles of 
International law in the Sea of Japan, the Korean Strait. and the Yellow Sea. S. Korea 
Utilized the natural-prolongation principle. which treats the continental shelf as an 
extension of the continent belonging to the country concerned: concessions -were 
based on an equitable boundary delimitation and a hypothetical median line. China 
also proclaimed the principle of natural-prolongation in the Yellow Sea. but used it 
to claim the entire continental shelf as a natural extension of the Chinese land 
territory(36). 
As the survey work grew more intense. Chinese naval vessels began to harass 
survey vessels operating relatively far from the S. Korean coast in a potentially 
disputed middle zone of the Yellow Sea. China viewed Seoul as acting provocatively 
In allocaUng concessions "unflaterally" without first reaching a boundary agreement 
with Peking. In March 1973, Seoul offered to hold talks with "the authorities of the 
People's Republic of China" on the question of the delLmitation of the continental 
shelf areas between them. 7bLs was the first time that S. Korean government called 
China by its official name in public(37). 
China maintained a stem silence. however. charging that Japan and S. Korea 
had violated Chinese rights under international law. For these and other technical 
reasons. Gulf terminated Its drilling In Zone II in the Yellow Sea between China and 
S. Korea. stating that the controversy over sovereignty was not settled. America 
encouraged the oil company to give up further seismic drilling to avoid damaging 
relations with China. and had done so with S. Korea's tacit acquiescence(38). In fact. 
the conflict of claim seems to have been a major consideration in S. Korea's 
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abandorunent of its decision to continue exploratory drilling in the Yellow Sea and 
the East China Sea. 
In addition to the Yellow Sea. another possible locale for China-S. Korea 
Controversies was the Joint Development Zone (Hereafter JDZ) covered by the 
Continental Shelf Agreements between Japan and S. Korea (signed on January 30. 
1974; but not ratified by Japan until the summer of 1977). On March 16.1973. 
Seoul had offered to hold talks with China on the question of delimitation of the 
continental shelf areas between China and S. Korea. At first they referred to one 
another by serni-official national names. But then when the S. Korean government 
began to refer to the official name of the People's Republic of China (Jung-Hwa-ln- 
MLn-Kung-Hwa-Kuk In Korean) Instead of Communist China (Jung-Koung in Korean). 
China, In turn. referred to the "S. Korean authorities". instead of the "Park Chung- 
hee puppet regime" or the "puppet government of the US. " In the past the Chinese 
press had always called S. Korea "Nam-cho-syorV a derogatory narne used by N. Korea 
whenever reporting on S. Korea(39). 
7be treaty of 1974 was an attempt to defuse overlapping S. Korean and 
Japanese off-shore claims. creating ajoint comn-dssion to organise exploration and 
production activities of petroleum and natural gas and to implement yet-to-be- 
devised formulas for sharing costs and revenues. Soon after conclusion of the 
agreement. however. China alleged that the agreement. made without consultation 
with China, was illegal and null and void. stating: 
7be act is an Infringement of China's sovereignty, which the Chinese 
government absolutely cannot accept. If the Japanese government and South 
Korean authorities arbitrarily carry out development activitles In this area, 
they must bear full responsibility for all the consequences arising 
therefore.... 7be Chinese government holds that, according to the principle 
that the continental shelf is the natural extension of the continent. It stands 
to reason that the question of how to divide the continental shelf in the East 
China Sea should be decided by China and the other countries concerned 
through consultation(40). 
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7be S. Korean govenunent reaffIrmed that the areas where exploration and 
exploitation programmes were being carried out or contemplated were within the 
JurisdicUon of S. Korea in accordance with LntemaUonal law. 
After Japaxfs ratification of the Agreement In April 1977 both Japan and 
S. Korea implemented the so-called "special measures act for the implementation of 
the Japan-S. Korean agreement on the joint development of the continental shelf" in 
July 1978.7be PRC made offlcW protests: 
According to the principle that the continental shelf is the natural 
extension of the continent, the People's Republic of China has inviolable 
sovereignty over the continental shelf in the East China Sea. and the division 
of those parts of this continental shelf which involve other countries ought to 
be decided on through consultations by China and the countries concerned. 
7be unilateral marking off of a so-called Japan-ROK "Joint development zone" 
on the continental shelf In the East China Sea by the Japanese Government 
and the South Korean authorities through signing behind China's back the 
"Japan-ROK Agreement on Joint Development of the Continental Shelf" is an 
infringement of China! s sovereignty to which China will never agree (41). 
(emphasis added) 
The vague Chinese claims meant that the conflict between China and S. Korea, 
became a tripartite legal controversy with the advent of the JDZ: The PRC's protests 
were obviously not addressed to S. Korea alone. Even though the discussions 
proposed by Seoul failed to materiallse. It is clear that China's attitude was much 
more accommodating than in other disputes of a similar character. 7bus the PLA 
seized the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea from South Vietnam after a brief 
battle In January 1974. whereas in the S. Korean case the Chinese merely 
dispatched their naval units to observe procedures in the Yellow Sea(42). 
At the same time another more significant and serious point of political 
dispute arose between China and S. Korea. - the case of fishing in the Yellow Sea and 
the East China Sea. 
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Joint sea fisheries provided S. Korea with an opportunity to contact Peking. 
7be Southwest Seaboard of S. Korea and the East China Sea were rich in fish and 
these waters rnade important contributions to the output of marine and fresh water 
aquatic products. When an agreement on Fisheries between Japan and China was 
made on August 15.1975, Seoul also expressed a desire to talk on fishery affairs 
with Peking. S. Korea issued the Mowing statement: 
The Government of the Republic of Korea reaffirms the inherent and 
traditional rights of its nationals to engage in fishing in the Yellow Sea and 
the East China Sea. and reserves all the rights of the Republic of Korea as a 
coastal state of the area under international law. 
7be Government of the Republic of Korea takes this opportunity to 
state that It Is ready to enter into discussions at any time with parties 
interested in the question of such measures as the conservation of fishery 
resources and their rational utilisatIon in the area. the safety of fishing 
operations. and the relief of distress at sea. in accordance with the 
established rules of international law(43). 
This provided Seoul with an opportunity to communicate and negotiate with 
regarding national issues under the guise of peaceful resolution of regional issues. 
In June * 1976. when the Chinese departments concerned issued the S. Korean 
authorities with a serious warning that large numbers of S. Korean fishing boats had 
intruded into ChinXs territorial waters and regions where fishing was forbidden. 
sailing recklessly. hampering Chinese fishermen's operations and damaging their 
fishing gear. S. Korea expressed its willingness to Investigate the Chinese charges. 
When two S. Korean fishing boats were seized by the Chinese, the S. Korean 
govenunent proposed a conference with China so that their countries might 
negotiate a fishery treaty(44). Chinese fishing boats had already been permitted to 
shelter In the islands of Southern Korea in bad weather(45). 
Some fle3cibility was seen in China's attitude towards S. Korea on these issues. 
However. China had to consider the political and diplomatic implications of its 
negotiations with S. Korea. In the prevailing political circumstances. China found it 
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diffIcult to hold negotiations. for such a move might be interpreted as a recognition 
Of S. Korea. 7bus China preferred to leave the delicate Issue unresolved provided its 
Interests were not affected in any significant manner. 
FlexibWty in the USSR 
China regarded the Soviet threat as the principal rationale for a quasi-alliance 
With the US. She therefore made a cautious response to S. Korean overtures. rather 
than being outrightly negative in order to block a Soviet approach over the Korean 
peninsula. Although confrontation had been replaced by detente, with a measurable 
reduction of tensions in the early 1970's. a notable exception to this general trend 
was the continuation of Sino-Soviet rivalry in Asia. and In Northeast Asia In 
Particular. 
In retrospect. Sino-Soviet rivalry in Korea provided S. Korea, with an 
unexpected benefit. Following the Sino-Soviet border conflict in 1969. N. Korea's 
aggressive attitudes towards the US caused China some concern. The Chinese 
suspected that both the seizure of the USS Pueblo in January 1968. and the 
shooting down of a US Navy EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft over the East Sea (Sea 
of Japan) in 1969. were joint Soviet-N. Korean ventures. Peldng believed that the 
plane was monitoring the Sino-Soviet border rnilitary clashes(46). China showed no 
indication of support for N. Korean actions, and it posed a dilemma for Peldng in her 
relations with the North(47). 
On the other hand. Soviet-N. Korean relations seemed to suggest that the 
Soviet leaders were unhappy with N. Korea's tilt towards China and were mounting 
pressure on N. Korea to maintain an equidistant posture. One way of increasing 
pressure on N. Korea was to create an image of Soviet rapprocheawnt with Seoul. In 
June 1969. at the Conference of International Communist Parties. the USSR invited 
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all Asian countries to take part in creating an Asian Collective Security System. 
Whereas Pyongyang remained aloof from Brezhnev's Asian Collective Security Plan. 
S. Korea was the only Asian country other than Mongolia to support It(48). Moreover 
Ogor A. Nato. a Russian coach for an Ital= soccer team. was allowed to come to 
Seoul for the first time for an International soccer competition in September 
1971(49). 
Furthermore. when In June 1973 the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, 
embarrassed by Sino-American rapprochement said that the USSR would seek the 
cooperation and friendship of all Asian countries without exception, there were 
contacts at various levels between Moscow and Seoul(50). 7be USSR issued a travel 
pass to the S. Korean pmducer. Yu Dok-hyong, to participate In the 15th Congress of 
the Intemational 7beatre Association in Moscow In June 13.1973(51). He was the 
f1rst S. Korean to visit the USSR on a S. Korean passport. In the field of sport. despite 
N. Korean pmtests and a boycott. 38 Korean athletes were invited to take part In the 
Universtad Athletic Competition. held in Moscow on August. 1973(52). 
Two months later two medical doctors attended an International obstetrics and 
gynaccology seminar(53). In turn. Professor Alexander Aruttunov came to Seoul for 
an international conference on neuro-surgery in October, 1973. In October 1974, 
another form of cultural contact took place when books and materials were 
exchanged between the Lenin National Library in Moscow and the S. Korean National 
Assembly Library In Seoul(54). Moreover. an offlcW Soviet representative attended a 
meeting of the Korean Affairs Research Institute In Tokyo, in December 1973, where 
he discussed Soviet policy In Northeast Asia(55). It was. therefore. not surprising 
that the S. Korean ambassador to the US. Kim Dong-jo. met with the Soviet 
ambassador. Anatoly Dobrynin. to discuss political matters Involving Korea(56). 
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China could not ignore these non-political Soviet contacts with S. Korea. She 
therefore began to deal indirectly with S. Korea through international conference 
forums. such as the UN. In 1974 S. Korea established postal exchanges and 
telegraphic links with China. In turn. China allowed the Korean-Chinese In China to 
exchange letters with their relatives in S. Korea through the International Red Cross. 
Furthermore. Korea University's Institute of Asiatic Studies sent books to China. 
and received in return information on which books could be exchanged. as well as 
copies of the selected poems of Mao Zedong(57). When In November 1974, the 
Chinese ambassador to the UN discussed the Korean question at'the UN political 
Conunittee. he used the official title "Republic of Korea"(58). 7bus the Chinese 
perception of the Soviet approach towards S. Korea was instrumental in the decision 
to forge links with S. Korea. 
Meanwhile. S. Korca recognised China's influence in the region and realised 
the necessity of standing back from its anti-communist policies. 7be time seemed 
ripe for the S. Koreans to remove problems between China and themselves. 7be 
South Korean ambassador to the US, Dr Hahm Pyong-Choon, clearly expressed his 
government's willingness to do so in his Informal address in New York on June 7. 
1974. which was later published in Asian Survcy (Hereafter AS). as follows: 
When Premier Zhou En-lal set forth certain principles of PRC policy 
relating to Taiwan. he somehow included the Republic of Korea in the same 
category as the Republic of China. Thus, he declared that China would not 
be able to do business with any Japanese (or American) company that did 
business with either Taiwan or South Korea. But Korea Is certainly not a part 
of China: and we do not understand Peking's perspective in looking at the 
Republic of Korea and Taiwan as more or less the same(59). 
Moreover, returning from his tour of Southeast Asian countries. Kirn Yong- 
sam. president of the opposition New Democratic Party (Hereafter NDP), noted the 
changing policy towards China of many Asian countries. and proclaimed that he was 
willing to visit China(60). It was the S. Korean hope that the Chinese would conduct 
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selective low-key contacts with S. Korea, equivalent to Moscow's approach towards 
Seoul. 
The Collapse of South Vletnam and the Approach of the USSR to S. Korea 
7be cool relationship between China and S. Korea was relatively unaffected by 
the collapse of South Vietnam and instability on ChIrWs Southeastern. fronts. Like 
China! s concern in the Korean War. Vietnam was one of the fronts which China 
perceived as vulnerable to foreign intervention. The fall of South Vietnam and 
emergence of a united Vietnam as a strong new regional power in Southeast Asia 
made China afraid that N. Korea would use the same means to create a "Second 
Hanoi" as the USSR had done In Vietnam. Moreover. Moscows military and 
economic assistance towards Pyongyang concerned Peking because China could not 
match RussIWs aid. China was apprehensive about N. Korea's engaging in military 
build-ups and provocative activities, such as tunnelling under the DMZ, and 
aggressive infiltrations, by N. Korea from 1974 to 1975(61). In order to counter this 
trend. Peking attempted to give full support to the N. Korean leaders' contention that 
Pyongyang represented the whole Korean peninsula as "the sole legal sovereign state 
of the Korean nations". 7bey therefore opposed the Soviet Asian Collective Security 
Scheme when Kim 11-sung visited Peking In April 1975(62). Moreover a RMRB 
editorial commemorating the anniversary of the Korean war on June 25,1975 stated 
that China supported N. KoreXs reunification pollcy(63). 
After the collapse of South Vietnam the USSR took a number of steps to 
strengthen its Influence; holding military manoeuvres in Asia. and signing. with the 
Sociall3t Republic of Vietnam (Hereafter SRV). a treaty of Friendship & Cooperation. 
in the aftermath of the 11nal victory of the revolutionary forces in Indo-China in 
1975. Chinese fears of Soviet expansionism were exacerbated by Moscow's ensuing 
military build-up in Asia. According to S. Korean intelligence. the Soviet fleet wanted 
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naval bases at the ports of Nampo and Haeju. on the west coast of N. Korea opposite 
China, and was even thought to have its eye on possible facilities at the ports of 
ShinuiJu and Youngampo. virtually on the Chinese border. at the very mouth of Yalu 
River(64). 
7bere were other influences on US-S. Korea relations aside from the fall of 
South Vietnam which came to a head during the 1970's: the Military Aid Programme 
ended in 1974. the "Koreagatc" scandal which prevented President Carter's plan for 
the phased withdmwal of the US ground troops, and S. Korea's efforts towards 
building a nuclear bomb and the US response. As a consequence the support of the 
US could no longer be taken for granted(65). 
S. Korea remained heavily dependent on the US for its national security. and 
therefore had no choice but to accept the new US-ChLna status quo. even to the 
point of considering the establishment of her own relations with China. 7be 
S. Korean government was then seriously considering taking an initiative to help 
"prevent war and establish peace on the Korean peninsula" by all means. 7bis would 
involve the convening of an ambassadorial meeting among the two Koreas and the 
other powers concerned. The S. Korean government hoped that such a contact could 
lead to fully-fledged negotiations among the four nations - North and South Korea, 
the US and China(66). 
In January 1976 President Park stated that S. Korea was now preparing to 
meet the N. Korean threat against S. Korea. advocating the concept of self-rehant 
defence: 
Let me now bricily outhne the concept of self rellant defence. 7be 
form of armed invasion [by North Korea) can be narrowed down to two: one 
is that North Korea would stage an attack against South Korea on its own, 
without outside help. the other Is that an attack would be staged with the 
support of outside forces such as Red China or the Soviet Union. We can 
imagine either form of invasion. The concept of self-reliant defence that we 
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are advocating is based on the idea that. in the event of a North Korean 
Communist attack on us on its own without outside help. we should be able 
to repel and deter such an attack on our own and on a man-to-man basis 
without the support of friendly nations. and that we should possess such a 
defence capability at an early date(67). 
When the US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger proposed "Four-Power Talks" 
on Korea. S. Korea accepted this as saying: 
Only when China and N. Korea accept this proposal. will it be possible 
to achieve a relaxation In Korea as a prerequisite to Korea7s peaceful 
territorial unification. and put an end to "unproductive confrontations over 
the Korean question in the internatlonal community(68). 
It was contrast to N. Korea's reaction that Pyongyang rejected this as big power 
mediation in Korea(69). 
Meanwhile S. Korea, was laying a path towards peaceful coexistence with 
China. In November 1975. President Park stated the fundamental aim of sharing 
human progress and prosperity between S. Korea and China: 
In this light. if Cornmunist China should open their doors to us and 
move towards the establishment of friendly relations for our mutual benefit. 
In accordance with the principle of equality and reciprocity. we shall respond 
accordingly and in a positive manner. This Is our basic position(70). 
S. Korea had been hoping that Peking would use her influence to deter N. Korea 
from any military venture on the Korean peninsula(71). Many intermediaries had 
been urged to speak on Seoul's behalf in Peking. In April 1976 President Park 
dispatched a peace message to Peking through New Zealand's Prime Minister, 
Robert Muldoon. when he visited China(72). Again in May 1976 when the British 
Foreign Secretary Anthony Crosland visited China. the S. Korean govenunent asked 
him to convey the message that they wanted to have informal contact with China. It 
was confirmed by the Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs who visited Seoul to brief S. Korcan Foreign Minister Park 
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Dong-jin on the discussions Crosland had had with Chinese leaders on the Korean 
question during his visit to Peking(73). 
7bese invitations, however. were unsuccessful. Even though in general Peking 
simply ignored S. Korea's proposals, the responses were not negative but at their 
best somewhat encouraging on non-political issues. For example., according to the 
Communications Ministry. by the end of February 1976 post had been exchanged 
with 15 communist countries, not including N. Korea and North Vietnam which were 
both still classified as "hostile. " China topped the list. exchanging 7.752 items with 
S. Korea which accounted for 48% of the total letters and parcels exchanged up to 
that time compared with the USSR! s 1.502 ltems(74). 
On the other hand. Increasing contacts between the USSR and S. Korea led 
China to continue to emphasize N. Korea's geopolitical value in the contest with the 
Soviet Union. Weight-lifting and wrestling teams from S. Korea competed in Moscow 
and Minsk in 1975(75). Three S. Korean delegations attended the meeting In Moscow 
of the World Federation of United Nations Associations in 1975. After this followed a 
limited number of contacts. mainly cultural. economic. and sporting. The S. Korean 
press reported these infrequent meetings prominently. using them to support the 
image of improved S. Korean-Soviet relations(76). For instance, in January. 1975 
Park Chung-hoon. chairman of the Korea Trade Association (Hereafter KTA), held a 
meeting with Soviet officials In New York to discuss the possibility of establishing 
trade relations between Seoul and Moscow(77). In February. S. Korean Foreign 
Minister Kim Dong-jo hinted that S. Korean goods were being exported to the USSR 
through other parties(78). The S. Korean government revealed at this time that the 
USSR would allow S. Korcan goods to pass through Soviet territory. A telegram 
service between S. Korea and Belorussia and the Ukraine was opened on April 30 
1976(79). A study was under way by the S. Korean government seeking ways to make 
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contact with the Soviet goverrunent in order to protect S-Korean fishing rights in 
waters near Kamchatka as the USSR Inclined towards a 200 mile economic zone(80). 
It would seem that China was consolidating its relationship with N. Korea so as 
to ensure that Peking would play a role in any political settlement on the Korean 
peninsula. China had been supplying Pyongyang with oil at a special price, to the 
extent of 18,000 barrels a day In 1975. and assured the N. Koreans of their absolute 
opposition to any "Two Koreasr formula(81). For example. a map of the world 
published in a Chinese magazine ignores even the division of Korea, designating the 
entire peninsula as N. Korea. Neither the 38th parallel nor the DMZ is shown(82). On 
the anniversary of the signing of the PRC-N. Korea treaty of friendship. co-operation 
and mutual assistance. II July 1976. RMRB referred to the relations with N. Korea 
as "a great, everlasting friendship"(83). S. KoreWs attempts to open a direct dialogue 
with China had apparently been received with little enthusiasm by the Chinese. 
presumably because of Pekinges desire not to lose Pyongyang in the contest with the 
Soviet Union on the Korean peninsula. 
The Post-Mao Period 
After the death of Mao in 1976 and the rise of Deng Xlaoping in subsequent 
years. China stepped up her Worts to promote domestic economic development 
while downplaying ideological and rhetorical support for the Third World. Chinese 
pragmatic foreign policy might be described as a policy of reducing of tensions with 
virtually all of its former rivals and adversaries, with the obvious exception of the 
USSR and Vietnam. Peking was more interested In the maintenance of a peaceful 
international environment, particularly with neighbouring countries in Asia. than 
ever before. China's domestic policy. meanwhile. moved in dramatically new 
directions. Although these were power struggles between different factions In the 
CCP, economic modernisation was given the highest priority on the national agenda. 
60 
with Maoist interest in maintaining the purity of the revolutionary vision now 
virtuaUy extinct. 
Even prior to the death of Mao the Chinese Foreign Minister. Qiao Guan-hua. 
assured the Japanese Ambassador in April 1976 that there would be no change in 
China! s foreign policy following the dismissal of Deng Xiaoping(84). Hua Kuo-feng 
also pointed out during the visit of Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore. to 
China in May 1976 that certain differences of opinion were only to be expected 
because of national interests or ideology, but that these need not prevent the 
development of relaUans(85). 
China relied upon a global alliance. marked by Sino-American rapprochenwnt. 
to block Soviet hegemonism. 7bus Chinese officials indicated privately and 
informally to their American counterparts a desire to see US troops remain In 
S. Korea as a partial deterrent to Soviet expansionism(86). At this point. the Chinese 
publicly displayed a milder policy of mere disapproval of the US troop presence. 
while adhering to the general principle of self-detenrWnation. meaning that the 
Korean issue should be resolved by the Koreans themselves. It was reported that 
China described the Soviet aircraft carrier Kiev as a "pointer to the Kremlin's 
feverish expansion of its naval power. " and public opinion In the West considered 
that the accelerated building of Soviet aircraft carriers had the purpose of gaining 
overall naval supremacy for the USSR187). YJnhu covered US criticism of President 
Carter's defence policy on the subject of nuclear weapons and the strategic arms 
lin-dtation taEks with the USSR. stating: Mr Carter has been putting too much stress 
on arm control and not enough on Americaýs defence agaJnst what they consider to 
be a Soviet drive for strategic supcriority(88). In fact these were Indications that 
China might have preferred a continued division of the Korean peninsula if any 
alternative development seemed likely tojeopardise her relations with the US. 
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'Me Chinese attitude was made clear during the August 1976 tree-cutting 
incident at Parimunjom, the so-called "axe incident" In which two US Army officers 
were killed by N. Korean guards with axes. 7bis was a crisis of similar significance to 
the capture of the Pueblo and the shooting down of the EC-121(89). 'Me Chinese 
were very careful not to endorse N. Korea's action in any way. During negotiations of 
the Military Armistice Conunission (Hereafter MAC) in the Joint Security Area 
(Hereafter JSAL in Panmunjom. China raised the level of her representation on the 
MAC and made apparent her Interest in a quick settlement of the issue(90). Peking 
recognised that the Incident might sabotage the lessening of tension in the Korean 
peninsula that was necessary for further improvements In relations between China 
and the US: essential if RussWs encirclement policy towards China was to be 
deterred. III 
I After a period of ambivalent attitudes towards the communist countries during 
the 1960's. S. Korea was attempting to improve relations with them by all means(91). 
S. Korea was having to dIvert the countrys security-oriented diplomacy in order to 
abandon its traditional anti-communist foreign policy(92). 'Me Foreign Ministry was 
expanded in order to arrange a dialogue with Peldng and Moscow. In which East 
Europe was to play an Intermediate role(93). 
A 27-man S. Korean sports team participated in the 1977 summer untvcrsiadc, 
held in Sofia Bulgaria on August 17 1977(94). Three S. Korean government delegates 
were granted visas by the Romanian authorities to attend a conference in Bucharest 
in October 1977. of the International Committee of the Red Cross., It was the first 
time that S. Korean government delegates had attended an international gathering in 
Eastern Europe(95). 7be S. Korcan Transport Minister disclosed that Seoul was 
using the Soviet trans-Siberian railway to convey exports to Europe. Third countries 
were used to ship the goods from S. Korea to Vladivostok. a S. Korean request for 
direct access to Vladivostok having been rejected by the USSM95). 
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In this context China was. by this time. entering a stage in which she could 
not afford to discriminate on political grounds alone against any country if that 
might have signIficant. implications for her desired economic development. China 
was reluctant to get involved in the issue of Korea because this would force her to 
take a position on such sensitive Issues as the US troop presence In S. Korea. in a 
speech at a banquet given in his honour. in Rangoon on January 27 1978 during 
his visit to Burma. Deng Xlaoping stated that "disputes among some Asian countries 
should be resolved by the countries concerned through friendly consultations on the 
basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence"(97). 
There are more substantial developments to be considered between the USSR 
and S. Korea after the dow7iing of the Korean Airline (Hereafter KAL) plane In April 
1978. Following the KAL incident. the S. Korean government formally announced 
that it had sought through an indirect channel the opportunity to Initiate a dialogue 
with the USSR on the possibility of diplomatic relations with the USSR(98). 
Only a few months later, in September 1978, the USSR issued an entry visa to 
a cabinet member of the S. Korean government, the Minister of Health and Social 
Affairs Shin Hyun-hwak. to take part In an international conference sponsored 
jointly by the World Health Organisation (Hereafter WHO) and the United Nations 
International Childreds Emergency Fund (Hereafter UNICEF) at Alma-Alta. the 
capital city of the Soviet Republic of Kazakhstan. Two S. Korean journalists were also 
admitted to the USSR to cover the proceedings of the conference and telephone 
contacts were established between the two countries for the first time since 1948. 
Moreover. the Kazakhstan Pravda. an oMcial organ of the ConununLst Party in 
Kazakhstan, printed the official title "the Republic of Korea" when it reported. on 
September 7 1978. the speech delivered by the S. Korcan minister. 7be practice of 
using the oMcial name of S. Korea was considered to be a rare and unusual gesture 
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on the part of the USSR(99). Four S. Korean delegates to an international meeting on 
nature preservation held in the USSR in October 1978 were warmly received by 
Soviet researchers who suggested cooperation on the exchange of results. It is 
noteworthy that no report was made either of contact or conversations between the 
Soviets and N. Korean delegates during the mecting(100). 
In reaction to the new Soviet relationship with S. Korea. China took a rigid 
stance towards S. Korea. When entry visas were Issued to S. Korean citizens to attend 
an International conference In the USSR In 1978. RMRB criticized the Soviet 
rapprochement with S. Korea, and called It an Insidious plot to expand Soviet 
influence on the Korean peninsula(IOI). Although Peking had a much lower proftle 
in Seoul than Moscow. Chinese interest in the security of Northeast Asia was still 
strong and they strove to maintain stability on the Korean peninsula. - 
China maintained an extremely cautious attitude towards S. Korea in order to 
avoid N. Korea ffirting with Russia. As long as China viewed the USSR as presenting 
the paramount threat to the region, and S. Korea was still reluctant to accept this 
view, China refused to adrnit S. Korean athletes to international competitions. and 
she also boycotted International sports events located in Seoul. Seoul was excluded 
from the Asian Youth Badminton Championships held In China in April 1978, and 
the Asian Youth Soccer Tournament scheduled to be held in Shanghai in October 
1978 was cancelled because China did not want to invite the S. Korean team. Again 
the World Ice Hockey Championships. originally to be held in Peking in March 1979. 
were moved to Barcelona for the same reason. A similar rejection was made by 
China to the S. Korcan junior soccer team. resulting in the cancellation of the 21st 
Asian Junior Soccer Championships scheduled for October 1979 in China(102). 
When the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrey Gromyko. for the first time ever 
in his UN General Assembly speech completely ignorcd the Korean issue. which was 
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a kind of tacit support for S. Korea. rather than N. Korea. RMRB carried furious attack 
on the Soviet-S. Korean relaUonship(103). 
The new Soviet relationship with S. Korea had a serious impact on S. Korea! s 
China policy. President Park. obviously eager to rescue the USSR from its 
predicament, declared in October 1978 that Seoul and Moscow were doing nothing 
to improve relations between the USSR and S. Korea. He admitted, however. that 
contacts between them had become more frequent(104). Chlna! s decisive rejection of 
S. Korea! s policy arose directly from Its concern over Soviet expansionism in the 
Korean peninsula. Peking appears to have been trying to head off a rapprochement 
between Moscow and Seoul, and to persuade N. Korea to rally more closely behind 
China. When the 7bal Premier delivered S. Korea's "peace-oriented unification policy" 
to the Chinese leaders during his visit. China laid stress on the consolidation of 
high-profile relations with N. Korea. rather than on developing contacts with 
S. Korea(105). Hua Guofeng's visit to Pyongyang in May 1978. the first ever as the 
Chairman of the CCP. was certainly aimed at keeping N. Korea close to Peking(106). 
Less than four months later. on September 8. Deng Xiaoping also visited N. Korea to 
attend ceremonies for the 30th anniversary of the founding of N. Korea's Communist 
regime. which it was the second visit since 1961(107). Moreover. Deng emphasized 
his "one Korea" view to Prime Minister Fukuda when he visited Japan in October 
1978 to ratify the peace treaty(108). It coincided with the broadcasting by N. Korea of 
Chinese criticism of the USSR(109). 
2.2 Economic Relations 
While old polemics and threats were gradually disappearing. economic Ues 
were also being reconstructed. 7bc Chinese push towards industriallsation began in 
earnest in the early 1970's. almost a decade after S. Korca's Lndustrialisatlon began. 
7be relative status of industriallsation of the two economies was such that both 
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countries were in a position to benefit greatly from complementarity In trade 
relations between them. 
Complementary Economic Relationships 
Until the 1970's, S. Korea had had no economic links with China since the 
Korean War. Beginning In the early 1970's. however. there were a series of dramatic 
policy changes. After suffering lengthy economic isolation China's open-door policy 
departed from the Maoist principle of national self-reliance, being aimed at 
promoting economic reforms and development. Taken together with S. Korea's open 
trading policy towards the communist bloc, the way was open for commercial 
relations. 
Sustained and rapid economic growth had become essential in order to catch 
up with international technological frontlers. Its achievement I required 'wide 
acceptance within society of the importance of economic policies that supported high 
investment, high and rising international orientation, and rapid structural change. 
7be technological disparity between China and the rest of the world was such that 
her economic development lagged ten to twenty years behind, and the gap could 
only be expected to widen. In a campaign to regain lost time and prosperity. the 
Chinese leaders became determined to make up for what was increasingly described 
as the "ten lost years" of the Cultural Revolu Uon(l 10). 
During the 1960's. while the rest of East Asia was making every effort to 
IndustrIa. Use and develop export markets, China remained autarkic. Her economic 
growth averaged 7.4% between 1965 and 1973, compared 10% for her neighbour, 
S. Korea(I 11). 
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In these circumstances the stage was set for complementary economic 
relations between China and S. Korea. Both countries were In a position to move 
towards their economic objectives by pursuing substantial growth in cross-border 
trade. Involving the movements of capital and technology(I 12). S. Korea was engaged 
in a classic neo-mercantillst strategy to achieve growth through exports of highly 
labour-Intensive products while resisting Imports or the internationallsation of its 
domestic capital market. S. Korea experienced rapid and substantial econornic 
growth. adopting a panoply of policies--export finance guarantees. preferential 
provision of Infrastructure and utilities for export producers. export tax incentives. 
etc--to promote exports. 'Me net effect of these policies was to provide Increasing 
export Incentives that amounted to almost a third of the value of exports by 
1971(113). 
New export markets and, external sources of raw materials were required. 
making S. Korea vulnerable In its external economic relations. 7bere was a steady 
erosion of progress in diversilying the cornmodity structure of ejcports. and It was 
necessary to move In the direction of sophisticated skill-intenstvc products as well 
as a diversification of, trading partners(I 14). In this respect. if Seoul wanted a 
suitable partner. China was the obvious choice. 
Despite its traditional dogmatic interpretations of socialism, China's 
recognition of S. Korea's economic growth provided a plausible justification for 
economic ties with S. Korea. Having experienced sustained rapid growth since the 
early 1960's, S. Korea had steadily widened her advantage over N. Korea. From 1971 
to 1975. the rate of S. Korea! s annual economic growth exceeded N. Korea's by 9.7%. 
whereas the rate of N. Korean economic growth had been 4.6% higher than S. Korea 
during the 1960's. After 1976. S. Korea was far better positioned than N. Korea In all 
areas. including military expenditure. S. Korea's military expenditure in that year 
was 36.7 billion dollars, compared to N. Korea's 31.6 billion(I 15). 
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In order to prevent China's economy falling behind its East Asian neighbours. 
therefore. China acknowledged the necessity of moving to a capitalistic market- 
oriented economy. The moderate leadership's decision to forge new links with 
S. Korea was an obvious way to improve the Chinese economy. S. Korea was poor in 
resources: China was rich in natural resources. As a result. it was necessary not 
only to relax their antagonistic attitude towards one another. but also to emphasize 
long-term policies and economic development agendas as primary weapons in 
foreign policy. It also led them. In particular China. not to reject foreign investment 
but to regulate and control it. accepting foreign technology. skills and investments 
that were practical. effective, cheap and convenient to use. 
When China considered how to update its economy. S. Korea. as a successful 
example of a government-led-export-orlented economic policy was a good model for 
China's "Four Modemisations". For example. while oil prices were sharply increased 
in 1973-74 with severe repercussions in the global economy. S. Korea overcame it by 
means of efficient management of foreign trade with the West. While S. Korea 
received large amounts of economic aid from the West. mainly from the US and 
Japan in the 1950's and 1960's: the country was subsequently cited as one of the 
success stories of the developed countries' aid programmes. On September 7.1978, 
an official of the Xinhu said that the economic success of S. Korea was worthy of 
attention(I 16). 
Seoul's efforts to improve relations with the PRC were aimed not only at 
dfversl. ýýLng its trading partners. but also at ensuring peace and security on the 
Korean peninsula. S. Korea's export-led economic policy requLred trading partners 
who could provide raw materials and overseas markets. S. Korea exported primarily- 
over 33%--to the American market. and viewed the expansion of trade with China 
and other socialist countries as a means to reduce dependence upon the US and 
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Japan(l 17). 7bough the PRC was concerned about the growing international status 
of S. Korea. her more advanced technologies and financial capabilities held great 
i 
potential for the Chinese economy. 
The Emergence of Indirect Secret Trade 
I- 
,ý it was In - the early 1970's that, S. Korea! s govenunent lifted its rigid ban on 
trade with conununist countries. S. Korea announced in 1971 that Seoul would be 
willing to -improve relations with any "non-hostile" communist country -that 
recognised the sovereignty of S. Korea and gave no aid to N. Korea. In September of 
that year. a "S. Korean economic delegation" led by the president of KOTIRA visited 
communist countries with government approval(I IS). 
In 1971. S. Korea's attitude towards trade with the USSR was positive. and 
that initially triggered China's change of policy towards S. Korea(119). According to 
Japanese sources, there was evidence of Soviet contact with representatives of 
S. Korea from January 1971. but neither country acknowledged these rumours(120). 
There was some rivalry between China and the USSR In trade with S. Korea. For 
examplc. Xinhu accused "Soviet social-imperialism" of "Intensifying collusion with 
the Park Chung-hee clique to mislead world public opinion. " A statement made by a 
S. Korean businessman. based on a conversation with a Soviet trade oMcial in 
London, suggested bright prospects for direct trade between S. Korea and the USSR. 
In its turn. the USSR struck back at Peking. alleging that China had signed a deal 
with S. Korea for the sale of 1.000 tons of red peppers. This provoked a heated denlal 
from Xinhila. citing additional examples of "open and secret collusion between 
Soviet social-imperialism and the S. Korean puppet Park Chung-hee clique"(1 2 1)., ,: 
After the June 23,1973 declaration it became permissible for S. Korcan ships 
to berth in conununist ports and vice versa, thus giving access to parts of the world 
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that had formerly been forbidden(122). Furthermore. the S. Korean Ministry of 
Finance extended permission for industries to participate in International bids, at 
the invitation of communist countries in particular. by means of an amendment to 
the Trade Transaction Act (Hereafter 7TA) made on April 12.1974. 
Expatriate-Koreans played an important role in establishing friendly 
commercial links with China. Since the Chinese insisted that they would discuss 
S. Korean trade only with people they trusted. several of Korea's overseas 
businessmen who had obtained American citizenship, and who had connections 
with expatriate-Chinese businessmen, attempted to do-business with China and 
S. Korea via third countries: notably South Vietnam, West Germany. and the US. 
From Interviews with expatriate-Korean businessmen it emerged that during the 
substantial S. Korean involvement In the Vietnam War In the 1970's. Kor-yo Kukjae 
Mun-hun Mu-oek KorWýsa [Korea International Cultural Trade Company]. run by 
Graham Ahn. a businessman In Los Angeles. began trading with China and S. Korea 
via South Vietnam(123). In this way, the Initial portion of S. Korea's China trade was 
through third parties, especially via South Vietnam due to S. Korea's involvement in 
the Vietnam War. 
The chief items imported from China via third countries to S. Korea were 
medicinal herbs, wigs and peanuts. Due to the political constraints imposed by the 
N. Korean government. there was no direct trade between China and S. Korea. 7be 
process of trade between the two countries seems have been on a three pronged 
basis. Kor-yo Kukjae Mun-tuva Mu-oek Kong-sa Imported semi-finished materials 
from China via a Chinese company in South Vietnam and exported them to S. Korea 
for completion and final export to the US. After 1972 several S. Koreans holding 
American citizenship visited Vietnarn seeking further trade opportunities. 7bey had 
already secured those Chinese Items which were essential for S. Korea 
manufactures, but they reallsed that both the manufacturing process and the 
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delfvery of re-exported materials were made both more difficult and inefficient than 
necessary, due largely to the state of political relations between the two 
countries(124). 
The Hong Kong Connection 
It was well known in the West that seeking Intermediary partners. such as 
Hong Kong. Japan. Singapore. West Germany. or other countries was the best way 
to overcome the obstacles raised by political constraints. Such Is the Importance of 
Hong Kong In particular that Chinese-S. Korean trade can be tracked using unofficial 
f1gures from this country. 
7be role of Hong Kong as a lively commercial entrepreneurial centre with its 
own manufacturing industry. and an acute sensitivity to world markets. together 
with ChIna7s quest for standing In the Intemational community. and S. Korea's 
export-oriented economic policy made possible unoMcW econon-dc relations between 
China and S. Korea. 
7be nature of Hong Kong's contribution to China is worth spelling out. It has. 
over the years. provided up to 40% of the entire foreign exchange earnings of China. 
During the two decades of US attempts to isolate Peking from world commerce. 
Hong Kong served as an essential. politically neutral, staging-post for the 
transshipment of Chinese goods to the rest of the world; even at the very height of 
Cultural Revolution xenophobia and anti-Westernism during the 1960's. -- 
Hong Kong provided S. Korca with a quiet but effective window in its trade with 
the non-capitalist countries. Since the Korean War the S. Korean govenunent had 
been allowed to use Hong Kong as a base for observing China. It seemed obvious for 
S. Korea to consider Hong Kong as a feasible nexus through which to trade with 
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China. In 1971. Hong Kong was S. Korea! s fourth largest trading partner, surpassed 
only by the US, Japan and South Vietnam: and was also one of the few areas with 
which S. Korea had a favourable trade balance. In 1972 Hong Kong's re-exports to 
S. Korea increased by 68.3% to US$142 million. Moreover China ranked second 
amongst Hong Kong's Import partners until 1981. and after that year ranked 
first(125). Hong Kong imported various raw materials from China. then packed and 
despatched them to S. Korea. In 1970 for instance S. Korea imported from Hong Kong 
around US$15 million worth of dairy produce. sugar, coffee and tea. beverages, 
textile fibres. scrap metal, machine products and chemical products. none of which 
were available from Hong Kong, and these presumably originated in China. -I 
S. Korea. in turn. exported around US$30 millionvorth of local products to 
Hong Kong in 1970: cotton textiles. cement. fertilizer industries. tiles. electrical 
components and PVC materials(126). It-is, however. diMcult to say whether these 
commodities from S-Korea to Hong Kong were re-exported to China. because similar 
commodities were required for Hong Kong's constructIon projects. According to 
recent S. Korean sources, of S. Korea! s exports to Hong Kong In the early 1970; 90% 
were consumed In Hong Kong. while the remaining 10% were re-exported to China. 
A few S. Korean sen-d-finished goods, i. e. some of the PVC materials and fertilizer 
materials. were completed and packed In Hong Kong(127). 
Furthermore. many expatriate-Koreans in the US and Hong Kong with family 
links In S. Korea and dealings with expatriate-ChInese businessmen. helped Hong 
Kong to strengthen its Intermediary role between China and S. Korea. thus 
encouraging China's efforts to regenerate Its economic relations with the West via 
Hong Kong. Many S. Korean businessmen in S. Korea who were more interested in 
Hong Kong! s role in the context of the trade and service networks between Hong 
Kong and S. Korea. were encouraged by Hong Kong's economic successes and its 
entrepot trade with China. For instance, S. Korean trade oMcIals and businessmen in 
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Hong Kong were employed by government owned companies worth US$2.5 million. 
Ile New S. Korea Trade Centre opened In Hong Kong in 1971, containing some 
twenty-one S. Korean retail shops(128). 
, Chinas attitude was shown by the fact that permission was given for Mang 
1Aqun to visit Seoul with his wife en route to Hong Kong. Indicating their willingness 
to trade with S. Korea(129). Communication with S. Korean businessmen and fwnfly 
members abroad was maintained through friends or acquaintances In Hong Kong. 
7bey took advantage of the possibilities to further the Interconnection of Korean- 
overseas business between China and S. Korea: avoiding the S. Korean government's 
restrictions on foreign exchange. and the danger of trading failures due to the non- 
existence of diplomatic relations. From a practical point of view. commercial links 
between China and S. Korea became easier after the establishment of postal and 
telegraphic communications between them In 1974. The initial discreet trade via 
third parties grew into an important two-way trade--a development of such 
significance as to overshadow all that had gone before. 
2.3 Conclusions 
During this period. relations between China and S. Korea were characterised 
by cautious Chinese responses to S. Korean overtures. China was constrained by her 
determination not to Jeopardise ties with Pyongyang, and by Sino-Soviet rivalry In 
the peninsula. 77he Initial test for China and S. Korea concerned security relations. In 
this period mutual denigration ceased. and some of the potential conflicts between 
them were sidestepped. The two countries met at international fora. though not in 
China, and the Chinese response stopped short of total rejection. As long as the 
Chinese continued to stress relations with N. Korea. In the wake of the collapse of 
Vietnam and Soviet military expansionism in Northeast Asia, they Ignored the many 
intermediaries that spoke on Seoul's behalf in Peking. 
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In restructuring ChinXs foreign trade apparatus. it was S. Korea that was the 
main beneficiary of the new Chinese foreign policy. Once relations between China 
and S. Korea no longer relied purely on political factors. economic development could 
reasonably be substituted for the security agenda. In order to cope with serious 
economic and social problems. China needed to conduct revolutionary changes so as 
to regenerate her trade relations with the West. In these circumstances indirect 
secret trade via Hong Kong with informal contacts with S. Korea. appears to have 
flourished. 
While animosity remained between China and S. Korea. however, as a 
consequence of the N. Korean complications. S. Korea chose to develop a policy 
towards China based on an economic agenda. Both China and S. Korea appear to 
have had some difflculty distinguishing and disentangling China's policy towards 
S. Korea from Its Korean policy in general. Relations between the countries in this 
period could be described as good progress under poor conditions. S. Korea! s so- 
called "June 23rd Declaration" could not be fully implemented to Improve relations 
with China if China would not cooperate. for example, China still did not allow 
S. Koreans to participate in international meetings and sporting events in China. In 
essence. China had no real policy towards S. Korea(130). 
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QLAPTER THREE: ENCOUR-AGING DEVELOPMENTS. DECEM[BER 197s. 1984 
After the period of cautious -developments 
between China and S. Korea 
relations entered a period of encouraging developments between 1978 and 1984. 
Further progress was made possible by the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh 
Central Conurdttee of the CCP, In December 1978, which gave a new and vital 
Impetus to S. Korea! s contacts with China. as China was now committed to reaching 
out to the West. The second essential stimulus was provided by the Sino-American 
normallsation In January 1979, which allowed China to devote her energies to the 
pursuit of a peaceful regional envirorunent, In particular on and around the Korean 
peninsula. During this period there were a number of unforeseen incidents and 
developments which required policy-makers to become more adaptable. thus 
crystalLsing a great many new links between China and S. Korea. 
3.1 PoUtico-Strategic Relations 
During the period between 1978 and 1984. China needed a peaceful 
environment to allow modernisation. She first reflected S. Korea's fle; dbillty. then 
actively pursued such a stance herself, through It remained diMcult for Peking to 
ignore Its traditional ally, N. Korea. 7be first official contact between China and 
S. Korea provided them with the opportunity to sound out the likelihood of 
rapprochement. S. Korea's security required Chinese support. no less than the 
Chinese required regional calm. and this ultimately allowed relations between the 
two countries to be accorded a new and positive prominence. 
Development of Chinese Regional Policy and Its Flexibility towards 
S. Korea I 
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After the Tbird Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Conunittee of the CCP 
III December 1978, China was willing to take practical steps towards a pragmatic 
Policy on the Korean peninsula. in order to devote the greatest possible attention to 
the "Four Modernisatlons" at the expense of Maoist ideological certainties. The rapid 
improvement of relations with the industrial West was seem most clearly in the 
tionnalisation of relations with the US, and the signing of a Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship with Japan. This resulted in Increasing tension with the USSR. and later 
In a strtving for balance between the US and the USSR(l). 
'Mese shifts in attitude were rooted in China! s efforts towards moden-Lisation. 
Together with China! s long-term foreign policy goals this'produced a new thrust in 
Peking's extemal policies. As the open door policy expanded'. the need to'coordinate 
foreign policy with diplomatic-political policy encouraged a new pragmatism and 
flexibility in relations between China and S. Korea. 
After developing rnIlItary pseuda-alliances with the US and Japan and taking 
an anti-hegemony stance towards the USSR. China publicised her efforts to ease 
tensions on the peninsula and sought to enhance her image as a peace-loving 
country. 7bis new approach arose out of a review of international relations in the 
region. in which China recognised the central importance of peace and stability on 
the Korean peninsula: the threat of military confrontation between the North and 
the South being seen as the most dangerous flashpoint in Northeast Asia. 
7be Chinese leaders recognised that military confrontation In Korea would 
place China in the strategic dilenuna of either supporting N. Korea. thereby 
jeopardising Sino-US/Japan relations. or abandoning N. Korea, totally to Soviet 
influence. To forestall such a possibility it was clearly in ChIni! s national interest to 
pursue a more practical course in Its relations with S. Korea. 7be key element of the 
new policy was the maintenance of the status quo on the Korean peninsula, together 
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With the easing of tension. On the one hand. China continued to maintain its long- 
established friendly relations with N. Korea: while on the other hand. China had to 
develop friendly. cooperative relations with S. Korea. 
I Chtna7s regional responsibilities necessitated the moderation of their attitude 
towards S. Korea after the hostility of the post-Korean War years. China's actually 
Playing a paci6ring role on the Korean peninsula is a vivid demonstration that 
S. Korea had been drawn Into Peking's broader regional strategy(2). During Deng 
XIaopIng`s visit to Washington In January 1979, he agreed to the US request that 
China play a more active role in defusing tension on the Korean peninsula: so that 
when President Park was assassinated by his chief aide In October 1979. China 
Wormed N. Korea that if Pyongyang took any aggressive action-against the South. 
causing difficulties between Peking and Washington, China would cut oil supplies to 
N. Korea(3). Despite President Park's death and the increased influence of Moscow on 
S. Korea. (the USSR was sending economic missions and groups of journalists to 
Seoul by this Ume). a ranldng Chinese Foreign Ministry official stated that China 
had no Intention of establishing contact with S. Korea(4). - 
Peking's attitude towards S-Korea was confirmed by the Chinese Foreign 
Secretary Huang Hua. in his speech. "Policies Foreign Affairs and the General 
Situation in the 1980's and Future Tasks". later published by the Institute of 
International Relations in Taipei. He declared "Kuan-men pu-shang-sd" Ithe door is 
closed but not deadly lockedl. Huang Hua outlined the regime's basic principles for 
dealings with the Korean peninsula in his 1980 report. First. the reunification of 
N. Korca and S. Korea must be effected through peaceful means without outside 
intervention. Thus. Peking acknowledged the US military presence in S. Korca, 
Peking made its position clear and expressed its understanding of the US stance. 
Second. China regarded the USSR as the main dangerous factor on the Korean 
peninsula. The PRC. along with the US and Japan. shared the responsibility, for 
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Upholding the status quo. thus ensuring stability In Northeast Asia and the whole 
Asla-Pacific region. 7bird, China would closely scrutintse the USSR's influence on 
the Korean peninsula, and continuously consult, with the US and Japan. Fourth, if 
N-Korea established a position whereby they would cooperate with the USSR against 
China, then China would irnmediately play their "S. Korea card". 7bis would tend to 
Weaken pro-Soviet putschist elements In N. Korea as well as improving relations with 
S-Korea where this was in their mutual Interest(5). 
By the end of the decade China had clearly reduced her animosity towards 
S. Korea. Although the Chinese leaders publicly reaffirmed Peking7s long-standing 
opposition to any mrWo Koreas" formula, the new approach would make a major 
contribution to the balancing act which China was conducting between N. Korea and 
S. Korea. allaying concern about Soviet threats, and assuring China's general foreign 
policy goal of relaxing tension in the peninsula. 'Me Chinese shifted from a position 
that would not countenance any ties with S. Korea to an increasingly active. non- 
governmental relationship. From this time onwards, Peking! s diplomats were allowed 
to contact their S. Korean counterparts at diplomatic meetings in other countries(6). 
Although Peking refused to issue entry visas to S. Koreans because of N. Korean 
oppositlon. China quietly repudiated the ideological principles that were once the 
hallmark of its foreign policy, dealing with Issues on a pragmatic, case-by-case 
basis. 
7be pro-Communist Chinese daily newspapers of Hong Kong reflected the 
changing attitudes of Peldng towards S. Korea by beginning to use the term 
*Republic of Korea7 (HanKuo In Chinese) frequently in their headlines. TaglonffBao, 
WenwelPo. and ShinwanPo still described S. Korea as Nan-chao-xtan In their articles. 
but they often called It the "Republic of Koree or "HarV. the init. 1al of the Chinese 
name of Korea. In their non-political or sporting headlines. In particular. in spite of 
N. Korean protests to these dailies regarding their use of S. Korea's official name. 
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Chinese reports covering the 1980 Asian Women's Basketball Championships held 
in Hong Kong consistently referred to the Republic of Korea as "Hankuk"(7). On May 
5 1980 an editorial In DR referred to S. Korea In a new way. alluding to it as 
"diehard". instead'of the long-used terms "reactionary" or "Imperialist running 
dog"(8). 
Peking was far less active than the USSR in criticising the S. Korean 
government for the repression in Kwangju In May 1980(9). On May 20 1980 an 
editorial in RMRB criticised the S. Korean government as follows: "the cowardliness 
and weakness of the Seoul regime... fully express its hostility to the people In 
continuing'the policy of dictatorship" instead of using the term "criminal act" which 
had previously been used(10). 
It has also been'Teported that Peking persuaded Washington to suspend 
President Cartefs decision to withdraw troops from S. Korea in 1979(l 1). It can be 
viewed as encouraging that China played a part in at least presenring the status quo 
on the Korean peninsula. 
N. Korea and the Status Quo on the Korean Peninsula 
China began to reassess its relationship with N. Korea. hoping to ease the 
strains between them, after the Chinese military machine failed to profit from the 
lessons of Vietnam. More seriously. Pyongyang's recognition of Babrak Karmal's pro. 
Soviet government. after the USSIrs invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979, meant 
that Peking was surrounded by Afghanistan. Vietnam. and Mongolla. 'all of which 
were either allies of. or aligned to the USSR(12). Jonathan D. Pollack argued that 
leaders in both China and N. Korea reached the conclusion that neither stood to gain 
from the open polemical battles that marked Sino-Soviet relations in the early 
1960's and Sino-Vietnamese relations In the late 1970's(13). 
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In the light of the PRC's self-appointed mandate to maintain a peaceful 
international environment. Peking could not but interpret S. Korea! s efforts in sharp 
contrast to those of N. Korea(14). When US Secretary of Defence Harold Brown 
visited Peking In January 1980, he was assured that China would not support 
N. Korea in the event of an attack on the South. Seeing what had happened in 
Afghanistan China feared that if N. Korea invaded S. Korea Pyongyang might be 
occupied by the USSR on the pretext of protecting N. Korea(15). Chinese leaders were 
also concerned about the instability in the peninsula resulting from N. Korea's 
reckless and belligerent behaviour(16). N. Korean soldiers fired across the DMZ on 12 
August 1981. and two N. Korean MIG-21's flew over Paengnyung Island which was 
under United Nations Control (Hereafter UNC). Furthermore. a N. Korean missile was 
fired at a US reconnaissance plane on 27 August 1981. By contrast. when a corpse 
and other items. believed to belong to a Chinese soldier killed during the Korean 
war. were found south of the demilitarized zone on 23 July 1981. S. Korea 
respectfully and unconditionally returned them to the Chinese representative of 
MAC. in cooperation with the UNC at the D MZ(1 7). 
From the early 1980's onwards It Is evident that the Chinese increased 
diplomatic activity towards N. Korea. in the hope of developing more friendly 
relauons(18). This was marked by a series of exchanges between top leaders in 
China and N. Korea. Between 1981 and 1984. there were six meetings disclosed in 
which one or more of the senior leaders from each state participated (Kim 11-sung 
and Kim Jong 11 for N. Korea: Deng Xlaoping. Hu Yaobang. and Zhao Zlyang for 
ChIna)(19). For example, Deng accompanied Kim on a tour of Sichuan province for 
four days. and Hu Yaobang escorted him from Chengdu to Man, returning together 
to Peking(20). 
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Seeking stability on the peninsula the PRC did their best to encourage the 
Pyongyang regime to follow a course of reform similar to that pursued by Deng 
Xiaoping since 1978. Chinese leaders also repeatedly emphasised their hope that 
Peking had persuaded N. Korea to accept the ongoing political, economic, and 
strategic evolution In the international environment. For example, Peking helped 
N. Korea to gain a United Nations Development Program (Hereafter UNDP) loan of 
US$8 million for the development of railway facilities. under the auspices of the 
US(2 1). 
N. Korea attempted to alleviate its terrorist-exporting image with Kim 11-sung's 
new proposals towards the US in 1984. It is significant that China conveyed 
Pyongyang's first proposal for tripartite talks to the US while the USSR showed no 
sign of endorsing N. Karea! s Initiative. After US senator Jacob Javit's meeting with 
Deng Xiaoping. he told reporters that Chinese leaders supported a tripartite 
conference suggested by Pyongyang, involving the US. the South and the North(22). 
China did not intend to play an Intermediary role between the US and N. Korea 
because this might adversely affect Sino-Amerlcan relations. It Is also noteworthy 
that Deng Maoping recommended Panmunjom, in Korea's DMZ. to US defence 
secretary Caspar Weinberger as the venue for four power armistice talks(23). 
7be Chinese leaders were careful to avoid being drawn into a closer 
association with the US, despite the urgings of American leaders, and were 
beginning at the same time to improve relations with the USSR without sacrificing 
any basic principles. A major component of China's foreign policy was to reduce 
tensions on the Korean peninsula, so as to assure an environment in which her 
modernisation could come to fruition(24). When. In September 1984, the British and 
Chinese governments reached agreement over Hong Kong under the unique 
arrangement of "one country, two systems". it was reported that Chinese leaders 
admitted that China did not completely support some of the paths that N. Korea had 
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taken. They had urged N. Korea to accept a similar formula. in effect a Chinese 
version of the N. Korean "confederated state" formula. which would "respect" the 
existing systems of the North and the South(25). Chinese leaders were also using 
terms of moderate tone. such as "durable peace". rather than more assertive terms. 
For example. during his visit to Pyongyang in May 1984 Hu Yaobang stated:, 
When the US President visited China recently, Chinese leaders. 
myself included. frankly reiterated the stand of China fully supporting the 
independent and peaceful reunification of Korea. in the framework of a 
confederation. through talks, in order to move towards a durable peace on 
the Korean peninsula. It Is the most realistic and feasible way, and therefore 
the best way to reunify the Korean peninsula peacefully(26). 
In addition. it was reported that there were ditTerent views held by the Chinese 
and the N. KorearLs on the struggle against Imperialism. At a world conference of 
journalists opposed to imperialism, held in Pyongyang in July 1983. part of a speech 
by a Chinese delegate was omitted in the N. Korean translation(27). The Chinese 
leaders clearly wished to depict their relations with N. Korea as modest. limited. and 
indirect: indeed. China went beyond her repeated assurances concerning the North's 
lack of aggressive intentions, and set explicit limits to the PRCs prospective support 
in the event of renewed hostilities. In a meeting with a delegation from the Japanese 
Socialist Party (Hereafter JSP) in June 1984. Mang Yjangshan. an adviser to the 
CCP International Liaison Department. stated that "If the DPRK strikes the first blow 
and starts a war. China would be In no position to support her. " His statement 
sought to explicitly dissociate China from any renewed hostilities initiated by the 
North(28). 
Secking China's Support under the Fffth RepubUc 
After the assumption of power by general Chun Doo-hwan in 1980 and the 
emergence of the 5th Republic. the new President and his government faced the 
double tasks of consolidating a tolerable degree of political stability and tackling the 
88 
equally pressing problems of the economy. He pursued the same strategy" for 
improving relations with China as President Park: using a body of skilled and 
experienced technocrats(29). Foreign and security policy seeking support from China 
continued to absorb much of the attention of the Sth Re public. because the survival 
of both the governrnent and the country itself depended to a considerable extent on 
the maintenance of at least areasonably fa, ýourable external environment. 
From 1978 onwards editorials in leading S. Korean newspapers were f1mily 
supportive of normal relations between China, America and Japan, in contrast to 
Seoul's suspicious response to Sino-American rapprochement In 1972. Many in 
S. Korea. especially In government circles. regarded China as "a balance" against the 
USSR(30). S. Korea was also seeking China! s support to influence the formulation of 
a reuniflcation strategy, especially regarding North-South dialogues and economic 
co-operation. It would provide S. Korea with more favourable opportunities to 
Improve relations with China than ever before. 
China's contact with S. Korea remained exceedingly limited and Indirect In 
nature. Chun therefore attempted to pursue a more effectivc organisation of the 
government so as to engage In more active contact with China. For this he 
emphasised the so-called 'Trio" of diplomats: the S. Korean Ambassador to India Lee 
Bum-suk. the former Premier and foreign minister Choi Kyu Hah. and the 
Ambassador to Washington Kim Young Shik. all leading playcrs In the scheme of 
S. Korea's foreign policy towards communist countries. In particular. President Chun 
appointed 1-ce Bum-suk. one of the few S. Koreans better known outside his own 
country than within it, as Minister of National Unification. He later became Minister 
of Foreign Affairs and was in favour of casing restrictions on communism In order to 
extend S. Korca's "north-oriented" foreign policy(3 1). 
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President Chun freely expressed his willingness to cooperate with countries in 
ideological opposition to the US Including China. At a news conference at the 
National Press Club in Washington. D. C. In February 1981. he stated his attitude 
towards China by answering a question as follows, "If the People's Republic of China 
is a friend of the US. I think I can extend the logic and say a friend of a friend is less 
of a threat to us than the other power that you have mentioned"(32). He further 
elaborated a basic Korean policy towards China in an Interview with Tj= magazine 
in April 198 1: 
We are as a matter of principle in favour of exchanges of goods and 
people with countries that do not agree with us ideologically. provided that 
those countries do not take hostile action against us. But I do not believe It 
will be easy for us to improve these relations rapidly. 7be US could help us. 
for example. by helping to persuade China to engage in an exchange of 
goods. to recognise the Republic of Korea and help the Republic of Korea 
become a member of the UN. 7ben the US could recognise the existence of 
N. Korea(33). 
Another factor prompting S. Korea, to reassess her attitude towards China was 
the retrenchment In military budgets. Financial considerations obliged S. Korea to 
cutback Its military budget. turning Its energies away from military options. and 
towards a foreign policy of rapprochement with China. This alternative strategy to 
deal with the N. Korean threat Is largely responsible for the Improvement in Inter- 
Korean relations. 
After Seoul was awarded the 1988 Olympic Games, on September 30 1981. 
S. Korea began cutting defence budgets in order to erect Olympic facilities. 7bis 
process continued when the Asian Carnes Federation decided to hold the 1986 Asian 
Gaines in Seoul: the S. Korean govenunent found it Increasingly dLfflcult to persuade 
the National Assembly to vote additional funds to the military budget as a result in 
the growth of the peace movement at home(34). It became clear that S. Korea's most 
expedient means to discourage the North's militant policy of unification was to 
cooperate with China. thus maintaining the peace in the region. 
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Contacts between China and S. Korea became more regular than before. 
Limited nonpolitical contacts with S. Korea Increased. Both China and S. Korea began 
to participate regularly in international events in other countries. 7be most frequent 
exchanges between China and S. Korea were made by Korean staff members of the 
WHO. A Chinese staff member of the UN Secretariat participated In an International 
workshop on Maritime Law held in Seoul during the summer of 1981, returning 
again for a seminar on international law sponsored by the UN Institute for Training 
and Research in October '1982(35). In July 1981. another Chinese scholar. Yuan 
Chuangjing, who is a member of the law institute of the PRC Academy of Social 
Sciences, reportedly came to the same meeting on a Chinese passport though he did 
not travel directly from China but from the US where he was serving as a visiting 
scholar(36). Soon afterwards two Chinese staff members from WHO visited Seoul for 
a regional conference of the organisation. When a Chinese baseball team 
participated the international baseball championship in Seoul in 1981, a senior 
Chinese official stated that China would attend the 1988 Olympic games in Seoul 
despite N. Korea's opposition. 7be oMcW'told reporters: "As a member of the 
Olympic movement we will go where the games are held"(37). 
In the same spirit. China granted visas to expatriate Koreans holding S. Korean 
passports to visit their relatives in China, or for commercial purposes. Fifteen 
hundred did so In 1982, compared to 800 in 1981. A 76-year old man who had 
emigrated to Manchuria in 1940 and lived in Jilin province for 37 years was assisted 
to return to S. Korea by the S. Korean Red Cross, he was reported to have obtained 
permission from the Chinese government(38). Agreements even permitted Chthese 
fishermen to seek shelter from the weather In S. Korean ports, and another 
procedure existed whereby Chinese fishermen shipwrecked on the S. Korean coast 
were returned, without publicity, to the authorities in Hong Kong(39). Additionally, 
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at the end of 1982. China allowed 65 people from 47 families. to return to S. Korea, 
permanently, and a further 23 people to return for temporary visits(40). 
The S. Korean government was now ready, to permit a Tokyo-Peking Air Route 
via S. Korean airspace. In testimony before the Foreign Affairs Conunittee of the 
National Assembly on November 11 1981 Deputy Foreign Minister Kim Dong-whie 
stated that the government would not oppose such a flight route for commercial 
aircraft. This suggestion had been made by the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (Hereafter ICAO). to reduce flight time and fuel consumption. The 
Tokyo-Peking route, opened In 1974. detoured south of Cheju island. A straightened 
out route, via S. Korean airspace. flight time would be shortened by one hour and 
twenty minutes, according to the Deputy Mirilster(41). 
It is also noteworthy that Sir John Addis, former British envoy in Peldng. often 
visited S. Korea. and he even anticipated the establishment of diplomatic relations 
between China and S. Korea In the near future(42). He emphasised that "it would be 
the right course of development. " After talldng with "responsible people in Peldng", 
he had come to accept that China was exerting iniluence on N. Korea to deter 
another war on the Korean peninsula. 
The First Official Contact, and Seoul's Debut of "Northern Policy" 
Against this background an unexpected opportunity arose to break the log-J am 
between Peking and Seoul. The first direct contact came about as a consequence of 
the hijacking of a Chinese civil airliner to S. Korea in May 1983, Initiating a genuine 
breakthrough in relations between the two countries(43). 
After the landing of a hijacked airliner of the CMI Aviation Administration of 
China (Hereafter CAAC) on an air field near Chuncheon. China was eager to resolve 
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the issue quickly. sending a team of 33 officials led by Shen Tu. Director General of 
the CAAC. on May 7.1983(44). The Chinese officials together with the crew of their 
Boeing 707. unconditionally received 72 hour entry permits. From the S. Korean 
perspective. It was "the day that changed relations with China7. The Chinese team 
carried out negotiations for the repatriation of the aircraft. its cargo, and the 106 
passengers on broad. directly with the S. Korean authorities. under the auspices of 
the US Embassy In Peking. It was reported that the US played a signMcant role in 
facilitating the negotiations which led to the Chinese delegation's surprising visit to 
Seoul. 
According to S. Korean intelligence sources the hijacked airplane carried 
several officials of the Chinese Foreign Ministry as well as. ironically. an expert on 
China! s nuclear development program. Thus, ' China wanied to re'solve the incident 
as quickly as possible without the involvement of third parties. and this produced an 
official agreement under which the hijacked airliner. crew. and passengers were 
promptly returned to China(45). From a S. Korean point of view. It was important to 
avoid provoking the outrage of Pyongyang which had been evident, for example, in 
the N. Korean reaction in 1982 to the lucrative trade developing between Peking and 
Seoul. Taiwan made a strong protest referring to "Kowtow Diplomacy". 
7bis incident provided S. Korea with an opportunity for its first official contact 
with China and implied significant political tolerance. Immediately after the 
hijacking of a Chinese airliner to S. Korea. China sent a cable message to the 
S. Korean authorities demanding direct negotiations in Seoul concerning the 
hijacked jet and passengers. In the cable. China oMclally used the official'title of 
S. Korea. the "Republic of Korea" (Hankuk in Korean) for the first time since the 
establishment of We PRC in 1949(46). Shen Tu later expressed his thanks to the 
S. Korean authorities for their hospitality and humanitarian concern. In a 
memorandum signed by both sides on 9 May. which bear their oftial Identities for 
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the first time. signed in the name of the "Republic of Koree and the "People's 
Republic of China". thus implying a form of diplomatic recognition for S. Korea. they 
agreed to further cooperation should similar emergency situations occur(47). 
The defections. at various time. of several Chinese pilots to S. Korea occasioned 
a practical need to deal officially with such situations now that It was very possible 
to do so(48). When Chinese aircraft hopped across the Yellow Sea to S. Korea. Seoul 
was flattered to be regarded as a sanctuary of freedom but. more importantly. it 
came to reallse that the flights led China into active contact with S. Korea. When the 
hijacking trial took place in Seoul it seemed likely that Peking would be asked to 
send witnesses to testify in court. but the PRC appeared eager to leave it to S. Korea 
without any further involvement In the trial of the four hijackers(49). When. on 7 
August 1983. a Chinese air force pilot defected. with a MIG-21 to S. Korea. Seoul 
said that she stood ready to respond to any approach from Peking. but not via a 
third party. On this occasion, China did not demand direct negotiations on the 
return of the plane. unlike the case of the hijacking. Instead. a spokeswoman from 
the Chinese Foreign Ministry simply said that they wanted the aircraft and pilot 
returned(50). 
How would these unanticipated. open. face-to-face contacts affect S. Korea and 
her changing foreign policy towards China? Seoul hoped that these incidents would 
pave the way for substantial gains in the sense of a much broader contact with 
Peking. in line with diplomatic efforts which had been pursued for many years. 
s. Korea! s former Foreign Miz-dster Lee Bum-suk's address before the National 
Defence College on 29 June 1983. stressed a bold policy approach towards the 
socialist countries or "Puk-bang-chung-ckaele [Northern Policy]. He placed the 
establishment of formal relations with China as the first priority in S. Korea! s 
Northern Policy. the airn of which was to enhance Seoul's profile in the international 
community(51). He pointed out: 
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Our most important foreign policy goal in the 1980's is to prevent the 
recurrence of war on the Korean peninsula. And from now on, the most 
imminent task Is how to create an advantageous and favourable diplomatic 
situation for the implementation of the 'Towards North" policy. which means 
to normallse relations with the USSR and China(52). 
In accord with such statements. Seoul immediately made further bold 
diplomatic advances towards communist countries. It is also noteworthy that 
S. Korea seized on Pyongyang's Intransigence to forge links with pro-Pyongyang 
countries. For example. Pakistan. friend of China and sometime friend of N. Korea. 
chose to announce full diplomatic relations with S. Korea in November 1983. 
As a consequence of the Chinese airline hijacking incident. the resulting covert 
inter-governmental negotiation between China and S. Korea clearly demonstrated 
that. although Peking could not formally recognise S. Korea. she tacitly 
acknowledged the existence of S. Korea on the Korean peninsula. It was one of 
S. Koreaýs most practical achievements, and seemed to favour the long term 
coexistence of the two Koreas. In June 1983 it was revealed that Seoul, Tokyo and 
Peking had reached an agreement the previous January on a new air route linking 
Fukueo in Japan with Shanghai. This permitted Chinese and Japanese planes, as 
well as three other foreign airlines. to fly through the Korean Air Defence 
identification Zone (Hereafter KADIZ). beginning 5 August 1984(53). 
The Cautious Chinese Reaction 
Contacts arising from these incidents could hardly be said to encompass the 
full range of normal interstate relations. Certainly S. Korean expectaUons regarding 
intergovernmental relations were disappointed. China was still highly sensitive to 
N. Korea's reaction to any move they made regarding the South. Indeed, Chirws 
readiness to send important officials to Pyongyang must have upset the N. Koreans. 
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For example. the immediate action taken by China after the hijacking incident was 
to send Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian to N. Korea to placate Kim II-sung's fear of a 
possible China-S. Korea rapprochemeM54). 
China sought to mix continued expressions of firm support with efforts to 
nudge N. Korea In new directions. During Kim Jong 11's secret visit to China In June 
1983. Hu Yaobang accompanied him on a tour of Chengdu and Nanjing. and Hu 
Qill. Secretary of the CCP Central Committee. travelled with Kim Jong 11 to Shanghai 
and Hangzhou. Kim met the majority of the leading cadres of the CCP Central 
Conuratee. and members of the Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo and 
Secretariat. China also sent a delegation to N. Korea to participate in the 35th 
anniversary of the establishment of the N. Korean government in September 1983. 
The delegation was headed by Peng Zhen. a CCP Politburo member. and included 
Hu QflI(55). The importance which was accorded to Kim during this visit seems to 
indicate that the Chinese were ready to accept the North Korean succession 
arrangements. 
Moreover. China stuck to its policy of barring S. Korean officials from 
international meetings In China. When Seoul made secret contact with the PRC's 
government concerning the Chinese First Off-shore Oil Conference and Exhibition in 
Guangzhou (Canton). held 23-27 November 1981 and organised by Wah-Chang 
international Company and the China Council for Promotion of International Trade 
(Hereafter CCPM, a London-based News agency. S. Koreaýs application to attend was 
politely refused by Peking to avoid upsetting N. Korea(56). Peking also turned down 
the visa applicatlon made by a S. Korean official to participate in a geological training 
programme. held in Shandong Province under the auspices of UNESCO between 
May 20-June 9.1983. Similarly China denied an entry visa to an offlclal of the state- 
run Korean Electric Corporation (Hereafter KEQ, who was going to attend a hydro- 
electric workshop at Hangzhou sponsored by the UN Industrial Development 
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Organisation between May 22-June 18.1983. Furthermore, the UN Environmental 
Plan postponed a workshop. originally scheduled to be held in Guangdong Province. 
from 15 November-4 December 1982 because of the Chinese rejection of the official 
S. Korean delegation. Again. China refused entry to Lee Chang Yon. an official of the 
National Fisheries Research and Development Agency. a subordinate body of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fishery(57). He had been parUcipating in an agriculture 
training programme In the Philippines sponsored by the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation, with the aid of the UNDP. Part of this programme was a month-long 
seminar on agriculture techniques In China. 
S. Korea! s patience apparently ran out when for the third time China refused 
entry to a Seoul oMcW. When Lee Chang Yon's request was turned down. S. Korews 
Foreign Ministry was furious. stating: "Meir whole attitude Is really farcical. We. 
thought the Chinese would be more mature than the N. Koreans"(58). From the 
S. Korean point of view. Pekings explanation for refusing the visas (because Peking 
had no diplomatic ties with Seoul). sounded Implausible. For example. China's 
relations with Indonesia had been frozen since 1969, yet Indonesians were allowed 
into China to attend the UN agency meetings. S. Korea was determined not to let 
China get away with a policy of discrimination justified by such a flimsy excuse. ' 
S. Korean oillcials pointed out that the USSR. like China. had close ties with 
Pyongyang. and was quietly but broadly responsive to Seoul's overtures(59). Lee 
Chang Choon. a prominent policyniaker in the Foreign Ministry argued that. 
"considering S. Korea! s membership of 15 speciallsed UN agencies since 1948, as a 
nation with pride and dignity. we cannot let China consistently belittle us in the 
international community. " S. KoreXs position had won some sympathy within 
various UN agencies. A circular issued on 30 June 1983 by the UNDP requested that 
the fundamental principle that all Invited participants be allowed to enter the host 
country be firmly established before entering into any organisational or financial 
comrnitment between the two parties(60). According to Seoul's interpretation. this, 
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statement was tantamount to saying that the UN agency should not'give financial 
assistance or lend its name to any meeting at which the host government was not 
prepared to issue entry visas for all participants. 
On the other hand. S. Korea'could well understand China's difflcufty In 
maintaining a balance between the two Koreas after the hijacking Incident. To 
compensate for China! s offlcial contact with S. Korea in the wake of hijacking 
incident In'1983 Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqlan visited Pyongyang(6 1). As far 
as N. Korea was concerned, Seoul sought to save Pekinirs face. A scholar in Seoul 
said "Considering the N. Korean factor. Seoul should give Peking more time to deal 
with its ales In N. Korea. China Is at a loss as to how to handle two Koreas 
simultaneousV'(62). ' Faced with the Chinese passivity, 'but conunitted to the 
ambitious Puk-bang-chung-ckaek [Northern Policy). Seoul was apparently inclined to 
follow the same formula adopted in the hijacking incident. 
I It was indirectly reported that S. Korea had been asked by Peking to keep the 
reconciliation process between them discreet, for fear of provoking Pyongyang(63). In 
effect. this amounted to asking Seoul not to openly chastise Peking regarding Its 
dealings with Seoul. In response. Foreign Minister Lee Bum Suk cautiously pointed 
out that maturity and confidence would mark S. Korea! s diplomatic posture 
regarding detente with the major socialist countries(64). Finally. 'in August 1983, 
Peking issued a visa on separate sheets of paper to S. Korean government officW to 
attend a UN-sponsored training programme In China. 'Mis was the first time a 
S. Korean public official visited China for any reason. 
After the USSR shot down the Korean Airliner KAL 007 in October 1983 with 
the loss of all on board. China issued a statement In the name of the AH-China 
Federation of Taiwan Compatriots expressing condolences to the families of the 
Taiwan compatriots killed. Shen Tu. Director Ceneral of the Chinese Civil Aviation 
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Authorities. also sent a private message of sympathy to his counterpart in S. Korea 
as saying "We wish to express our condolences on the demise of the victim and 
sympathy to the bereaved familles"(65). Nevertheless, China remained aloof from the 
well-orchestrated indignation. Chinese press comment on the KAL Incident was 
extremely restrained. and. In the Security Council. China abstained in the vote 
condemning the USSR(66). 
At the End of 1983 S. Korea cautiously reviewed its relations with China which 
had been hostile since China intervened in the Korean war 30 years before. A series 
of events in 1983 provided the two countries with hopes for better relations despite 
their ideological differences. The two countries had their first official, contact In May 
to discuss the repatriation of a hijacked Chinese aircraft and its passengers. Then 
Peking allowed S. Korean officials to enter its territory for the first time to attend 
international conferences. The diplomatic and political barrier between the two 
countries still eidsted. however. as was shown by the case of a Chinese Air Force 
pilot's defection to Taiwan by way of S. Korea(67). 
The Impact of the Rangoon Incident, and Pyongyang's Flirtation with 
Moscow 
ChIna! s ambiguous political stance on the Korean peninsula was not effectIve, 
as a peace-keeping strategy. 7bis was made clear by the N. Korean responses to the 
improved Chinese relations with S. Korea which had resulted from the hijacking 
incident. First there was the dramatic and unexpected violence of the Rangoon 
incident in October 1983. which killed several S. Korean cabinet nift-dsters including 
Ixe Bum Suk. the chief exponent of Puk-bang-chung-ckaek 7ben there was 
pyongyanges flirtation with Moscow. regarded by Peking as a very dangerous 
development which was critically dangerous to the region. 
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Pyongyang was firmly resolved to prevent contacts between China and S. Korea 
- at any level. but the Rangoon incident set in motion political consequences very 
different from those N. Korea had anticipated. Ironically. the bombing occurred a day 
after the Chinese leadership had passed N. Korea! s message to the US seeking direct 
contact with Washington(68). The N. Korean action flew in the face of Pekings 
repeated reassurances to the US and Japan that Pyongyang posed no military threat 
to S. Korea. and N-Korea broke their promise to China that N. Korea would not use 
force against S. Korea except In self-defence. As a result. the US and Western 
countries came to regard N. Korea as one of the most dangerous terrorist countries 
in the world, issuing strong statements of condemnation(69). '7be death of S. Koreaýs 
Foreign Minister Lee Bum Suk. moreover. who had been the chief architect of their 
Northern Policy with regard to the third world. especially India. seemed unwelcomed 
by China. 
7be US Department of State had turned down a request made In 1981 by the 
N. Korcan observers at the UN for permission to travel to Washington, D. C. to attend 
an international trade conference jointly sponsored by the UN and the World Bank. 
Subsequently. discussions held in 1983 between China and the US regarding 
developments on the Korean peninsula. had led to Peking helping to arrange the 
inauguration of low-level diplomatic contact between the American and N. Korean 
embassies in Peking(70). Regarding the improvement of relations between the US 
and N. Korea via China's intermediacy. Lee Bum Suk had stressed. when he visited 
Washington in May 1983, that the US should co-ordinate its strategy towards China 
with S. Koreaýs geopolitical and geoeconornic designs. He also suggested that the US 
should contact Pyongyang at the lowest levels with Seoul's full knowledge and 
agreement(71). This had been welcomed by Peking. both to secure the status quo on 
the Korean peninsula. 
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Given the S. Korean desire to improve relations with China it was important 
that they be seen to exculpate China from any involvement In the Rangoon bombing 
despite Burma exploiting ChIna! s alleged role in Rangoon bombing(72). S. Korea 
insisted therefore that the Rangoon incident was part of N. Koreges accustomed 
aggressive pattern: provoking tension on the Korean peninsula without consulting 
Peking. President Chun said in a special statement that "this N. Korean provocation 
is tantamount to a declaration of war". and warned that S. Korea would respond to 
another such act with retaliation(73). 
As it turned out. the Rangoon bombing did more to encourage than to 
discourage S. Korea's relations with China. China's subsequent public comments to 
N. Korea warned of extremely severe political consequences between them if the 
North acted again in a manner grossly contrary to its repeated reassurances of 
peaceful intent(74). For instance. on 6 November 1983 RMRB said that Peking 
agreed with the official Burmese accusation that N. Korea was responsible for the 
bombing. During his visit to Japan later In the month. Hu Yaobang stated: "China... 
holds that whatever actions are likely to aggravate tension [in Koreal, no matter 
where they are from, should be avoided"--as close to a dissociation from the 
N. Korean action as Peking could come under the circumstances(75). China was 
arudous to persuade N. Korea to join the international society; encouraging the 
leadership to end decades of violence and militarisation on the Korean peninsula. 
N. Korea had 'made several overtures to the Soviets at the beginning of the 
1980's. but these were ignored until the succession of Yuri Andropov as Ceneral 
Secretary In late 1082. N. Korea tilted noticeably towards the USSR following the 
Rangoon bombing in October 1983 and the Soviet downing of the KAL in the same 
month. High level contacts. including three rounds of talks between Kim 11-sung and 
Konstantin Chemenko in Moscow during May 1984. resulted in expanded Soviet 
trade development. as well as significant sales of advanced Soviet weaponry(76). 7be 
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Soviets also gained access to N. Korean airspace, which enhanced Soviet air-strike 
capabilities. and to its ports. which were described In a 1984 Soviet military manual 
as "fully integrated" into Soviet Far East Asian strategy(77). 
Closer Soviet-N. Korean ties were reflected In increased N. Korean support for 
Soviet foreign policies and greater public Soviet support for key N. Korean policy 
positions. Pyongyang provided strong rhetorical support for Moscows denunciations 
of an alleged "US-%Japan-S. Korean military axis", echoing N. Korea! s steady stream of 
ominous warnings about the imminence of war and the US nuclear threat to 
N. Korea. Such warnings were almost ignored by the Chinese. 7be Soviets. for their 
part, stepped up their condemnation, of the annual US-S. Korea "ream Spirit" 
military exercises. 
Unlike the USSR. although the Chinese uttered occasional criticisms of the 
annual Team Spirit exercises between US and S-Korean forces. these criticisms were 
generally low-key. For instance. while visiting Japan in March 1984. Vice Premier 
Wan LI stated that "We hope that S. Korean and American troops stationed In 
S. Korea will not launch military actions against Chine(78). Thus. China tacitly 
acknowledged that they would not call for the withdrawal of US forces on the 
peninsula. By Implication. the Chinese recognised that the US forces remained a 
stabillsing element on the Korean peninsula. to which the PRC no longer took 
strenuous exception. 
China began to actively pursue efforts to reduce tension on the Korean 
peninsula. consulting with the US and Japan for this purpose. and making clear 
ChIna! s support for the tripartite talks proposed by N. Korea(79). The Chinese 
attempted to put across the message that N. Korea was willing to develop better 
relations with the US and Japan(80). Deng Xiaoping gave assurances during his 
talks with Japanese visitors that on the Korean Issue China supported the proposal 
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for a peaceful reunification of Korea put forward by N. Korea. and China would work 
for a peaceful solution to the Korean issue and favour a settlement through 
negotlaUons(81). 
' Despite Peking7s concern, about N. Korea playing the "Soviet card". seeking and 
receiving increased military and economic support from the USSR. there was no 
retrenchment of Chiriaýs unofficial and business contacts with* S. Korea. Both China 
and the USSR wanted to maintain peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. but, 
with a conservative Soviet leader In power. China appeared to have a stronger 
interest than the USSR In keeping a balance between the North and the South in 
order to devote all its resources to the pursuit of economic modemisation and 
reform. 7bis led to a positive Chinese attitude regarding S. Korea's efforts to improve 
relations with them. resulting in the IntensifIcation. of the policy of "unofficial 
contacts". Involving sports exchanges. contacts with S. Koreans in international fora. 
family reunification visits. and a burgeoning trade relationship. 7be President of the 
S. Korean Red Cross. Yu Chang-sun. proposed in a letter sent in April 1984 to Qlan 
Xinzhong, president of the Red Cross Society of China, that China allow Korean 
residents In China to visit their relatives in S. Korea. and vice versa as well as 
discussing other humanitarian matters of mutual concern(82). 
While the N. Korcan flirtation with the USSR was regarded by China as an 
irritant. rather than an immediate threat. it was nevertheless a dangerous 
disturbance to ChinWs pursuit of regional stability. Peking began to make more 
positive responses to Seoul's overtures. For instance. on 25 February 1984 a 
S. Korean tennis tearn was allowed to compete in the Davis Cup Eastern Zone 
Eliminat. ion Gaines in Kumning(83). 
It was also reported that two Korean journalists and six soccer Ofllcials visited 
china to attend the general meeting of the Asian Football Confederation (Hereafter 
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AFB)(84). In addition. a 24-member Chinese team participated in the Eighth Asian 
Junior Basketball Championship Games held in S. Korea. at which Taiwan was also 
competing. This caused problems in protocol between Seoul and Taipei due to 
S. Korea's decision not to permit the ROC's national flag and anthem: Taiwan at once 
withdrew its teams from the Gaines. The Olympic Council of Asia held its plenary 
meeting in Seoul from 27-31 September 1984. and chose Peking as the venue for the 
1990 Asian Games. S. Korea having helped Peking lobby members in support of 
Chiras candidacy(85). It was also reported that two leading local provincial officials 
arrtved in Seoul to participate In the international conference on agriculture in 
December 1984(86). 
In effect. Peldng had become Considerably more acUve in the balancing act 
between the North and the South. As stated by Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian in April 
16 1984: 
7he present problem is to encourage the parties involved in the 
tension on the Korean peninsula to enter into talks about ways in which 
tension can be relaxed there... North and South Korea are parties directly 
involved in the tension... as is the US. which stations troops there. We are 
willing to help from the sidelines to encourage both the North and South 
Koreans to enter into talks for peaceful reunification and to discuss ways to 
relax tensions in Northeast Asia. In short. we are willing to do whatever Is in 
our capability. But we cannot say that China can play a prominent role. 
China supported N. Korea's proposal for tripartite talks and is willing to do 
somet 
, 
hing from the sidelines which is conducive to the peaceful reunification 
of Korea and to the relaxation of tensions in Northeast Asta(87). 
China was thus publicly supporting the N. Korean proposals for the 
reunification of the peninsula. but In practice they had not advanced much beyond 
vague statements about creating an environment for dialogue on the peninsula. 
The impact of the Japanese Textbook Controversy 
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Looking at Japan from the Chinese and S. Korean perspective, the most 
sensitive of the standard issues in their perception of Japan is a deep fear that 
Japan might seek a level of mWtarism or ultra-riaUonalisrn commensurate with its 
economic power. For many decades both China and Korea perceived -Japan as a 
potential threat in terms of the Japanese desire for influence on and direct control of 
the Korean peninsula. When. in June 1982, a controversy was sparked by a report 
in the Japanese press that material was shortly to be Introduced for use in Japanese 
secondary, schools which described earlier Japanese aggression against Japan's 
neighbours as "advances". and the Korean independence movement of 1919 as a 
"riot", the issue was taken up by the media In China and then spread quickly to 
S. Korea. both recalling the record of Japanese past aggression(88). 
When the Japanese government refused to accept official complaints from the 
Chinese and S. Korean governments because of domestic pressures, the reaction In 
both China and S. Korea was swift and hostile. 7his Issue brought to the surface the 
powerful. historically-rooted. anti-Japanese feelings, that for decades had never 
been more than just beneath the surface. 7bis shared reaction was particularly 
timely in improving relations between China and S. Korea, there being in both 
countries a deep-seated fear of Japanese militarism, and a perception of right-wing 
sentiments in Japan Increasing In proportion to economic strength. 71ils shared 
position lent urgency to the reconciliation of their differences. 
In 1984 the issue again flared bricfly because of the disclosure of a Japanese 
Ministry of Education document. revealing that the ministry had made a number of 
controversial recommendations for alterations to a particular history textbook. It 
had. for instance, advised that either "assault" or "advance" should be used as the 
standard word to replace "Invasion". When the Japanese published a new series of 
history textbooks'for school use in 1984. the Chinese and S. Koreans expressed 
dissatisfaction that so little had been done to accommodate their grievances-, and 
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again. as after the 1982 controversy. the issue was widely debated in the press of 
both countries(89). 
Japan's textbook distortions of 1982 and 1984 provided China and S. Korea, 
with a subtle mutual consensus. 7be textbook Imbroglio, official visits to the 
Vhsukuni ShrUw. and other events symbolic of past Japanese militarism, had evoked 
shrill warnings of what the future might hold if this tendency was not kept carefully 
in check. 7broughout the summer of 1984 a proliferation of articles condemning the 
distortion of historical facts In Japanese textbooks filled Chinese and S. Korean 
newspapers and journals. 'Mey strongly expressed their common disapproval of the 
efforts. by some conservative and nationalistic groups, in Japan. to publish 
textbooks which exonerated Japanese colonialism and expansionism In Asia during 
the first half of the century, and downplayed Japanese atrocities during World War 
11. Many such articles accused those responsible for the books of attempting to 
rekindle Japanese militarisin(90). 
S. Korea was particularly disappointed by the Japanese Emperor Hirohito's 
choice of words in describing as "the unfortunate past" and "regrettable" the 
suppression of the Korean independence movement and the forced transportation of 
Koreans to Japan in his memoirs. During President Chun's visit to Tokyo, in 
September 1984. the Chinese strongly criticised the "reemergence of Japanese 
militarisur at the expense of the PRC suggesting that Japan considered that the 
PRC. had become a source of hostility to Japan when It sided with N. Korea(9 1). 
In this light it can be seen why the domestic turbulences in China, such as the 
crack-down on reformers in 1979. the anti-bourgeois liberalisation campaign in 
1981. and the anti-spiritual pollution campaign in 1983-1984. did not have much 
influence on Chinese-S. Korean relations. Premier Zhao Zlyang made China! s 
position quite clear In advance of his visit to the US in January 1984. He said: Me 
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Chinese people are preoccupied with the modernisation prograr=e. which requires 
a durable peaceful International enviro=ent". He continued: ýro this end. ... the 
general principle of China! s foreign policy Is to establish and develop friendly 
relations with all countries"(92). 
3.2 Economic Relations 
Although commercial incentives existed for economic relations between China 
and S. Korea. and since the early 1970's a basic trade framework had developed. 
there was a need to move towards more constructive economic relations. It was in 
December 1978 that the Chinese leaders adopted a bold reforming policy, almed at 
attracting technology and capital from their neighbouring countries to speed-up 
modernIsation. From the late 1970's then this "open-door" policy of actively 
pursuing foreign trade and seeking foreign capital and Investment. laid an 
appropriate theoretical base for relations between the two countries resulting in the 
growing integration of economic relations between China and S. Korea in the 
Northeast Asian region. 
The Basis of the New Economic Relations 
17he 7bird Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee in December 
1978 made the strategic decision to open up to the outside world in order to 
invigorate the domestic economy. Ibis initiated fundamental changes in the 
economic system. admitting much greater influence by the outside world, most 
notably by S. Korea. Soon after the decision was taken substantial econornic 
relations developed between China and S. Korea. 
priority was given to promoting both international trade and technology 
transfer as instruments of moden-Asation. 'Mis was offIcially written into the party 
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constitution (Eleventh Congress. 18 August 1977) and the state constitution (Fifth 
National People's Congress. 5 March 1978). In addition, the Third Plenary Session of 
the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP (Hereafter CCPCC) in December 1978 
refocused the domestic economic perspective of the Chinese leadership; Hua 
Guofeng's Ten-Year Development Plan was abandoned in favour of new economic 
development and modernisation. including major changes in agricultural policy and 
a relaxation of controls over privately owned businesses. More emphasis was given 
to "OULaW (professionalism) than to "Hongr'(Ideology) in economic reform. In the 
spirit of "Shf-shl-qtu-shr (seeking truth from facts); ' society was granted greater 
freedom from the state. the economy greater freedom of planning. the government 
greater freedom from the party; and intellectual and cultural life greater freedom 
from ideology(93). As Robert F. Dernberger says, It represented "a wholesale 
rejection of the Maoist economic ideology"(94). 
In tenns of foreign policy. Deng Xiaoping referred to the new open door policy 
as "the Second Revolution": 
"While we have achieved political stability and unity.... we are 
now ... actively expanding economic co-operation in terms of equity and 
mutual benefit with other countries on the basis of self-reliance, striving to 
adopt the world's advanced technologies and equipment and strengthening 
scientific and educational work to meet the needs of modernisation"(95). 
Deng Maoping's much-vaunted cornmitment to economic pragmatism laid the 
basis of a new order of economic relations with S. Korea, which would exploit the 
potential economic complementary between China and S. Korea. This placed S. Korea 
in a vital position with respect to China's economic modernisation. Sino-S. Korcan 
economic relations benefited from many factors in comparison with China's other 
economic partners. Geographic proximity and the consequent ease of sea-borne 
commerce. linguistic complementarity. historical familiarity with local conditions, 
and the S. Korean focus on Goverment-Business coordination in the industrial 
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sector, aU were factors which contributed to the success of trade between the two 
countries. 
Failure to develop contacts with S. Korea would make the achievement of 
China7s opening-up policy costly and uncertain, China therefore studied S. Korea's 
development strategies. both for planned and market economics. - and In 
consequence Implemented a similar. though somewhat modified, strategy employing 
substantial state intervention in the economy. including credit allocation and trade 
quota allocaUon. During 1978 a number of high-level Chinese officials began to 
mention S. Korea's economic growth and potential. In that year the Chinese Academy 
of Social Science (Hereafter CASS) established a small research group. under its 
Institute, of World Economy and Politics. to study the developmental model of 
S. Korea's economy(96). Moreover. when Deng met the Japanese Prime Minister 
Ohira In February 1979, he seemed to have become more aware of the economic 
potential of S. Korea(97). Even though Deng's remarks were aimed at encouraging 
'Japanese Investment for China's modernisation plans, they clearly heralded the 
development of relations between China and S. Korea subsequent to 1978.1 
In practice, as was pointed out by scholars in the West. the Chinese 
government was most interested in establishing special trading zones. along the 
lines of the successful free economic zones in S. Korea. China contained a poor but 
extremely hard-working population that potentially could follow the path blazed by 
the Newly Industriallsed Countries (Hereafter NICs). In doing this. China offered 
greater autonomy and incentives to managers: she decentralLsed management of 
foreign trade. and established the so called "Special Economic Zones" (Hereafter 
SEZs) in coastal areas to attract foreign Investmcnt(98). 
S. Korea's Tentative Attitude 
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On December 1 1978 Kim Kyung-won. special assistant to President Park 
Chung-hee. said that S. Korea's technology and capital would help China to make 
Improvements in human resources that had received low priority throughout the 
entire pTereform period. and would also engender a new stage in the evolving 
multipolar division of international trade and Investment which had resulted from a 
combination of rapid and sustained advances In technology. and the implementation 
of more open policies(99). At the same time. Foreign Minister Park Dong-jin made it 
clear that "the government will not prohibit any commercial activities with 
communist countries with which they have no diplomatic relations"(100). After 
China's reform of the foreign trade system more than 80% of her trade came to be 
with non-communist, countries. mainly the US and Japan, Seoul's know-how and 
technology from Japan were fundamental to this change(i 0 1). 
S. Korea developed its multifaceted policy towards China in parallel with the 
changing economic circumstances and the emergence of a new leadership in the 
CCP during 1980. Although President Chun drew his basic support from the 
military. his economic policy showed that he was prepared to rely on and support 
civilian advisers. For example. he appointed Nam Duck Woo, an expert in foreign 
policy decision-making, as deputy prime minister, minister of the Economic 
Planning Board (Hereafter EPB), and special advisor on economic affairs to the 
Presidency. Nam stated that S. Korea was prepared to act as an Intermediate trading 
partner between China and the US and that transit via N. Korea should be discussed 
for this trade. thus demonstrating S. Korea's conunitment to rapid economic growth 
and outward-looking economic policies(102). He clearly stated In his interview with 
1= magazine that the S-Korean government was willing to develop economic ties 
with China regardless of Ideological hamssment(103). 7bese statements from Seoul 
were intended to coincide with China's open-door policy to the outside world 
emphasising economic development. 
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Such S. Korean efforts seemed to be welcomed by the Chinese reformist 
leadership. who were arudous that their reforms should proceed, while maintaining 
the peace on the Korean peninsula. A long-term political chasin had persisted within 
the Chinese government. both factions being in search of a theoretical foundation to 
support economic reforms. From 1978 onwards the reformists' victories became 
more frequent. notably with the replacement of Hua Guofeng as premier by Zhao, 
Zlyang at the 7bird Session of the Fifth National People's Congress (Hereafter NPC) 
in August-September 1980. Such victories laid the foundation for cooperation 
between China and S. Korea during the 1980's. 
Hua also resigned the chairmanship of the CCPCC. this position being filled by 
Hu Yaobang at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh CCPCC in June 1981. The 
new leadership of Deng-Hu-Zhao reflected not only the open-mindedness of China's 
government at the time. but also the growing professionalisation and 
institutionallsation of foreign policy-making processes in Peking, and elevation of 
pragmatism and open-door policies to the principal agenda of the four 
modcrnisations programme(104). On 14 December 1980 Hu Yaobang. in an 
interview with the offlcial newspaper of the Greek Conunurdst Party, conunented 
that "ChinaCs open-door policy is based on the developmental experiences of 
Yugoslavia. Rumania and S. Korea7(105). In the same month. Zhao Ziyang said in an 
interview with Yugoslavian reporters that "China is in fact studying the experiences 
of S. Korea's economic development"(106). 
Hong Kong as the Middleman between China and S. Korea 
Hong Kong's role In trading with China. already very substantial. became more 
valuable when China began to open up to the outside world. most decisively under 
the reformist open-door policies of Deng Xiaoping from 1979 onwards. At this point, 
Hong Kong came into its *own as a major commercial outlet for China Itself. Hong 
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Kong middlemen. skilfully exploiting their familiarity with Western technological and 
economic resources, brought them within reach of a Peking bureaucracy anxious to 
acquire them. Late in 1979 and during the early 1980's S-KOrea's trade with China 
was mainly indirect open trade in the form of re-exports from Hong Kong. Singapore. 
and Japan. S. Koreans used various intermediaries: American, Japanese, and 
overseas-Chinese general trading firms; Hong Kong trading companies which had 
contacts with S. Korean trading companies; and trading firms owned by expatriate 
Koreans(107). 
In the trade between China and S. Korea. Hong Kong surpassed other 
intermediaries in economies of scale in the provision of trading services. 7be 
Chinese-S. KOrean trade can be traced through oMcL-d figures available in Hong 
Kong. S. Korea understood that the most plausible way to pursue such trade was 
through the Hong Kong offlces of S. Korean trading companies. Hong Kong became 
increasingly important as a centre for services. Although Hong Kong was 
strategically more closely situated to China than alternative options. location was 
not as decisive as 
ýconomlc: efficiency In the provision of trading services. In line 
with the "theory of entrepot trade". Hong Kong may be designated as the 
intermediary in S. Korea! s trade with China, goods being imported and re-exported 
without incurring duty. owing to Hong Kong's free port policy. Hong Kong's 
intermediary role can be categorised from the S. Korean perspective as a trading 
partner. middleman and facilitator of trade and investment(108). 
Hong Kong's role as intermediary in commodity trading between China and 
S. Korca continued to grow due to the benefits and low costs of trading there, despite 
the fact that since the development of the open-door policy in 1979 China had 
established many direct diplomatic. commercial and transportation links with the 
outside world(109). 7be sharp rises in China's indirect trade with S. Korea in 1979 
and 1981 resulted from the use of middle-men and third parties in Worts to obscure 
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product destination through Hong Kong. those being essential to the continued flow 
of items from both countries at this stage(110). According to Nicholas R. Lardy. 
Hong Kong's role In China's foreign trade was transformed from being simply a 
distribution point, to become their biggest trading partner. It became possible for 
S. Korean businessmen to deal indirectly with their business or official economic 
counterparts in China with equal effectiveness as if these had been direct contacts, 
consistent with the theory of entrepot trade(l 11). 
For example the S. Korean state companies, KOTIRA and KTA. established 
many subsidised companies In Hong Kong and sought to establish their regional 
office headquarters there due to Hong Kong's role in international trade between 
China and S. Korea. In the mid 1980's S. Korea invested large sums of money in Hong 
Kong, whereas other foreign ftrrns in Hong Kong began seeking business 
opportunities elsewhere(112). As long as the largest share of Indirect trade between 
China and S. Korea was through Hong Kong, it was obvious that S. Korean 
conglomerates would expand their subsidiaries in Hong Kong in order to trade with 
China. 0 13). 
Although many S. Korean businessmen had been In Hong Kong to trade with 
china. Hong Kong being the main gate for contact with the Chinese. and had there 
been using the Cantonese language. with the prospect of direct trade becoming 
important they now sought to learn the Mandarin that was used on the mainland. 
over thirty Universities In S. Korea opened new departments of Chinese language, 
aiming to cultivate talented experts in Chinese affairs. Simultaneously, hundreds of 
postgraduate S-Korcan students travelled to Taiwan to study Mandarin. In 1984 
there were over one thousand students In Taipei, including businessmen, 
government officials, and self-supporting students taking short-term language 
courses. notably including those studying at Guo-yu Zhoung-xin Me Centre for 
Chinese Studies) at the Taiwan National Normal University. This passion among the 
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S. Korean people to learn Chinese, and to study Chinese affairs. gave rise to what 
may fairly be described as a "China Boom. " 
Person-to-Person Contacts 
While China and S. Korea seemed to be satisfied with this indirect method of 
trade between them. they needed to open practical lines of communication between 
their countries In order to trade easily with one another. Unlike the case of Taiwan, 
the absence of political and direct trade relationships did not prevent S. Korean 
companies from seeking to establish long-range investments and a variety of forms 
of technical cooperation with China(I 14). 
-. Many small-, and medium-level 
S. Karean businessmen, not to mention the 
chaeboLs or -major entrepreneurs, became involved in trade with the Communist 
countries. Even though S. Korean businessmen insist that they had their own 
Independent plans to trade with or start upJoint ventures in China. In practice these 
plans resulted from the active encouragement of the S. Korean government. which, in 
its efforts to establish trade with China. developed many forms of promotion and 
regulation for this new, market. 7be S. Korean economy depends upon a close 
cooperation between the chaebols and government leaders, to ensure Investment 
capital for the risks associated with new production. and to coordinate direct 
government initiatives to assist in the establishment of overseas markets. 7be 
government utillsed many appropriate agencies, such as KOTRA and FKI, as well as 
holding regular meetings with business executives, to forge the ongoing partnership 
between government and business(I 15). 
S. Korean businessmen were prepared to gamble on investment and trade with 
ChIna(I 16). in many respects the desire for contact with Peking was fuelled by 
S. Koreaýs ambition to be perceived as a great Industrially advanced capitalist 
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country by the end of century. A catchword was "Hae-oye-si-chang da-byen-fuwý 
[diversify trading partners]. 7be S. Korean govemment's fifteen-year programme for 
economic development envisaged a rise in GNP to a level of US $250 billion in 1984. 
ranking them within the top 15 nations of the world. in addition, foreign trade 
tumover was projected to rise to US $243 billion, placing S. Korea among the world's 
top ten exporters(117). 7bese plans lent confidence to S. Korean businessmen in 
exploring cooperative relations with China. 
, 
The Chinese affirmed that they would discuss the S. Korean trade only with 
people they trusted. so that S. Korean businessmen. including high-ranking 
executives from major trading companies, were anxious to establish cooperaUve 
relations with China through personal contact. Although S. Korea was used to 
trading indirectly with China through Hong Kong, a similar systernic structure 
e)dsted in Chinese and S. Korean finns that were defined by closed or concentrated 
ownership. i. e., an owner-manager structure or state-appointed bureaucratic 
nianagement, and this encouraged S. Korean businessmen to believe In the 
possibility of making an individual breakthrough into Chinese markets(I 18). 7be 
Chinese exploration of commercial incentives. in line with S. Korean practice, 
accelerated interpersonal contacts between Peking and Seoul. mainly involving 
businessmen and unoMcial politicians In S. Korea. 
The Chinese slogan "Man-youhao, hou-maoyt- [first friendship. then trade] gave 
S. Korea some encouragement in seeking interpersonal contact for trading with 
ChInaG 19). China! s economic modernisation primarily focused on the attraction of 
direct foreign Investment under the tenns of the Joint Venture Law. giving high 
priority to light Industry and relaxing restrictjons on Individual entrepreneurs. 
Despite the restrictions implied by the narrow definition of Direct, Foreign 
investment (Hereafter DFI) there were nevertheless noticeable indications' that 
s. Korea had increased trade with and Investments into China(120). 
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, diversification of China's trading system resulted from the An important 
authorisation of local authorities and groups of speciallsed enterprises to carry out 
foreign trade transactions. They. in turn. set up a large number of new Foreign 
Trade Corporations (Hereafter FTCs) and began to look for business opportunities 
elsewhere(121). According to Mnhua, In an Interview In Peking, Wang Guangying. 
chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Conference, said that his corporation was prepared to do business with foreign firms 
that the Chinese government does not deal with "for Instance. some of the countries 
that have no diplomatic relations with China1122). 
in this regard, Shandong and Liaoning province had the best prospects for 
promoting links with S. Korea- For instance. Shandong province ranked sixth highest 
among the 28 provinces. in terms of the total value of foreign Investment up to 1984 
with US $62.01 rnillion(123). Signillcantly. In September 1981 the Chairman of the 
People's Institute for Foreign Affairs in China was reported as saying that in reality 
China conducted trade with S. Korea through Shanghai. rather than Hong Kong. 017he 
Chairman said this when he met Japanese Diet member Oki Hiroshi. of the liberal 
Democratic Party. who was invited to Peking by the Institute. 7bis was the flrst time 
that such a high ranking Chinese oMcW acknowledged the existence of such 
trade(124). 
Since the late 1970's. the Chinese authorities had permitted contact with 
S. Korean businessmen at international events. Also. some members of the Korean 
community living in China who wished to visit S. Korea were granted entry visas. 
Based on information gathered in this way it would appear that there were several 
secret visits by S. Korean businessmen to China via Hong Kong. It was reported that 
Kim woo-choong, chairman of the Daewoo Corporation (one of the biggest S. Korean 
conglomerates), had visited China as early as the early 1980's. and several times 
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since. in order'to assess the possibility of 'Joint ventures(125). His personal 
salesmanship played a part in the well-known story - of Daewoo's dramatic 
success(126). 
Additionally. many S. Korean' businessmen based in the US and Japan had 
also been to China. and trade oMcials from Peking had come to S. Korea, attempting 
to make -direct, personal contact(127). It is likely that there were a number of 
meetings between the Chinese and the S. Koreans for the purpose of resisting 
protectionism by the advanced lndýstrial countries. In July 1984. Lee'Ki-joo, who 
directed Seoul's position at the Multifibr"e Arrangements (Hereafter MFA) meeting. 
discussed with'a Chinese delegate to the MFA. the establishment of an international 
textiles and clothing bureau in Karachi. Both countries' representatives in this 
bureau met publicly to promote cooperation in resisting protectionism by advanced 
industrial countries (mainly the US). and to enhance their personal relationship with 
each other(128). On I March 1983 China and S. Korea exchanged television 
programmes for two minutes via a Japanese satellite. This first publicised cultural 
exchange between their countries was arranged as a test to prepare for a 7V news 
exchange 'programme. named "Aslavision" among members of the Asian 
Broadcasting Union (Hereafter ABU) (129). 
Personal contacts for business purposes in China were. however. less than 
entirely successful. In the first place. the prospects for direct interpersonal 
operations between the two capitals were still unpromising. And, whereas the 
Chinese stuck to selective low-key contacts that served their Interests. so long as 
these did not aggravate the N. Koreans. the S. Koreans had a tendency to publicise 
the contacts for their own domestic political purposes. in the same manner as they 
had with the Russians(130). At the same time. S. Korean businessmen making 
personal contact with the Chinese had very little information relating to the political 
system between central and local gavernments. or between party officWds and 
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administration officials: they didn't, even understand the way contacts should be 
ratifled between them. A typical case which Illustrates the dimculties which faced 
S. Korean businessmen concerns a S. Korean company speclalising In shipbuilding 
and construction. which first made contact with China in 1982. offering to build a 
cement plant In Fujian province. Not until late in 1984 did three executives of the 
company receive. and accept. invitations to visit Fuzhou. Fujian, and they later 
travelled to Shandong province. In Shandong they were hosted by the China Council 
for the promotion of International Trade (Hereafter CCPM. and even managed to 
secure a tentative contract to build a new harbour in that province. But after the 
Korean businessmen returned to Seoul their journey was reported In the S. Korean 
newspapers. As a result their correspondence was not returned and the project was 
dumped by the Chinese(131). 
When in March 1982. the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade was combined 
with the Ministry of Foreign Relations, and renamed the Ministry of Foreign 
Relations and Trade (Hereafter MOFEM, an oMcial stated privately that they were 
not properly able to understand the administrative approach of policy-makers in 
china. Many S. Korean businessmen have been confused by the structure of Chinese 
management organisations. being unable to draw a clear distinction between 
authority-oriented and market-oriented aspects of the trade system. As long as there 
was no practical, systematic change in the method of trading between their 
countries, S. Korea re"sed that interpersonal contacts and commercial links to 
china were far less advanced than had been anticipated. 
"Open-SecreV Trade 
Economic relations between China and S. Korea from the late 1970's up to the 
middle of 1980's had been publicised by several Western sources. Before 1978 trade 
between Seoul and Peking was certainly not a matter of public record. Subsequently 
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it picked up sharply taking the form of secret two-way trade via third parties. mainly 
Hong Kong, In order to avoid provoking their jealous neighbour N. Korea. On 18 
December 1978 the Chinese Minister of Foreign Trade. U Glang. hinted in an 
interview in'Hong Kong that "China may have to consider having indirect economic 
contacts with S. Koiea". and In Seoul this was considered to be an "open 
secretliiU 
Three sources have publicised the pattern of development trade between 
S. Korea and China: Although two-way trade posed substantial difficulties due to the 
non-existence 'of diplomatic relations, during this period there occurred a major 
breakthrough in economic relations. Many of the goods were being shipped directly 
between Chinese and S. Korean ports, their destination being disguised through false 
documentaUon(133). 
In the early 1980's Moscow launched a loud campaign against Peking's trade 
relations with Seoul. Soviet propaganda attacked China for trading with S. Korea. not 
merely indirectly. through Hong Kong and Singapore. but directly, using Chinese 
cargo vessels flying the PRC flag(134). The USSR asserted that the trade figure in 
1980 approached US$600 million. and that It would approach US$l billion in 
198 1 (135). At first neither Seoul nor Peking acknowledged this rumour. then on 11 
March 1981 Xinhu denied the eidstence of Chinese-S. Korean trade, and accused 
the USSR of spreading a pure fabrication. On the same day the Chinese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs denied that their coal went straight to S. Korea. At the UN. a Chinese 
diplomat also denied the reports with a press release entitled "Rumour about China 
Conducting Trade with South Korea and South Africa Refuted. " Vice-Prenlier JI 
Pengfai was said by Mnhua to have told Ibrahim Ayyub, the visiting Jordanian 
Minister of Supplies, that the rumour that China was trading with S. Korea was a 
sheer fabrication aimed at sowing dissension between China and her friends. 
Denials were also made by other sources(136). 
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7be Chinese economic reforms provoked growth in demand for all types of 
products. so that demand generally outstripped supply. Seoul's manufactured goods 
were exchanged for Peking's primary products, Le., food products; and electrical 
goods, including television sets and refrigerators, were exchange for coal. maize and 
cotton(137). 
The main conunodity which S. Korea Imported from China was coal and this 
played a crucial role in providing the impetus for the development of constructive 
trading relations between Chinaýs local provinces and S. Korea. It was reported that 
Seoul had been buying over 200.000 tons of coal annually from China's northeast 
provinces(138). The Pohang Iron and Steel, launched by the S. Korean government In 
1973. was rated in 1983 as the world's most efflcient producer of steel by Iron Age 
magazine. In 1984, S. Korea! s steel industry exported 40% of Its total production. 
about US$2 billion worth of steel(139). To sustain such a success story they needed 
to find the coal from foreign markets. 
Surprisingly. between the late 1970's and 1982, coal moved directly from 
China to S. Korean ports. although the arrangements were made through, brokers in 
Hong Kong. The port of destination of these shipped goods was secret-dctalls were 
not written down, but the exporters were aware of their true destination(140). 
Initially ships were required to call at ports in Japan before proceeding to S. Korean 
harbours. Direct shipping of coal and other products began from the Chinese ports 
of Qingdao. Dalian. Tianjin and Shanghai, to Pusan. Inchon. and Pohang and also to 
power plants along S. Korea's West coast(141). While some of the indirect coal trade 
between China and S. Korea operated via third-country vessels. some also arrived on 
s. Koreans ships flying I. Aberian or Panamanian flags. By 1981 coal to fuel S. Korean 
cement plants was arriving in Chinese vessels at a port north of Pohang on S. Korea's 
cast coast. though the crews were not allowed ashore(142). 
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Another development occurred on 11 April 1980 when S. Korea and the US 
agreed to grant each other trafflc rights, during a three-day bilateral aviation 
conference held in Washington. S-Korea authorised U. S. commercial aircraft to fly to 
China via Seoul; S. Korea was thus able to send goods directly to China without 
making U-turns in between destinations(143). Telephone services were not opened 
between China and S. Korea. although connections. via London. between the USSR 
and S. Korea had been established in the late 1970's(144). The trade between China 
and S. Korea could therefore no longer be considered as any kind of secret. 
Such failures in maintaining secrecy typically resulted in complaints to China 
from N. Korea. Pyongyang protested about the development of a sizable trade 
between China and S. Korea in 1980 and 1981. and this was undoubtedly one of the 
factors involved in the sharp fall in trade from US$218.8 million to US$149.4 million 
in 1982(145). After complaints from Pyongyang, Peking detained fourteen merchant 
ships that were carrying S. Korean goods. This set-back In economic relations 
between China and S. Korea did not last long; exports to S. Korea were temporarily 
reduced. as a sop to conservative forces within the CCP. but the declared 
suspensions were never made permanent. As long as China's modernisation had a 
high priority on the national agenda. they needed S. Korea more than S. Korea 
needed them. 
Although China continued to affect oMcial Ignorance of its trade with S. Korea 
it is manifestly clear that economic relations between the two countries irnproved 
dramatically during the early 1980' s. Apart from large quantities of mcdium-gradc 
coal. routed via West German. Japanese and American companies. the Chinese also 
exported selected food products. textile. yarn. peanuts. and organic chemicals. 
S. Korea exported electrical and electronic goods primarily. such as refrigerators and 
television sets. as well as textile fibres and fertillser. Chinese orders for S. Korean 
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television sets was placed through a Japanese company with instructions that the 
appliances should be labelled "made in Japan7. 
Although this trade was still being referred to by many scholars in the early 
1980's as "indirect trade". in practice the bulk of it was simply trans-shipped 
through Hong Kong(146). According to S. Korean sources. the overall trade between 
China and S. Korea, for the years 1979-1983. expressed in millions of US dollars, was 
20.7.78.5.218.8.149.4. and 133.8(147). In 1984 Important new policies for the 
urban and industrial economy were introduced to match the earlier liberalisation of 
the rural economy. and in both areas significant advances were made. Jae Ho 
Cheung's estimate of the total two-way trade through all channels for 1984 was US 
$461.6 million(148). Nicholas M Lardy's estimate for the, value of Sino-S. Korean 
trade in 1984 was US$700 million dollars(149). According to a S. Korean source 
S. Korea's trade with China was In surplus by US$25 million In 1984(150). 
Although these values are necessarily uncertain, being aggregated data from 
multiple trade mutes, it Is undeniable that from December 1978 the value of trade 
between Seoul and Peking, rose at a phenomenal rate. step by step with an 
unmistakable political thaw in Seoul-Peking relations. In fact, S. Korea's total trade 
with, China increased substantially from 1980 to 1984, signifying a burgeoning 
indirect/direct trade relationship that. according to most estimates. already 
exceeded China's trade with N. Korea. The volume of the China-S. Korea trade, was 
said to be twice as large as China! s trade with aU communist countries(151). 
3.3 ConcluslonS 
I 
On balance, China was Inclined to put more emphasis on areas where their 
njutual interests might draw S. Korea closer than on those areas where friction 
existed between China. the North, and the South. During this period China began to 
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offer explicit support for the maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean 
peninsula. including discouraging N-Korea from launching an attack against 
S. Korea, and moved further towards a pragmatic approach in policy-making. 7be 
S. Korean government, in turn, inclined further towards the accommodation of 
Chinese needs and desires, but the N. Koreans remained intransigent. continuing to 
threaten reunification of Korea by military means. 
Regarding political relations. as long as China could see the benefits of dealing 
with S. Korea at peace. and In a stable environment on the Korean peninsula. 
various opportunities and pressures persuaded her to assume a more active role, 
although this entailed a difficult balancing act as the PRC was constrained by a 
deterrnination not to jeopardise ties with Pyongyang. The most visible and dramatic 
breakthrough in Chinese relations with S. Korea was Pekinjrs willingness to 
negotiate directly with Seoul for the release of a hijacked Chinese airliner which 
landed in S. Korea in 1983. For the first time since the Korean War. the two 
countries had high-level offlcial contact, and this laid the foundation for S. Korea's 
"Northern POlicY'- China was politically testing the possibilities of a new approach 
towards S. Korea. Despite Peking's assurances to Pyongyang of continuing political 
support. N. Korea! s responses, specifically the Rangoon terrorist attack and a 
significant flirtation with Moscow, actually led China to show more, rather than less 
flexibility towards S. Korea. permitting a further development of the Northern Policy. 
In the economic sphere. bilateral relations progressed beyond secret indirect 
trade. After the publicisation of such contacts In 1978, there was an expansion of 
trade flows from 1979 onwards. and particularly after the 1983 hijack Incident. 
though lip service continued to be paid to secrecy. with Hong Kong playing an 
important role as a strategically placed middleman. Several decisions in the CCP 
encouraged this expansion and led S. Korean businessmen to develop interpersonal 
contacts with China; i. e.. the Foreign Investment Joint Venture Law, the 
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endorsement of "getting rich first". and the stimulation of light Industry. Although 
many goods were being shipped directly between Chinese and S. Korean ports. the 
deals were still brokered through Hong Kong in an attempt to allay N. Korea's 
opposition. The PRC's growing involvement In trade with S. Korea was acutely 
resented by N. Korea. as was the waning of Chinese military support (moral and 
material) after the Rangoon incident. the political Impact of which actively nurtured 
trading relations between China and S. Korea. 
During the period under consideration it became clear that long-term 
economic cooperation between China and S. Korea would play a more important role 
than political issues in deterrnining Chinese perception of. and policy towards. 
S. Korea. This change came about through the crystallisation of latent econornic and 
politico-strategic opportunities. which was assisted by the skilful management of 
several incidents that arose. Full development of the potential the relationship was 
limited by China! s sensitivity to further political rapprochement with S. Korea: China 
was reluctant, for example. to Issue entry visas to S. Korean nationals. Economic 
interaction ultimately approached a level where the political rarnifIcations of trading 
links came to supersede the desire to remain aloof for ideological purposes. Neither 
country could now afford to ignore the other. 
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The period 1985 to 1987 witnessed an even greater improvement in relations 
between China and S. Korea. than was seen during the period discussed in the last 
chapter. Sino-Soviet detente resulted In the Progressive marginalisation of N. Korea. 
allowing the Chinese leadership the freedom to pursue a de facto 'Two Koreas" 
policy, and also led to competition between the USSR and China regarding economic 
relations with S. Korea. China was still reluctant to acknowledge S. Korea as a 
legitimate power. but her tacit acceptance of Seoul's economIc consequence became 
more and more apparent. 7be Chinese torpedo boat incident in the Yellow Sea in 
march 1985. as well as the Chinese participation in the Seoul Asian Games in 1986. 
marked a change in the Chinese attitude towards S. Korea in which the 'Two Koreas" I 
policy was tested. At the same time the victory of the reformists in the CCP led to the 
formulation of a Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986-1990). which Provided a more 
supportive context for Sino-S. Korean economic relations. and officials and business 
people from both countries began to explore ways of broadening economic 
cooperation. Moreover. the Chinese reaffirmed their commitment to foreign 
investment and to the decentrallsation of economy. Relations between the two 
countries were further influenced by the necessity of maintaining the peace on and 
around the Korean peninsula. 
4.1 Politico-Strategic Relations 
Although the relationship between China and S-Korea Continued to be 
somewhat constrained by the sensitive nature of China's ideological relationship 
with pyongyang, Sino-Soviet rapprochement and several incidents in the n-dd- 1980's 
led to the Chinese taking a more positive attitude towards S. Korea. 
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Sino-Soviet Detente and the Creation of a More Stable Security Structure 
on the Korean Peninsula 
One of the most important factors determining China's foreign policy, and the 
single most important Influence affecting its relationship with S. Korea is Sino-Soviet 
detente. Both China and the USSR gave high priority to their respecttve domestic 
economic reforms. and began to view S. Korea as a vital player in a new and more 
stable security structure for 'the Northeast Asian region based on economic 
cooperation rather than conflict(l). 
From the nild-1980's after a decade or so of detente with the US. China began 
to look for ways to reduce'the dangers of too close an Identification with one 
superpower alone. China recognised that participation in a global alliance headed by 
the US (the purpose of which would be to block Soviet hegemony) potentially 
involved costs for Peking which would be incompatible with her modernisatIon 
policy. 
Gorbachev attempted. in his speech in Vladivostok in july 1986, to relieve 
deep-rooted disputes with China by acknowledging ChIna! S legitimate interests and 
concerns. Since the early 1980's China had been taking a more balanced approach 
to relations between the superpowers, conducting her so-called "Independent foreign 
policy. " and Peking now responded positively to Gorbachev's IWtIattve(2). During the 
Thirteenth National Congress of the CCP. held the following year from October 25 to 
November 1, jhe PRC declared a cessation to Its long-standing carnpaign against 
Soviet "hegemonisrrf'. and reaffirmed its desire to conduct an independent foreign 
policy, keeping an equal distance between Moscow and Washington(3). 
Deng's adjustment of the Chinese position in the world. and GorbacheVs 
stress on improving relations with 
China. including unilateral concessions t6 Peking 
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an a variety of political issues, led to a rapid improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. 
By the mid 1980's, it was clear that neither China nor the USSR was inclined to 
disturb the Korean status qua. Hostility between South and North Korea was a 
danger which neither Peking nor Moscow could countenance. and their policies on 
the Korean peninsula were framed accordingly. 
Sino-Soviet detenLe meant that Moscow and Peking largely ceased their 
competition over Pyongyang: leaving N. Korea in a difficult position(4). During Sino- 
Soviet rivalry. the N. Korean factor Inhibited the improvement of China's relations 
with S. Korea. At a time of Sino-Soviet detente, N. Korea had little leverage and found 
itself with less mom for manoeuvre to prevent China from developing her relations 
with S. Korea than at any time since the Korean War(5). 
Both China and the USSR had a vital stake in the maintenance of peace and 
stability on the, Korean peninsula and were taking roughly the same position on 
Korea - both made important advances towards improved relations with S. Korea. in 
support of a peace and stability on and around the Korean peninsula that was an 
essential background for their desired domestic economic refonns(6). 
The Korean peninsula had remained a potential source of danger during the 
previous two decades due to continuing tensions In the relationship between the 
pRC and the USSR. It is a measure of the Importance of the region to both countries 
that they were prepared to compromise in order to maintain a peaceful environment. 
in particular the USSR; and this was reflected in their growing non-political and 
economic ties with S. Korea to cope with their economic problems in the mid 1980's. 
Since the election of Mikhail Gorbachev as leader of the Soviet Conununist party, in 
march 1985, the USSR recognised the advantages of better ties with S. Korea. just as 
China had. and with a view to alleviating its economic situation the USSR sought to 
play a larger role 0 the lessening of tensions on the Korean peninsula. 'Me dramatic 
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transformation of its domestic society, but also the economic strength of S. Korea, 
offered the USSR new opportunities and posed new policy challenges in the region. 
China was already demonstrating the advantages of economic cooperation 
with S. Korea and the USSR had much to gain from cooperation with the dynamic 
economy and entrepreneurial skills of S. Korea. Gorbachev specifically mentioned In 
his vladivostok speech in July 1986, his hopes for the development of the Soviet Far 
East. Just as leadership change In China had allowed it to increase its contacts with 
S. Korea. Gorbachev gave Korean policy very special attention, and his efforts 
produced results as impressive as those achieved by China(7). S. Korea beneflted 
from Gorbachev's new stress on domestic economic reform and greater co-operation 
with the Asian-Pacific capitalist economies, with less emphasis on relations with 
N. Korea. 7be USSR could offer S. Korea a source of Primary products. while S. Korea 
could offer the USSR reliable. high-quality but relatively inexpensive manufactured 
goods, developing the immense, untapped potential of the Soviet market(8). 
The destruction of KAL flight 007 over Sakhalin in 1983 (according to the 
Soviet view. while on an intelligence gathering mission) delayed further progress in 
the development of relations between the USSR and S-Korea. Nevertheless indirect 
Moscow-Seoul trade was estimated at about US$122 million in 1985 and US$164 
million In 1987. with the USSR importing electronics, textiles, and machinery, and 
exporting coal and timber(9). 
with China no longer concerned about antagonising N. Korea in developing her 
extensive economic and political relations with S. Korea. the Chinese leadership was 
able to move steadily towards a more differentlated approach towards S. Korea and. 
on balance, China's actions in the nild 1980's made a positive contribution towards 
Sino-S-KOrean rapprochement. For exarnple. there were no longer Chinese responses 
to N. Korea's claims for US SR-71 violations of N. Korean airspace(IO). 
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China had more at stake in maintaining stability in the Korean peninsula than 
either the US or the USSR. and this was reflected in China's growing economic ties 
with S. Korea. It could be said that China became increasingly aware of S. Korea! s 
growing strategic and economic importance in Northeast Asia and, conversely. that 
S. Korea acknowledged China's dominant position ensured that she would play a 
responsible peace-promoting role in Northeast Asia. The developing relations 
between China and S. Korea could now proceed without Chinese concern about 
N. Korea. James Cotton described this as a dramatic development in China's regional 
policy(I. I). 
Behind-the-Scenes Official Contacts 
Certain incidents between China and S. Korea, pertaining to cases of poliucal 
asylum and the handling of military aircraft and vessels, illustrated the impossibility 
of settling problems by negotiation in the absence of formal diplomatic relations. 
in March 1985, the "torpedo boat" incident occurred. and this gave S. Korea an 
opportunity to make overtures to China. A Chinese navy torpedo boat. adrift in the 
Yellow Sea after a mutiny, was rescued by a S-Korean fishing boat and towed by a 
S. Korean Coast Guard vessel to the Port of Kunsan(12). Since the two countries had 
no formal diplomatic ties it was necessary to find a way of handling the situation. 
and as in the case of the hijacking incident of May 1983 China was willing to have 
discreet contacts with S. Korean officWs. I 
Negotiations began between Xu Jiatun, director of the Hong Kong offIce of 
XWbUa, and a member of the NPC Standing COMMIttee; 'and Kim Chae-chun. 
diplomat, and S. Korean Consul General in Hong Kong. A-memorandum addressed to 
the -Consul General of the Republic of Korea In Hong Kong". signed by the deputy 
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director for diplomatic affairs of YJnhua's Hong Kong oMce. and authorised by the 
foreign ministry in Peking. apologised for the intrusion by Chinese naval units into 
S. Korean territorial waters In order to search for a torpedo boat(13). The 
memorandum also stated that the PRC would make efforts to prevent future 
violations of S. Korean territorial waters, and would take the necessary action 
against those responsible. 7bis can be seen as Indicating a defacto recognition of 
Seoul by Peking. The memorandum also expressed appreciation for the decision by 
the S. Korean authorities to return the boat and crew(14). 
Shortly after the torpedo boat incident had been resolved. another maritime 
incident involving S. Korea and China occurred. On April 18.1985. a 10,000-ton 
Chinese freighter struck and sank a S. Korean fishing boat; all 12 fishermen were 
killed. Negotiations took place in Hong Kong on April 24,1985, and the owners of 
the vessel and the families of the deceased were represented by a legal adviser to 
S. Korea's Fisheries Administration. The director of the Shanghai Ocean Transport 
Corporation was the principal negotiator on the Chinese side. After twelve days of 
negotiations. the Chinese agreed to pay $470.000 compensation for the loss of the 
boat as well as the deaths of the fishermen. In September the Chinese Shipping 
Corporation remitted the money through the S. Korea Exchange Bank's branch in 
Hong K0ng(1 5) - 
other opportunities for S. Korea to enter into negotiations with China arose. In 
August 1985 a B-5 light bomber, a modification of the Soviet IL-28. crash-landed in 
s. Korea with three military personnel aboard. And in October 1986 Some Chinese 
MIG-19's entered S. Korean airspace(16). 
The Chinese pilots of the B-5 light bomber requested political asYlum in 
Taiwan, but the radio operator asked to be returned to China. In deciding what to do 
with the B-5 bomber 
S. Korea made discreet contacts with Chinese Officials in Hong 
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Kong. Furthermore., in order to discuss the matter with China. S. Korea was first 
obliged to study international conventions concerning the violation of airspace by" 
military aircraft. as there were no established international laws regarding the 
violation of s. Korean airspace by Chinese military aircraft. 7be S. Kore an government 
agreed to discuss returning the plane to China. In the eventuality of such a request. 
but in the absence of diplomatic relations between the two countries China made no 
such formal request(17). 
.- These incidents highlighted the need for Seoul to be able to negotiate directly 
with Peking, and Hong Kong became Of vital importance in establishing contacts 
between China and S-Korea. In 1985 the S. Korea government appointed. for the first 
time, a Consul General with the rank of Ambassador to represent S. Korea in Hong 
Kong(l 8). Two floors of the Far East Finance Co. Building, were purchased. at a cost 
of US$5,130.000 to serve as a Consulate(19). 
From 1985 onwards contacts between China and S. Korea grew. and the 
Chinese attitude towards S. Korea became more flexible. A month after the torpedo 
boat'incident, China'granted visas to two S. Korean diplomats to enable them to 
attend the LjN-sponsored political conference 
in China on the Palestine problem: and 
Lee SI-young and Kum Jin Ho. subsequently attended the'UN's 10th conference on 
the Palestine(20). This was the first time that China had granted visas to a S. Korean 
diplomat. During receptions hosted by the UN Secretary General and President 
Reagan respectively. the Chinese Premier, Zhao Zlyang. met the S. Korean Premier, 
No Sin-yong in October 1985(21). Furthermore, in May 1985. two representatives 
from S. Korea's broadcasting organIsation. which had had a long and close 
relationship with the Taiwan 
Broadcasting Enterprise in Taipei. attended the 
meeting of the Asia-Pacific Broadcasting 
Union (Hereafter APBU) held in Peking. No 
conditions were attached to their 
being allowed to attend(22). ' 
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Subsequently, S. Korean officials and politicians made both offlclal and 
unofficial visits to, China in order to establish personal contacts with China! s 
leadership. Two S. Korean officials reportedly attended a Conference in Peking, 
sponsored by the UN Fund for Population Activities. on Women Population and 
Development. No S. Koreans were, however. invited to an Asia-PacIfIc Youth Meeting 
in May 1985: but S. Korea did send three representatives, from both Buddhist and 
Christian organisations, to the World Conference on Religion and Peace which was 
held in Peking in June 1986. Moreover. five Chinese representatives had previously 
attended the third Asian Conference on Religion and Peace. held in Seoul(23). 
As a result of the absence of any high-level personal relationship between 
Chinese, and S. Korean officials. S. Korea found it necessary to forge unofficial links 
with influential Chinese figures. Shim Chul-ho. a champion of disabled people in 
S. Korea and a well-known former comedian, arranged the donation of hundreds of 
wheelchairs to China in order to persuade the Chinese to participate in the Disabled 
People's Athletic Games in Seoul in 1986. He also invited Deng Pufang. 43-year-old 
son of the senior Chinese leader Deng Maoping and president of the Chinese 
Disabled People's Federation, to visit Seoul at the time of the games(24). Another 
instance concerns Kim Pok-tong, an ex-General in the S. Korean Army and 
Chainnan of the Korean Mining Industry Corporation (Hereafter KMIC). who during 
his unofficial visit, to Hong Kong in Apr1I 1986, attempted to contact Peking in secret 
on the subject of cooperation, in the mining sector, with the China National Coal 
import and Fzport Corporation (Hereafter SINOCHEM)(25). 
The 1986 Seoul Asian Games 
it took the S. Koreans, considerable time and effort to persuade the Chinese to 
take part in the Asian Games, held in Seoul in 1986. President Chun stressed In his 
new year speech on January 16 1986 that S. Korea would devote itself "even more 
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earnestly" to diplomacy that would work ever more energetically to promote 
S. Korea's long-standing open-door policy towards China, and that such policies were 
aimed at ensuring S. Korea! s diplomatic success in the 1986 Asian Games and the 
1988 olympics, both to be held In Seoul(26). 
Even before the Games there were many sports exchanges between China and 
s. Korea. for example. the 17th Asian Weightlifting Championships. held In 
Hangzhou in April 1985, were won by the Chinese. with the S. Koreans taking 
second place. and the N. Koreans fourth. S. Korean divers also took part In the 4th 
World Cup International Diving Championship in Shanghai, and a Chinese men's 
handball team competed in Seoul in a preliminary round of the I Ith World Men's 
Handball Champlonships. ý With reference to sporting exchanges, Shin Pyong-hyon, 
deputy prime minister of S. Korea, reported to the National Assembly that S. Korean 
athletes had taken part in 19 events in China during the year 1985. and Chinese 
athletes had come to S. Korea for 10 events(27). 
Seoul's efforts to persuade China to participate in the games intensified as a 
result of the so-called "OLLUTWic Ku)an-ga&ui 
Sport Oye-ked' (Olympic-related Sports 
DiplomacY](28). The newly-appointed S. Korean Foreign Minister Choi Kwang-soo 
publicly declared S. Korea's 
desire for official recognition by China. and. with that 
aim in mind, on 26 August 1986 
the S. Korean Asian Games Preparation Committee 
officially acknowledged Chinaýs 
full official name as the PRC; the ROC became 
known as Taipei China(29). 
At the same time. S. Korea attempted to use Japan as a bridge between China 
and S. Korea(30). According to 
-a S. Korean source, President Chun sent a message, 
via the chairman of Japan's 
Komelto party, Yoshikatsu Takeiri, to Deng Yjaoping. 
expressing s. Kore; 30s 
desire for better relations with China. The message also 
expressed the hope that 
the Chinese government would support the attempt to 
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secure peace on the Korean peninsula by participating in the 1986 Asian Games, 
and the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul. In reply Deng Xiaoping gave an assurance 
that China was willing to take part in both events(3 1). In addition, at a meeting with 
the chairman of JSP, Takako Doi. Premier Zhao Zlyang also conflrmed that China 
would take part In the Seoul Olympic Games in 1988(32). 
At the time of the Asian Games in Seoul in 1986. the Secretary-general of 
ChIna! s Olympic Committee confirmed ChIna! s intention to participate in the 
Olympic Games in Seoul. 7be confirmation was qualified by a cautionary note 
indicating that Chinese participation in the Games would have no political import, 
and should be seen as being of significance only as far as sporting events were 
concerned. it was reported that a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said on 
August 20 1986 that China's participation in the Asian Games in Seoul did not 
indicate any change in its position on S. Korea(33). 
Seoul was visited by several Chinese officials around. the time of the 1986 
Asian Games. He zhenyang, a member of the International OlYmPic Committee 
(Hereafter TOO in China, as well as a delegation led by Zhang Balfa. Deputy Major of 
the Peking Asian Games OrganisatIonal Committee, visited Seoul and met with 
S. Korean officials to discuss the possibilities of Seoul helping Peking to host the 
1990 Asian Games(34). As a result of diplomatic, efforts by the S. Koreans the 
oiympic Committee in Asia (Hereafter OCA) awarded the next Games to Peking(35). 
There was a good co-operation between China and S. Korea in such international 
organisations. 
At last. China sent a 520-member contingent to the Games, which were 
boycotted by N. Korea(36). The new relationship between China and S. Korea was 
publicly demonstrated at the Games by the slogan "See you In Peking 1990". which 
appeared on the electronic score-board at the Chamsfl Olympic Stadium(37). 
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China! s decision to participate in the Asian Games set a precedent for future 
relations between China and S. Korea in both the political and the sporting arenas. 
China began to use the official name of S. Korea, "Han-kuk'. rather than "Nan-chao- 
xwdl. Ibus S. Korea was referred to as "Han-kuk'in a quaffying round for the Seoul 
Olympic Volleyball Games in Peking In June 1987(38). At a symposium on 
I#Managing Strategy in the period of Internationalisation. " sponsored by the Samsung 
Economic Institute, and held in Seoul on October 23,1986, Kim Young-tal. 
Assistant Economic Planning Minister for International Policy Coordination, 
remarked: 'This is just the beginning. We are waiting for China to accept the reality 
of the existence of S. Korea, and we are pursuing formal relations of all kinds with 
patience and diligence, anticipating the eventual establishment of a stable and 
peaceful co-existence with Chiria! '(39). 
Peking repeatedly stressed that China and N. Korea SUR maintained an 
excellent relationship. and China continued to feign close ties with N. Korea In order 
to prevent the latter leaning too far towards Moscow for support. At the same time, 
however, China continued Its attempt to forge new links with S. Korea, using various 
intermediaries to make contacts. China sent a large delegation to the Asiad in Seoul 
in September 1986, but shortly afterwards the Chinese President LI YJannian. said 
during his visit to Pyongyang in October 1986, that China had no intention of 
forming a closer relationship with S. Korea. It Is unlikely, however, that the 
N. Koreans were satisfied by these assurances, as LI was not regarded by them as a 
powerful or influential 'figure in the CCP(40). Moreover. on October 7.1986. 
politburo member Hu Qi1i denied speculation that Peking was on the point of 
establishing political ties with S-Korea(41). A Foreign Ministry spokesman later 
stated that the presence of a 
Chinese team in Seoul was not an Indication of any 
change in ChIna! s position vis-a-vts 
S. Korea(42). 
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The 17wo Koreas" PoUcy 
It was after the Seoul Asian Games that S. Korea began to benefit from China's 
new 'Two Koreas" policy. One diplomatic official optim, stically stated: ýMere is no 
question about it. the Peking-Seoul relationship Is going places. It may take Ume, 
but it is coming"(43). Despite the objections of the N. Koreans. the 1986 Asian Games 
gave rise to further hopes. from the S. Korean point of view. of improvement in the 
relationship between Seoul and Peking. - 
The Chinese leaders publicly reaffirmed their long-standing opposition to any 
policy that would officially recognise -the eidstence of two Koreas, on the Korean 
peninsula. However. included in China's new policy towards S. Korea. was the idea of 
maintaining a balanced relationship with the two Koreas: that Is of developing an 
equal relationship with the two countries in order to ensure the security of Chinese 
national interests. ,-- 
Commenting on this matter, Deng XIaopIng remarked in February 1985 that 
"the one country, two systems concept was the way to solve both the Chinese and 
the Korean questlons"(44). ý Around this time China was trying to settle the question 
of the return of Hong Kong and Macao to China. in 1997 and 1999 respectively. with 
the UK in - 1984 and Portugal in 1986 on the basis of "one country, two systems" 
strategy. These processes reinforced Peking's view that an analogy between the 
Korean situation and the question of Taiwan offered an opportunity for China to 
justify her 'Two Koreas" policy(45). Even though the Chinese leaders acknowledged 
important differences between her own "one country. two system" urimcatIon policy 
and N. Koreaýs, proposal of an united Korea under a confederal systern, they 
nevertheless regarded the "one country. two systems" strategy as an essential part of 
a dual policy towards Korea. 
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Moreover. an exact parallel between the China/Taiwan and North-South 
Korean issues cannot be drawn. From Peking's point of view the Chinese-Taiwanese 
question was one of national sovereignty and, as such. was a local issue; whereas 
the North-South Korean relationship was an international issue - both states being 
recognised as autonomous by more than sixty countries. This led Peking to accept 
the existence of S. Korea as an international fact. and Peking no longer contested the 
legitimacy of S. Korea, although a direct relationship still did not exist between the 
two goverTunents(46). During a visit to Peking In November 1986, the Japanese 
Prime Minister. Yasuhlro Nakasone. deltvering a personal message from President 
Chun,, suggested that although China was still reluctant to establish formal 
relations with S. Korea for fear of losing influence over N. Korea. Peking should 
"seriously consider" establishing trading offlces in Seoul if the latter were prepared 
to switch its diplomatic allegiance from Taiwan to China(47). 
At the same time, Peking repeatedly made it clear that China regarded the 
North-South contacts as a crucial prerequisite to establishing bilateral relations 
between China and S. Korea(48). In an interview with visiting Japanese 
correspondents in November 1984. Hu Yaobang asserted that "the further 
development of Chinese-S. Korean ties depend on how things develop between 
N-Korea and S. Korea! '(49). To encourage broader dialogue between the two Koreas. 
Chinese leaders told Japanese leaders, on March 9.1987. that Peking was studying 
the possibility of relaxing Its policy vfs-a-vts towards Seoul in order to prompt 
dialogue between North and South Korea. According to S. Korean sources, China 
sent Senior Communist International 1.1alson Dcpartment Chief. Zhu IAang, to 
Pyongyang in March 1987. to ask N. Korea to resume a dialogue with Seoul in order 
to reduce tensions between the two Koreas, and he also urged N. Korea to participate 
in the Seoul Olympics in 1988(50). 
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Peking did not object to the principle of "four-way talks" in which. it was 
hoped, official diplomatic channels would be opened between Peking and Seoul and 
also between Washington and Pyongyang. When S. Korea requested formal talks 
between N. Korea. S. Korea, China and the US. via the Japanese Prime Minister 
Yasuhiro Nakasone. Deng Maoping reportedly nodded his head in response to the 
request, but did not reply in the negattve(51). 
China then'attempted to persuade Washington to be more fleidble in its 
policies towards Pyongyang. For example. after Secretary of State George Shultz's 
visit to Peking in March 1987. at the request of China, the US agreed to a limited 
diplomatic dialogue with N. Korea. and offered to make further concessions if 
Pyongyang responded with positive gestures of Its own. This move allowed US 
diplomats to make limited contacts with N. Korean officials. and was designed to 
induce the N. Koreans to participate in the 1988 Seoul Olympics(52). Yjnhua 
welcomed the US decision to allow contacts between N. Korea and US. and noted 
that such consultations were a good basis for reaching an agreement on 
international issues(53). 
In response to such pressures, and with tensions building between the two 
Koreas. Foreign Minister Choi Kwang-Soo. In his address to the S. Korean Assembly 
on Septemberý 17 1987. said that the S. Korean government would allow its 
diplomats to have contact with their N. Korean counterparts at both fonnal and 
Informal functions'around the world in order to encourage good relations with 
China(54). 
The Impact of Chinese Political Reform 
The victory of the refomlists regarding the process Of modernisations, was 
another important factor in the more pragmatic attitude China now took towards 
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S. Korea(55). From the mid-1980's onwards China began to appreciate the need for 
faster reforms as a prerequisite for future modernisation. - In September 1985 the 
CCP held its first National Conference for 40 years; 131 elderly veterans of the 
Politburo and Central Committee resigned and the so-called "3rd Echelorf' was 
integrated Into the Politburo and the Central Committee. The Intention was to 
revitallse the central leadership. and sbdy-four 'Younger people". with an average 
age of 50.1 years. were chosen to take their places amongst the leaders. This new 
more professionally oriented leadership was regarded as favouring the policies of 
Deng Yjaoping, although some members who were critical of Deng's reforms 
remained in power(56). 
Encouraged by the process of political reform in CCP. S-Korean scholars set 
about studying a translation of the speeches and writings Of Peking's top leaders for 
remarks relevant to Chinese laws on trade and Investment(57). Moreover, several 
Chinese historians participated In a conference on 'The Study of Chinese Anti. 
Japanese Literature. 1937-1945" held by the Chinese Literary Society in Seoul, 
December 12-13,1986(58). It had previously been Chinese policy to seat S. Korean 
delegates separately from delegates participating from other countries. but at an 
international conference in Japan. sponsored by the Institute for Far Eastern 
Studies at Kyungnarn University. and held on November 24 1986. S. Korean and 
Chinese scholars were seated together for the first time. for a discussion of peace on 
the Korean peninsula and strategies of unMcation(59). China and S. Korca both 
participated In the Asian-Pacific conference on security in the Pacific, held In Kuala 
Lumpur on January 4 1987, and both countries attended a meeting of trade 
promotion organisations of Asian countries. held in Tokyo on May ig 1087. N. Korea 
was also represented at the first of these events(60). 
Although S. Korea was concerned about the impact of student demonstrations 
in the provinces and Peking. and also about the possibility of a Chinese crack-down 
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on the democratic movement, S. Korean officials and scholars felt that tension In the 
CCP itself would not unduly influence China's external policies(61). In support of 
this view it may be noted that when Deng Xiaoping met a Japanese politician-on 
June 4 1987 he said that "China would not support Pyongyang if It attacks 
S. Korea! '(62). In an Interview with a Nodongr Shinmun fLabouris Dailyl delegation In 
1984, however. Hu Yaobang was quoted as saying. "Should any country Invade the 
northern part of Korea, we will, as we have stated, go all out to help you defeat the 
invaders! '(63). 
The South China Moming Post said that Hu's resignation was a great blow to 
progressive elements in China and could well set back the clock of reform by five to 
10 years. But the power struggles in the CCP, raised distinctly less concern in 
s. Korea than in the West. Although the leadership was embarrassed by the 
possibility of a challenge to Communist rule in China. the US Secretary of State 
George Shultz's meeting with Deng Xiaoping in Peking in March 1987 clearly 
indicated that the conservative forces were not going to prevail. Deng Xiaoping 
assured Shultz that China would not abandon the open-door policy which had 
brought unparalleled success during the preceding decade(64). 
S. Korean, commentators have made much of the growing economic ties 
between the two countries. One of the leading China-watchers of the IUME Institute 
[presently the Sejong Institute] in Seoul. 0 Jin-young. said that ChinXs relations 
with S. Korea would remain unchanged because Hu had become a scapegoat of the 
campaign against bourgeois liberalisation. Regarding the appointment of the acting 
General Secretary of the CCP, Zhao Zlyang. he suggested that the relations between 
the two countries would be called "Cho-Ja-yang si-daeui han-ban-do oye-kyor rrhe 
Korean peninsula diplomacy of the Era of Zhao Zlyang](65). In the view of S-Korean 
scholars as long as China! s 
"open door" Policies continued her policy towards 
S. Korea would remain unchanged. It was reported that the S-KOrean Foreign 
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Ministry set up a special corrunittee on Chinese afWrs. under the Institute of 
Foreign Affairs and National Security. to provide the information needed to cope with 
the rapidly changing situation on the Korean peninsula(66). 
Persuading N. Korea 
As has already been argued. the N. Korean lessons from Sino-Soviet detente 
were clear. As long as Sino-Soviet detente and reforrrLs held. both Moscow and 
peking tacitly cooperated in urging Kim 11-sung to toe the line on domestic reform in 
one of the most stalinist states In the communist world. 
Neither China nor the USSR were being particularly forthcoming in assisting 
N. Korea's economic difficulties: as early as 1985 the Chinese indicated publicly that 
they would not extend much additional assistance to N. Korea(67). While N. Korea 
had nowhere to turn for friends it could be pressed to change or at least control its 
demands, and China was in an increasingly strong position when conducting its 
lvrwo Koreas" Policy, attempting to nudge Pyongyang into at least resuming the 
language of political compromise with S. Korea. -I 
The leverage that N. Korea once had on its communist patrons, playing one off 
against the other to maximise their support. was declining. and Peking had some 
success in persuading N. Korea to adopt a course of 
domestic reforTn that would have 
been hard to imagine a few years previously. 7bis can be seen from China's 
behaviour towards the N. Korean President. Kim 11-sung. during his visit to Peking on 
May 21.1987. 
Deng Xlaoping is reported to have turned down Kim 11-sung's request for crude 
oil supplies during his visit to Peking--although he did agree to donate 100.000 tons 
of grain. -allegedly because N. Korea had failed to pay back its existing crude oil debt 
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to the PRC(68). If true. this report would place the Chinese alongside the Russians.. 
who appeared reluctant to make new economic commitments to Pyongyang and 
continued to insist on balanced trade. repayment of N. Korea's debt. and cash 
payments in all bilateral transactions--in their increasingly hard line towards 
N. Korea's economic management. Instead, Deng XIaopIng urged Kim. indirectly, to 
adopt an open-door policy. He stressed the continuity. as well as the success, of 
China's own open-door policy and suggested that Pyongyang open Its doors to the 
outside world(69). Deng urged Kim to tour the SEZ in Shenzen. in order that he 
might see for himself the success of China! s economic developments(70). 
Evidence of N. Korea! s acceptance of such an open-door policy was found, on 
July 8.1987. In the Hong Kong newspapers: some of which carried a front page 
advertisement for 'W. Korean tourism"(71). The N. Korean airline. "Korean Airways". in 
conjunction with the N. Korean Tourist Bureau, were attempting to attract tourists 
from Hong Kong to N. Korea. Also participating in the promotion were "The Chinese 
Aviation Holiday Company Ud" and "Tbe Chinese Merchants Stearn Navigation 
Tourist Company I. Ad". Companies from Communist bloc countries had previously 
been banned by the British authorities in Hong Kong. but N. Korea ran its tourist 
business (and possibly other enterprises) with the help of Chinese organisations in 
Hong Kong(72). According to a S. Korean source, such a positive response to the 
Chinese suggestions would seem to Indicate N. Korea's implicit acceptance of the 
peking-Seoul relationship(73). 
it has also been suggested that the Chinese leadership attempted to convince 
Kirn that China! s relations with S. Korea would also benefit N. Korea. The Chinese 
were instrumental in initiating N. Korean-US rapprochenleat in order to discourage 
N. Korean designs on the Korean peninsula. and Kiln was asked to consider the 
cross-recognition opUon(74)., Peking also seems to have influenced Washington by 
setting up meetings with N. Koreans at receptions and In other neutral locaUons, - and 
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in April 1987, the US hinted at the'possibility of lifting the trade ban with Pyongyang 
as part of the effort to reduce tension In the peninsula(75). Deng Maoping. in a 
meeting with aJapanese political leader on June 4 1987. made It clear for the first 
time that China had asked the US to contact N. Korea(76). 
Whatever the purpose of Kim's visit. Peking adopted a policy of keeping "one 
foot in one camp and one foot in another', supporting some N. Korean policies, 
attempting to maintain friendly relations with Pyongyang. and developing extensive 
economic and unofficial Ues with Seoul. According to The Asian 3ul Street journal 
Weekl , for example. at the time of Kim's visit to PekIng some S. Koreans were also 
there to compete in a badminton tournament and to attend a conference on Dams, 
and the'baaminton match did make the sports news. but the conference passed 
unremarked by Chinese newspapers(77). 
Political Developments In S. Korea and the KAL Incident 
7be S. Korean Presidential elections were seen. by the Chinese, to be the result 
of mass demonstrations In mid 1987. The elections were also viewed by China as 
indicative of a move from a military-led authoritarian government to a more 
democratic government. 7be majority of the pro-PRC newspapers In Hong Kong took 
a neutral view of the S. Korean situation and the general position was; "S. Korea has 
begun to shift from authoritarianism to an authoritarian-pluralisuc political 
system"(78). 
Moreover. when President Chun outlined the basis of a new constitution in the 
wake of nation-wide demonstrations, a spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry 
stated: "we support S. Korea's efforts towards deMocracy"(79). The greatest 
concession made by Chun was the promise to conduct free and fair Presidential 
elections in S. Korea before the end of the year. YJnhua stated. through its 
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correspondent in Pyongyang. that "this was very healthy for S. Korea. " 7bis was in 
contrast to China's comment on Kim Dae Jung! s return to Seoul from the Us(80). 
After the controversial S. Korean Presidential election in 1987. China demonstrated 
that she had softened her attitude towards the new President-elect. Roh Tae-Woo, by 
writing "President" without double quotation marks in the newspaper Guangming 
Rfhan 1111umination DaW. published December 18 1987(81). Pyongyang. meanwhile. 
condemned as "Invalid" the December 16 1987 presidentW electlon in S. Korea(82). 
Chinese newspapers began to give S. Korean political affairs the same 
treatment as N. Korean affairs, and RMRB reported S-Korea's domestic affairs from 
its own point of view rather than from a N. Korean Perspective. References to 
Presidentlal-candidate Roh's eight-point democratisatIon package. known as the 
"yok+ku sun-oTf [the Declaration of June 291. and the reshuffle of the'S. Korean 
government Cabinet on July 17 1987, involved more than mere repetition of 
N. Korea's stance on S. Korean affairs. as had been the normal practice previously, for 
instance the report on dissident Kim Dae Jung on February 11 1985, which RMRB 
carried directly from the N. Korean newspaper Nodong ShInmun(83). 
President-elect Roh viewed relations with China as being fundamental to 
S. Korea! s foreign policy. In an interview with the Japanese newspaper, &ahl 
. 
5hjUM=, he revealed that his government wanted to move away from the somewhat 
reactionary attitude towards China and would work for the establishment of 
diplomatic relations with the "People's Republic of China"(84). With this purpose in 
niind he dispatched former S. Korean Foreign Minister. Park Dong-Jin. to Japan to 
sound out the possibility of his being Invited to China. 
In response to what China perceived to be a S. Korean strategy of realpolLijk 
China publicly stated her neutrality. According to diplomatic sources cited by KyDdg 
on December 17 1987. China stated that she would make a "realistic approach" 
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towards the next S. Korean government(85). A Chinese Foreign MhUstry spokesman 
said that China was principally concerned about whether the future situation in 
S. Korea would be conducive to peace on the peninsula(86). This was interpreted by 
many S. Korean China-watchers to be indicative of a qualitative change in the 
relationship between China and S. Korea(87). 
China made public her efforts in clearing the ground for a defacto recognition 
of S. Korea. but N. Koreaýs terrorist activity against S. Korea In 1987 led China to 
review her approach to the peninsula. Pyongyang regarded the International system. 
and a situation which had been imposed by the major powers. to be the source of 
the military confrontation between N. Korea and S. Korea. and this attitude 
contrasted sharply with the Chinese contribution to peace on the Korean peninsula,, 
indeed it could be regarded as being the most unstable factor In Northeast Asia. 
Pyongyang's terrorist attack on HAL Flight 858. blowing up an airliner over the 
Andaman Sea on its way from Abu Dhabi to Bangkok in December 1987, and killing 
all of its 115 passengers. was most unwelcome to China. Peking feared that it would 
create a major conflict Involving Peking and other major powers In Northeast Asia. 
and would destroy Peking's prospects for economJc development both in the present 
and in the future(88). Peking had. increasingly. moved away from its traditional 
policies vts-a-vts Pyongyang. and China therefore reacted strongly to the N. Korean 
terrorist action, not merely expressing regret but also joining international sancUons 
against N. Korea., 
7be Incident injured China! s reputation as a country which could persuade 
N. Korea to undertake further action to promote stability on the Korean peninsula, 
and Peking was not in a position to offer objections to the West's sanctions against 
N. Korea. Furthermore. when the US halted diplomatic contacts with N. Korea. adding 
N-Korea'to its list of countries sponsoring terrorism. Peking only offered a 
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perfunctory defence of Pyongyang's Innocence(89). When the incident was discussed 
at the UN Security Council in 1988. a spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry 
declined to criticise Washington's decision to rescind Its earlier decision to permit 
contacts between American and N. Korean diplomats(90). 
Such a stance convinced S. Koreans who had previously believed a Seoul- 
Peking partnership to be out of the question that-such a partnership was indeed 
possible in the light of the Chinese policy towards the Korean peninsula. S. Korea 
began to take a fresh look at bilateral relations with China. It was reported that 
when he attended the 43rd annual session of the UN Econornic and Social 
Corrunission of Asian and the Pacific (ESCAP). held in Bangkok. the Chinese Foreign 
Minister Wu Xueqian. held direct talks, for the first time. with the S. Korean Foreign 
Minister Choi Kwang-soo(91). Although this was denied by a Chinese Foreign 
Ministry official, S. Korea's government was actively pursuing improved relations 
with Peking. it is noteworthy that Choi said. during a debate sponsored by the press 
in the Kwanhun Club In January- 1988. that "On the matter of S. Korea's relations 
with China I believe that S. Korea ought to increase both non-political and political 
exchanges with China"(92). It Is clear that between 1985 and 1987 the Chinese were 
reasonably confident of their ability to maintain their relationship with the two 
Koreas,, and Peking's behind-the-scenes contacts with Seoul are strongly Indicative 
of a defacto recognition of S. Korea by China. 
4.2 Economic Relations 
Trade and economic ties between China and S. Korea were strengthened in the 
years 1985-1987. with the emphasis on direct trade rather than indirect trade; and 
the firstjoint Chinese /S. Korean business venture was established. 
Expanding Trade and the Growing Interdependence , 
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The nlid-1980's witnessed signifIcant success by China In Cultivating the 
export market and In Integrating her economy with the rest of world. Coupled with 
the expanding S. Korean trade this led to a growing interdependence between the two 
countries. 
S. Korea became fully integrated Into the world economy as a Newly 
Industrialised Economy (Hereafter NIE) and. given ChinWs more pragmatic approach 
to the outside world. began to see the attractions of dealing with China. S. Korea sold 
electronics goods, textiles, and steel to China. and China sold agricultural products 
to S. Korea. 7be main items on S. Korea's shopping list were maize. raw cotton, and 
sorghum. China! s grain production peaked in 1984 at a level which was roughly 
three times that of 1950, whereas S. Korea! s grain production had been declining for 
over a decade due to industrialisation which had claimed both land and labour(93). 
S. Korea was happy to import much of the surplus grain from China at bargain 
prices. According to Cao Wan-tong, president of the China National Cereals. Oils 
and Foodstuffs Import and Export Corp.. export Of grains doubled In 1985 compared 
with 1984 owing to a lack of processing facilities in China(94). In 1985 S. Korea 
e imported 200,000 tonnes of maize from China at a cost of us$11.12 a ton on a fre.. 
of-board (Hereafter FOB) basis: this was very competitively priced in comparison to 
US agricultural products. Hence, China emerged as S. Korca! s main supplier of 
maize in 1985. Some of ChInXs most Important maize-producing areas are in the 
Northeast. close to the S. Korean border. which made the arrangement convenient. 
reducing transportation costs and allowing the use of small vessels. which were able 
to enter shallow harbours at both ends of the transacUon(95). 
Corn was the most Important S. Korean import from China and the six major 
S. Korean corn import companies. who handled 80.7% of the total corn Imports in 
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1986-1987, took an average of 59.4% Of their com Imports from China(96). One of 
the largest companies involved in the com import trade with China was Hyosung 
and others are based in S. Korea. Hong Kong and Japan. e. g. mitsul. The S. Korean 
General Trading Company. and Carglll(97). It has been reported that agents have 
attempted to promote S. Korean fertillser sales to China In exchange for feedgrains. 
Following floods in 1984, which destroyed some of S-Korea's vegetable crop, garlic 
and red peppers were also imported from ChIna(98). 
The Role of Hong Kong In Circumventing Barriers to Trade 
There are important reasons why Hong Kong came to be of paramount 
irnportance to the trading relationship between China and S. Korea. Most of the trade 
was conducted through Hong Kong and the Chinese were aware that Hong Kong was 
the best place to meet S. Korean businessmen who were seen. by the Chinese. as 
sympathetic to and familiar with Western business skills. In 1985 80% of trade 
between the two countries was still routed through Hong Kong. the total value of the 
exchange being estimated at US$1 billion. an increase of 19% over the previous 
year(99). 
Following the opening up of China. various Chinese organisations, including 
foreign trade organisations aMlIated to the Central Authorities. sent personnel to 
Hong Kong to set up companies there. Various branches were set up in Hong Kong 
to conduct trading with S. Korea. because although the Japanese already had a 
permanent offiCe in China to manage their trade. the S. Koreans did not(100). 
of some importance in this context was the fact that tI he Hong 
ýong branch of 
the Xbý=- the official news outlet of the PRC. was allowed by the British to evolve 
into a defacto, representative of the Peking goverrunent. Of particular Interest to the 
S. Koreans was the availability of information about China that S. Korea needed in 
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order to conduct business with China, but which had hitherto been unobtainable. 
Many S. Korean business executives thought that a willingness on the part of 
S. Korea to use Hong Kong would enhance the relationship with China. for example 
the S. Korean Pohang Iron and Steel Company opened a branch. "Po-a shil-op gong- 
sa" [Po-a Business Company], In Hong Kong In 1985 for the purpose of establishing 
a trade in steel with ChIna(IOI)- ' 
Direct trade was. however. made, Impossible on most occasions by China's 
refusal to accept goods with shipping documents issued by S. Korea. Goods from 
S. Korea bound for China were marked as destined for Hong Kong, then re-exported 
to China. This procedure was also employed for goods from China destined for 
S. Korea. According to grain traders In Hong Kong. S. Korea's feedgrain was 
purchased from China in the following manner. 
Firstly, via Hong Kong and secondly through major organisations in 
S. Korea. such as the Korean Com Processing Industries Association and the 
National I. Avestock Cooperatives Federation who put out tenders to the 
S. Korean general-trading companies. which then telex the InformaUon to 
traders in Hong Kong. Thirdly. the destination is deliberately confused by two 
bills of lading. one of which is destroyed during the journey. Fourthly. the 
traders involved in this highly competitive business are a n-dxed bag--a large 
number of small China-based operators with oMces in Hong Kong. as well as 
international grain traders such as Cargill Inc. and Continental Grain(102). 
Officials at Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp.. financial consultants for 
the Chinese-S. Korean trade. estimated that the total amount exchanged between the 
two countries exceeded US$1.2 billion in 1986(103). Park Yong Chul, an expert on 
the Chinese economy at Korea University in Seoul. argues that although S. Korean 
exports to China through Hong Kong fell 22% to US$276 million in 1986 because 
China restricted imports as a result of a foreign-exchange crisis. Hong Kong's 
tremendous trade growth with China was nevertheless boosted by S. Korea's exports 
to China. (according to figures released by the Hong Kong government. trade. via 
Hong Kong alone, grew 7% to US$646 million in 1986)(104). It has also been 
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estimated that. in 1986 and 1987.80-90% of S-Korea's exports to China went 
through Hong Kong(105). 
Company-to-Company Contacts - 
A. New Opportunities for Change 
The impetus for S. Korean companies to develop company-to-company contacts 
came from China. From the mid-1980's onwards China targeted three main areas of 
importance for foreign trade: 1) the import of industrial equipment and advanced 
technology. 2) the export of raw materials in order to Increase the income from 
foreign exchange and. 3) the attraction of more foreign investinent(106). In order to 
achieve these aims the government was obliged to make dramatic changes in policy 
and to allow Direct Foreign Investment (Hereafter DFI) in China. The result of this 
was that foreign investment totalling US$3 billion was pledged. of which a billion 
dollars would be invested by the end of 1985. This led S. Korea, to step up her 
personal contacts with China and encouraged direct company-to-company 
contacts(107). 
China saw that increased business contacts with S-Korea would benefit China 
in several ways; China would gain valuable foreign currency and she would also 
benefit from S. Korean technology. China was a labour intensive, low-wage economy, 
whereas S. Korea was an increasingly medium- to high-wage economy with an 
abundance of skilled labour so that the benefits accruing from increased economic 
exchange were mutual(108). 
China was also concerned by the huge Imbalance in Sino-Japanese trade. It 
was felt that S. Korean technology was more appropriate to Chinese needs than that 
of Japan. and China therefore began to view S. Korea in a more favourable light as a 
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trading partner. From 1985 onwards China started to express dissatisfaction at the 
mounting trade deficit with Japan. Japan's, trade surplus with China fell from 
US$5.99 billion in, 1985. to US$ 2.59 billion'in the first eight months of 1986(109). 
At the time of the Japanese Prime Minister's visit to Peking; in December 1985, he 
was - warned that China would not -tolerate another year of trade deficit with 
Japan(l 10) - 
After the resignation in January 1987 of the General Secretary of the CCP. Hu 
Yaobang, who had sought closer commercial ties with Japan, Chinese leaders began 
to take a more critical view of the Increase in the Japanese defence budget. as well 
as Japan's closer business links with Taiwan. Prior to this. China had exported 
products to S. Korea at higher prices, than to Japan, but now the situation was 
reversed. For example. in July and August 1987. China sold Datong coal at $28 a 
ton to Japan and at $24 a, ton to South Korea: The FOB prices of Chinese 
ferrosilicon sold to Japan ranged from $495 to $500 per ton. whereas the FOB 
prices to S. Korea through Hong Kong businessmen ranged from $430 to $440 per 
ton. The prices of ferrostlicon exported to both Japan and r S. Korea - increased 
foUowing price rises in November 1987(l 11). 
Japan was only interested in exporting industrial and consumer products to 
China and in importing raw materials from China, so that Japanese investment in 
China was minimal. Japanese financial. and technological investment in China 
lagged, behind that of investors from other countries largely, due to Japanese 
concerns about the Chinese economic climate. According to Nigel Campbell's survey 
in 1985. Japanese business people lMng In China feared that Japanese investment 
in China would lead to the so-called "boomerang" effect such as had been observed 
in the case of American investment in Japan(l. 12). 
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Moreover. Japanese companies always retained control over equipment 
exported to China; for example China imported a Japanese refrigerator production 
line. , 
but compressors could not be manufactured on - the line, and China was 
consequently obliged to Import compressors from Japan. It was in such ways that 
imports to China from Japan were Increased(l 13). 
_ China therefore reviewed 
her economic relationship with Japan, and it was felt 
that S. Korea could be an important source of the goods and technology necessary 
for modernisation. at a competitive price compared to Japan. As a result the Chinese 
shifted their allegiance to the S. Korean market. -I 
B. Moving tovwds Joint Ventures 
7be relationship between China and S. Korea developed at a rapid pace, 
particularly after 1985 when the Chinese effectively lifted the ban on visits by 
S. Koreans. The S. Korean govenunent, as well as S. Korean businessmen. ý intensified 
their efforts to break Into the Chinese markets. The Chinese leaders were still to 
some extent reluctant to endorse S. Korean initiatives for fear : offending the 
N. Koreans, but despite this constraint China introduced in 1985 a flexible method 
by which S-Korean businessmen could visit China. 
Thereafter. according to sources In Seoul. a large number of S. Koreans, under 
the pretext of "Hyop-ryok-cha bang-mLaV (working visits]. had entry visas which 
approved by China(l 14). This followed on from the granting of visas to S. Koreans to 
attend the international Technology Exchange Fair held in China. S. Korea! s role as 
host for meetings of the most prestigious and influential of global economic 
organisations, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(Hereafter IMF) Conferences, added to her stature in Chinese eyes. encouraging 
moves towards freer access by S. Korean businessmen. 
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In September 1985, Chinese representatives attended a workshop in Seoul to 
combat protectionism in the textile trade. and to develop a cooperative position to 
actively oppose renewal of the MFA(1 15). In October 1985. a 22-member delegation, 
headed by Liu Hung-Ju, vice president of the "People's Bank7. attended the 40th 
annual joint meeting of the IMF and the International Bank of Reconstruction and 
Development (Hereafter IBRD) in Seoul(l 16). 
--A example of a successful Chinese-S. Korean joint venture Is that of Daewoo in 
Fujian. Daewoo's chairman Kim Woo Choong was a typical example of the growing 
number of pro-Pekft4 business executives in S-Korea who visited China to discuss 
the possibility of establishing business relations. In 1985 he visited China no less 
than five times at the invitation of Chinese ministrIes Interested in doing business 
with him. According to interviews. the Chinese'told him that they would like the 
S. Koreans to help -them develop their own mineral resources and also to act as 
major buyers. Moreover, they made it clear to him that the absence of diplomatic 
relations between Seoul and Peking posed no problem. In response to these offers. 
Kim explained that S. Korea would prefer to enter Into joint ventures with China 
indirectly. using Hong Kong companies as Intermedlaries(l 17). According to : 11= 
ELQngML-A-, five-tiered lines of communication connecting Daewoo Corporation in 
New york with Ming Long Development Company of Jujina Enterprises resulted in 
the establishment of a US$10 million refrigerator joint factory in Fujian 
province(l 18). Discussions were also hold pertaining to three further pmJects by 
Daewoo: I) a car plant in Fuzhou with General Motors as a partner: U) a coal mining 
venture in Shanxi; and ill) a power plant project In Nanyng(i 19). 
Several big S. K6rean conglomerates, including Daewoo. Hyaosung. Lucky-Gold 
Star, Samsung, and Hyundai. attempted to establish contacts with Chinese 
companies by sending Korean-American scouts to assess the Prospects for such 
161 
pmJects as cement plants, harbour construction, fishing-rod production, coal 
development and others(120). S. Korean construction companies, who had gained 
experience In major building projects in the Middle East and elsewhere. were also 
anxious to develop business with China and, according to Nicholas R. Lardy. some 
companies did succeed in securing contracts in China and made use of Chinese 
labour in these proj ects(l 2 1). 
7bere were reports of small wale S-KOrean companies recetving government- 
subsidised loans to trade with China(122). Directly after the Daewoo transaction was 
concluded the S. Korean Association of Small-Medium Companies (Hereafter KSMCA) 
sent a delegation to China to discuss the possibility of dealing in electronic 
a components and chemicals. S. Korea was specifIcally interested in doing business 
with the China International Trust and Investment Corp. (Hereafter CMC) (123). 
Furthermore, the S. Korean Plastic Industry Corporation (Hereafter KPIC). 
comprising medium sized S. Korean companies. reached agreement With the 
Liaoning provincial, government to produce melamine dinnerware In Liaoning 
province(124). Thus Park Soo-gil, a leading S. Korean government Foreign Ministry 
OfTicial, said "It isn't a matter of if we're going to have closer relations with China, 
but when; it could take five years, or it could take a decade"(125). The Chinese 
practice of linking political considerations to trade, as far as S. Korea was concerned. 
and therefore refusing to trade directly with S. Korean companies, was distinctly 
weakened by Daewoo's first joint venture with China. 
The Beginning of Direct Entrepot Trades 
In the summer and autumn of 1987, direct shipments of goods between China 
and s. Korea were made. Such direct shipments have Increased rapidýr since 1987., 
but are still officially classifled as indirect trade. so-called "Direct Entrepot Trade", 
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because payment has to be arranged in Hong Kong due to the lack of offleial political 
and conunercial Ihiks(126). 
China began to separate politics from economic considerations from the mid- 
1980's onwards and began to relax control over several provinces. particularly the 
provinces bordering on S. Korea. in order to simplify trade proceedings(127). it 
should be noted here that Zhao Zlyang, in his key speech at the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (Hereafter APEC) meeting in 1986, remarked that the Asia- 
Pacific countries needed to overcome the enemy of their own Ideological and political 
system in order to negotiate economic cooperation. and that the different political 
systems in other countries should be respected(128). It is only a fourteen hour trip 
by sea from Qingdao In China to Inchon in S. Korea and this accessibility. plus the 
fact that both China and S. Korea are active participants in many of the Asian Pacific 
organisations. made direct trade Inevitable. 
China therefore made great efforts to exploit her geo-economic position, and 
the , Chinese ý announced the decision to open up the Shandong and Liaoning, 
peninsulas, with the formal establishment of SEZs scheduled the end of 1992-Trade 
officials and businessmen in Seoul viewed the Shandong and Liaoning peninsulas as 
prospective partners. and the S. Korean government announced. In 1987. a, large. 
scale development plan, the so-called "Soh-hae-an kea-bal kae-hoik' [Project of the 
west coast development], for Its western coastal region. S. Korea's plan to establish 
four large-scale industrial complexes, Namyang gongdan, Daesan gongdan. 
Kwangyok sanopgiji. and Dabul gongdan. coincided with the Chinese announcement 
concerning the opening up of the Shandong and Liaoning peninsulas(129). S. KoreXs 
plan was welcomed, semiofflclally, by Pu shan, president of the Zhong-guo sJdJje 
jUVy xue-hu4 [Chinese Association for International Economic Research]. who 
stated it would be necessary 
for China to cooperate closely with the NICs. including 
S. Korea, in order to develop her coastal areas(130). 
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ý It is necessary to look at the coal trade in order to see how and why China and 
S. Korea began to engage in direct trade. Prior to the early 1980's there had been a 
glut of coal on the international market. China! s main foreign purchasers of coal 
were Japan and S. Korea and, although other countries were In need of coal. China 
was less interested in selling to them because of the high transportation costs. 
China offered coal to S. Korea at a cost of US$ 24 a ton as compared to US$ 28 a ton 
to japan(131). The CCIEC sent personnel to S. Korea to market Chinese coal and 
also to act as agents. In addition, the CCIEC also invited major S. Korean coal clients 
to China to inspect coal production and transportation(132). 
Although direct trade with S. Korea was likely to offend the N. Koreans, China 
had probably obtained a tacit agreement that they would accept the reality of 
Chinese-S. Korean trade. Deng Xiaoping had promised Kim II-sung, during his visit 
to Peking on 21 May 1987.10 nifflion tons of grain as payment for N. Korean 
acceptance% of Chinese-S. Korean trade(133). Moreover. the Chinese leadership 
attempted to convince Kim that a healthy economic relationship between China and 
S. Korea would be of equal benefit to N. Korea. Evidence of the success of this 
pressure can be seen from Daewoo's Fujian project, work on which had been put on 
hold due to pressure from N. Korea in 1986. but which was resumed in early 1987. 
On November 9.1987. Hu QW, a newly-named member of China's Politburo 
Standing Committee. - said China would trade directly with S. Korca but only with the 
consent of the North(134). 
7be above three reasons cannot. however,, entirely exphUn the Chinese 
decision to engage in direct trade with S-Korea. It is also necessary to look more 
closely at the Internal situation in China. Due largely to internal difficulties within 
China. notably double figure -inflation. corruption. and the changing income 
distribution after 1984. there was a widespread demand for further economic reform 
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in order to strike a better balance between a socialist economy and market 
mechanisms(135). According to a survey conducted by GoniTen Rlbao Workees 
Daily] in January 1987.84.9% of those questioned said that the reforms to date had 
improved their standard of living. 830/6 stated that they believed production had 
increased as'a result of the reforms. 82% said the market supply was better. and 
62% said there were now more opportunities to make money. On the other hand, 
60.6% said they were not satisfied with their Income(136). 
With the promulgation by the CCP of open-door policies there were now 
debates over how to combine the free market mechanisin with socialist planning so 
as to develop China! s internal market as well as the foreign trade market(137). 
In his report to the 13th National Congress of the CCP. in October-November 
1987. zhao Zlyang pointed out that at China's level of economic development the 
theory of -She-hui-zhu-yt chu-qiJLe-du-arV [the initial stage of socialism] allowed for 
co-operation with foreign countries and companies. this being necessary for 
technological and financial reasons. He also said that the rules for long-term 
economic reform had been rewritten so that 
China had to grasp all such 
opportunities in the not too distant 
future in order to gain strength for the Four 
Modemisations(138). David S. G. Goodman argued in The Pacific Review that at the 
13th National Congress of the CCP. 25 October-1 November 1987. the theory of the 
initial stage of socialism proved capable of absorbing major political and econornic 
reforms, so as to adequately meet 
the perceived economic objectives(139). 
The political reforms which took place in the CCP in 1987 cauýed considerable 
internal conflict. Nevertheless Chinese leaders were willing to compromise In order 
to build up trade with S. Korea. and also to modernise the Chinese economy. From 
1987. China and S. Korea began to enjoy a mutually beneficial good business 
relationship. It became possible to obtain S. Korean shipping documents so that 
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ships and their cargo were able to proceed. directly from China to S. Korea without 
docIdng in a third countzy. Ships sailing from S. Korea could now call at Chinese 
ports with the tacit consent of the Chinese authorities. 
Although intermediaries were still used, direct trade was growing. China had 
relaxed her regulations and. according to statistics compiled by S. Korea. the total 
volume of Chinese-S-Korean trade amounted to US$1.27 billion: Chinese exports to 
S. Korea totalled US$620 million or more. and Chinese imports from S. Korea totalled 
were just over US$640 million. This latter figure being approximately three times the 
value of the Pyongyang-Peking trade. which totalled US$194 million. according to 
S. Korean f1gures(140). In the, Asian Wall 5treet Journal -Weewy, the Chinese- 
s. Korean economic relationship was summed up in the words of a S. Korean 
executive who visits China regularly* "You know, China loves Koreans. 7bey envy us. 
And they would like to develop a closer relati. onship-as soon as possibie(141). 
4.3 ConClusions 
From 1985 onwards there were substantial Improvements in Sino-S. Korean 
relations, both politically and economically. China overcame N. Korean hostility to 
her improved relationship to S. Korea and maintained a more equal relationship with 
the two Koreas. 
. 
The effects of the Sino-Soviet detente, Insofar as it influenced Sino-S. Korean 
relations, were twofold: N-Korea became Isolated. with neither of her patrons lending 
any support for, her violent ambitions for reunification: and Chinese and Soviet 
interests came to coincide. In that both were more Interested in S. Korea as a 
potential economic partner vital to their respective economic reform programmes 
than in ideological partnership with N. Korea. Competition for S-Korea trade and 
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capital prompted a new flexibility on the part of the Chinese. who feared being left 
behind by the Soviets, and the N-Korean factor was effectively neutraltsed. 
China was steadily moving towards substantive relations with S. Korea, now 
that N. Korea could not exercise any leverage by playing the Soviet card. and at last 
developed her'Two Koreas" policy. China7s actions in this period moved it to defacto 
recognition of S. Korea, precipitated by the entry of a Chinese torpedo boat into 
S. Korean waters in 1985. Also of significance was the Chinese participation in the 
1986 Asian Games in Seoul. 
The pattern of trade which developed between China and S-Korea came about 
through Peking's willingness to move away from indirect trade to direct trade with 
Seoul. Daewoo's first initiative towards a joint venture with China,, through 
subsidiary companies, was openly discussed in direct company-to-company 
contacts. Ships were now routinely carrying cargo directly to China from S-Korea, 
and it can be seen that S. Korean efforts to establish trading relations with China 
had borne fruit. 
In the process of recasting Peking's 'Two KoreW policy. between 1985 and 
1987, relations between China and S. Korea moved substantially closer, both 
politically and economically. Once China was able to persuade N. Korea to accept the 
reality of Chinese-S. Korean relatlons it became possible to conduct a more balanced 
policy between Seoul and Pyongyang, avoiding any appearance of favouritism. and 
maintaining a deliberate distinction between words and actions In pursuance of 
China: s'Two Koreas" policy. 
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developments In the communist world and the related 
improvement in relations among the major powers during 1988-1990 prompted the 
opening of a new era in which official relaUons, both economic and political. were 
established between Peking and Seoul. Early in 1988 President Roh sought a 
diplomatic strategy by which to move towards full diplomatic relations with China. 
During this period there were radical changes occurring in the political and 
economic environment as a consequence of the global relaxation of tension resulting 
from the ending of the Cold War. Tbroughout these changes China and S. Korea 
continued to draw closer together, both politically and economically. seeking to 
improve bilateral relations for their mutual benefit. - 
5.1 PoUtico-Strategic Relations 
The years 1988-1990 will be remembered as one of the most eventful periods 
in relations between China and S. Korea. There were remarkable developments on 
several fronts: the launching of President Roh's government's New Northern 
Diplomacy in 1988, the Seoul Olympics in September 1988. the normalisation of 
relations with the USSR on September 
30.1990, the agreement with the PRC to set 
up trade offices in Peking and Seoul after the Peking Asian Games, and the 
resumption of an Inter-Korean 
dialogue at the prime ministerial level. Peking faced 
the dual challenges of maintaining its relationship with Pyongyang and improving 
contacts with Seoul. Despite the impact of the Mananmen Incident in Peking in 
June 1989, China and S. Korea were committed to closer interaction at all levels, and 
this meant that Chjnaýs relations with S. Korea were more transparent than those 
with N. Korea; indeed China! s policy towards S. Korea came to resemble its formal 
approach towards the USSR. moving steadily in the direction of normalcy, and the 





Apart from the relaxation of Sino-Soviet tensions. there also was' quiet 
collaboration among the superpowers to reduce tensions on the peninsula. It was 
reported that agreement was reached on ways of reducing tension in Korea between 
the US assistance secretaxy of state, Gaston Sigur. and the Soviet deputy fo I reign 
minister, Igor Rogachev. when they met in Paris In December 1988(2). 7bere was 
also a consensus between China and the USSR regarding the Korean'peninsula. on 
December 1-3.1988. Qian QIchen visited Moscow, the first time a Chinese Foreign 
minister had done so since Zhou Enlai in 1956. and held intensive talks with his 
Soviet counterpart Eduard Shevardnadze, It was stated then that the two countries 
would continue to work to ease the tension on the Korean peninsula(3). Peking's role 
as the host for the newly-started talks between the US and N. Korea wa's a further 
manifestation of this more active involve 
i ment. and Moscow#s`role in facilitating a 
meeting between former N-Korean Foreign Minister Ho Dam and S. Korean 
opposition leader Kim Young sam 
might be a harbinger of what to expect from the 
Soviets in an era'of reduced international tensions. 
7be global detente in international politics influenced developments on the 
Korean peninsula for at least two reasons. For one thing. the trend towards detente 
in the communist world consolidated the likelihood that neither the Soviets nor 
Chinese would support N. Korean military adventures. Both the Chinese and the 
Soviets made clear the limits of their willingness and ability to support N. Korean 
aspirations. For another thing, 
these developments Increased the importance' of 
economic interactions with S. Korea. 
heightening communist-bloc incentives to move 
towards a defacto - and in some cases actual - -rwo Koreas" policy. Such a move 
was facilitated by the general reduction in the importance placed'on ideology, which 
weakened tolerance among the socialist countries for PyOngyang's rhetoric and 
extremist positions. 
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N. Korea was facing formidable challenges(4). Both the USSR and China were 
now primarIly interested In maintaining the status quo on the Korean peninsula, so 
that N. Korea became progresstvely more isolated, unable any longer to manipulate 
Sino-Soviet tensions to. its advantage. The military assistance which both powers 
supplied to N. Korea contradicted the image of global detente leading to improved 
relations with non-communist countr1es, and was a matter of concern as a 
destabilising ! nfluence on the Korean peninsula. 
S. Korea's economic standing in the Asian-Paciflc region, and within the world 
community as a whole, meant that China and the USSFL both of whom were 
suffering serious internal difficulties. were increasingly inclined to acknowledge her, 
in order to further economic cooperation with S. Korea which they needed 
desperately. 7bey had long indicated that they neither sought another war on the 
Korean peninsula nor the complete withdrawal of American troops from S. Korea and 
recognised there were limits to one anothers cooperation with N. Korea. 
During this crucial period 1988 to 1990. many S. Korean media and academic 
circles were emphatically predicting dramatic changes in the geopolitical 
environment now that the new parameters In major power relations surrounding the 
Korean peninsula. and the consequent strategic global detente, gave a lead to the 
thaw of the Cold War in Northeast Asia. As long as China was confident that 
pyongyang would never seek an exclusive relationship with the USSR. relations 
between China and S. Korea were no longer being shaped by the two countries' 
leaders' calculations regarding the strategic threat from their super-power 
adversaries(5). 1rhey anticipated the formal establishment of relations with China. 
breaking the cold war in the region and opening a new page in history. One 
S. Korean China-watcher said that the International climate in the surrounding 
region offered an excellent opportunity to enhance S. Korea! s security, leading to a 
"New Era of Strategy"(6). 7bis was the "Bak-neon-manut-gi-how [golden opportunity 
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of the century]--the possibillt)r of turning from confrontation to negotiation arose 
routinely for numerous problems on the Korean peninsula(7). 
S. Korea's Puk-bang Oye-kyo [New Northern Diplomacy] 
President-elect Roh attempted unsuccessfully. using Japanese intermediaries, 
to arrange a visit to Peking in December 1987 as adviser to the Seoul Olympic 
Organisation Committee (Hereafter SLOOC), in advance of 'his February 
inauguration. Subsequently he proposed some tentative ideas regarding a two-Uered 
policy towards , China: as well as pursuing better relations through the 
intermediaries of third countries S. Korea would also seek to conduct a direct 
dialogue with China to the same end. In March 1988 President Roh reinforced this 
position'at an annual meeting of "Ambassadors" where he stressed that better 
relationswith China had become the bull's eye of the diplomatic target. ' When Lee 
Won-kyong, ambassador to Japan. asked what role Japan should'play in promoting 
Chinese-S. Korean relations. he indicated that although S. Korea had many pipelines 
to China. his government planned to promote Independent relations with China(8). - 
This commitment was publicly affIrmed in a special declaration made by 
president Roh on July 7 1988. which Caine to be known as 'The Second June 23. 
1973 Declaratioxf. S. Koreaýs "Puk-bang-oye-kyd, [New Northern Diplomacy] also 
known by some scholars as "Puk-bang-chong-chae; e. [Northern policyl was 
announced in this declaration, which comprised a six-point policy on 
reunification(9). As regards the approach to China it was stated: -' 
To create an atmosphere conducive to durable peace on the Korean 
peninsula, we are willing to cooperate with Pyongyang in its efforts to 
improve ties with countries friendly to us, Including the US and Japan, and 
in parallel with this, we will continue to seek improved relations with the 
USSR. China. and other socialist countries(10). 
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From this time forwards, S. Korea's foreign policy came to Include President 
Roh's policy, a comprehensive concept analogous to West Germany's ostpoUffk. 
which stepped up ties and trade with both China and N. Korea simultaneously. The 
president's initiative was greatly furthered by his use of "citizen ambassadors": 
several of President Roh's special envoys made clandestine visits to Peking in order 
to sound out the possibility of developing closer political and econornic ties between 
the two countries. Former Foreign Minister, Park Dong-jin; the President's Special 
Adviser for Policy. Park Chul On; Chairman of the Daewoo Group. Kim Woo choong: 
and Kim Pok-tong. a brother-in-law of president Roh; all made private visits to 
Peking to convey letters from the President(i 1). 
When S. Korea's deputy economic planning minister, Mun Hui-kab, -visited 
Peking to attend an academic seminar sponsored by the United Nations development 
programme, he delivered a letter from president Roh to the Chinese leadership, and 
exchanged views with Chinese officials on the experience of economic development 
of their countries, and on other matters of mutual concern. Chung Hun-mok, 
president of the Hyundai engineering and construction co.. and Yu Song-chae, dean 
of the business administration school at Chungang University. accompanied Mun on 
this visit(12). 
While these contacts were proceeding, S. Korea was also expressing her desire 
that Washington. Tokyo and the Western allies should help its efforts to improve 
relations with China(13). In the first such concrete action. following its recent 
overtures for improved ties with leading communist powers, S. Korea arranged for US 
secretarY of state, George Shultz. to deliver a message to the Chinese leaders. 7be 
S. Korean government also asked the West German foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher. to Convey to top Chinese leaders through diplomatic channels that 
s. Korea was sincere in her desire for peace(14). 
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internal pressures within S. Korea for further "democratisation" coupled with a 
popular. enthusiasm for real progress towards reunification, obliged President Roh's 
government to deal seriously with the N. Korean issue as an essential part of the New 
Northern Diplomacy and its objective of securing better relations with China(15). 
Another factor motivating S. Korea to move towards better relatiorLs with N. Korea was 
China's desire for genuine stability on the Korean peninsula. without the threat of 
inter-Korean conflict disturbing her economic links with S. Korea. upon which the 
Chinese modernisation prograr=e depended. Peking could not move closer to Seoul 
without further isolating Pyongyang, which would have unpredictable consequences. 
Robert A. Scalapino stressed, In a serninar organised by the Korean-US Society on 
january 29 1988. that even though Peking was pursuing a "rWo Koreas" policy in its 
relations with the South and the North, Peking's Korea policy would continue, to 
depend on how S. Korea cultivated Its relations with N. Korea(16). 
In order to encourage N-Korea to play a greater role in the international 
community. thus laying the groundwork for eventual discussions on reunification. 
and, with the paramount objective of securing a stable peace on the Korean 
peninsula. ' S. Korea proposed that both North and South should join the UN. with 
this in mind, President Roh set up a task force comprising senior officials from 
various ministries together with Park Chul On and Kim Chong WbI as his 
presidential advisers. They organtsed a special 10 man team drawn from the NSPA, 
many of them so-called Chong-san-kwan chun-mun-ga [veteran analysts on 
communist affairs] for the implementation of the New Northern Policy(17). Later they 
were merged with the so-called "SeouL Dae-hak: ra nw, comprising Lee Hong-Koo. 
Kim Hak-Joon and Roh Jaebong who had taught at Seoul National University in the 
faculty of International Relations, and had been involved In formulating strategy for 
the New Northern Diplomacy. They had persuaded the government to call off its 
diplomatic war with N. Korea. and to move away from confrontation between the 
North and the South., ,' 
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The reasons behind such a movement were summarised by Lee Ki Won, a 
researcher at the Sejong Institute. In a presentation given on April 2.1988; he 
argued that two sovereign states eidsted on the Korean peninsula: 
'"We have to accept the reality of this situation. Although N. Korea is 
undoubtedly resistant, to the changes which have recently taken place, we 
are confident of the strength of S. Korea! s position. which is based on our 
faith in the superiority of our liberal democratic system, on the economic 
power resulting from our capitalist orientation. and on a belief in continuing 
political development-including that of N. Korea. Structural competition with 
the North is already over. and the question which remains is how to draw 
N. Korea into the South's system"(18). 
There were positive signals from China that S-Korea's efforts in this direction 
were acceptable, although Chinese Officials consistently declined to confirm that 
special envoys from President Roh had visited China(19). China's top leader Deng 
Xiaoping reacted positively. saying that President Roh's declaration would contribute 
to stability and peace on the Korean peninsula(20). In terms of practical steps, 
China agreed with a S. Korean govenunent proposal for the establishment of links 
between S. Korean and Chinese research institutes for the exchange of research 
materials and data. This was revealed by the S. Korean national unification minister. 
Lee Hong-Koo. - In his testimony at the foreign affairs and unification committee of 
the national assembly(2 1). ,. I 
Rebalancing of China's Foreign Policy 
a 1ý 
After President Roh had called publicly for Improved relations with China. the 
initial focus of the New Northern Diplomacy was to encourage China to participate In 
the Olympics in September 1988 in Seoul. This event provided a good opportunity 
for S. Korea to make mutual contact with China. Sports delegations and other 
groups from China visited Seoul many times to practise. and to check out the 
facilities. The Chinese decision to attend the 1988 Seoul Olympics. and the 
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establishment of a variety of new formal contacts with S. Korea. was a major success 
in the implementation of S. Korea's New Northern Diplomatic policy towards China. 
The political impact of the Olympic Games was. however. limited. The Chinese 
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen. - in an April 7.1988 press conference, stated that 
China! s participation in the Seoul Olympic Games did not signify a move by Peking 
to establish diplomatic relations with S. Korea(22). By this time China was already 
involved with preparation for the Olympics. For instance. according to information 
obtained from the -departments concerned, the China Central Television Station 
(Hereafter CCIM had purchased the exclusive rights to broadcast the 24th Olympic 
Games on the Chinese mainlan& Through an agreement with the Seoul 
International Broadcasting Centre. CC`rV were to spend a total of US$I million in 
reporting this major event. covering the Olympic Games mainly through live relay. 
over a total of 170 hours(23). 
The political Impact of the Olympic Games as regards N. Korea was also less 
than had been hoped for. Peking had requested Pyongyang not to disrupt ý the 
Olympics, and In his interview with Mozambique President Joaquim Chissano in 
1988, Kim II-sung clearly pledged that N. Korea would Indeed refrain from disrupting 
the event. 7bis was an extraordinary statement compared with that carried by 
RMRB entitled "[North)Korean Foreign Ministry Spokesman Issues Written 
Statement calling on the United States and Japan to stop abusing (North)Koreaft 
, Ibe text of this "article included the following: 'rhe Foreign Ministry of -the 
DemoCratJC ]People's Republic of [North]Korea has urged the U. S.. Japanese, and 
S. Korean authorities to stop hurling abuse at N. Korea. the so-called 'ChXU>-xkm bei- 
fan. 4. under the pretext of ensuring security for the Olympic Games, and has 
indicated that it would continue its efforts to cohost the 24th Olympic Gaines with 
the South"(24). 
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At the same time as pursuing her New Northern Diplomacy S. Korea wanted to 
maintain her "one-China-one-Taiwad' policy. During the Olympics the S. Korean 
government officially referred to the PRC as Voong-kuk [Chinal" and the ROC as 
--joorw-kuk Dae-buk [China Taipei]". regardless of Talwan's remarks concerning 
, worrying differences" with the S. Koreans over attitudes to China. 
Around this time, there were substantial non-political exchanges between 
China and S. Korea. For example. as the time of the Olympics drew closer. Peking 
permitted Korean Airliners to fly over Chinese territory on their way to destinations 
in Pakistan and India(25). The two countries subsequently agreed to start tourist 
exchanges, making, the special ferry between Wethai and Inchon a regular 
service(26). According to S. Korean sources, the agreement was reached when He 
Ruchang, vice president of China International Travel Service. a Chinese state-run 
travel company, expressed interest during his visit to Seoul in July 1988, in 
organising tourist exchanges with S. Korea. for general tourism and family visits. 
S. Korea adopted a Chinese proposal to initially limit tourist visas to history teachers 
and those in cultural fields, before extending the issue of visas to the general 
public(27). The S-Korean National Tourism Corporation recommended Global Tours, 
Hanjin Travel Service co., and Korea Travel Bureau inc. as counterparts for the 
China International Travel Service. It was also reported that the S. Korean Electric 
Telecommunication Corporation (Hereafter KETC) signed contracts in September 
1988, with the China Asia Satellite Telecommunications Company Ltd. (Hereafter 
AsTQ for the lease of three transponders on AsiaSat 1 which was to be launched in 
1990 using China! s Long MarCh 3 Rocket. from the Yichang Launch Site in Sichuan 
province in southwestern China(28). 
The 1988 Olympic games played -a useful role in building bridges between 
China and S. Korea. The S. Korean Foreign Minister Choi Kwang-soo. during a 
closed-door breakfast meeting with the National Assembly's Foreign Affairs and 
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Unification Committees, on October 9 1988. committed the government to a set of 
follow-up measures at the ministerial level. based on President Roh's New Northern 
Diplomacy which sought a sweeping improvement in Its relations with China and 
the eventual reunification of the dtvided Korean peninsula. He said: "As far as I 
know, China has expressed a considerable amount of sympathy with S. Korea's latest 
peace overturesr(29). 
'llie success of the Olympic games, Insofar as China participated fully. and 
although N. Korea did not attend it also did not attempt any serious disturbance of 
the proceedings. was yet insufficient as a platform from which to upgrade political 
relations between China and S. Korea to the status of full diplomatic recognition(30). 
Although S. Korea had perhaps hoped for such an outcome China still sought to 
avoid any deterioration in Its relations with Pyongyang. fearing to isolate the 
N. Koreans 'and thus perhaps to provoke a'destabilising response. While Seoul 
wished to set up an official mission with consular functions. China sought merely to 
establish a civillan-level office with no diplomatic trappings. China still declined to 
acknowledge any political implications attendant upon her participation In the Seoul 
Olympic Gaines. For instance. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, LI Zhaoxing. 
toned down further speculation on post-Olympic developments when he told a press 
briefing in Peking that there was no formal diplomatic relationship between China 
and S. Korea. although Peking considered all questions from the perspective of 
whether it was conducive to stability and the relaxation of tension on the Korean 
peninsula(3 I). 
With the tendency towards relaxation of world tensions, it was the S. Korean 
view that a strategy of making "cross-contacts". i. e. S. Korea establishing contacts 
with China and the USSR. in parallel with N. Korea establishing contacts with the US 
and japan, based upon "cross-recognitiorfl. could offer a final opportunity to case 
N. Korea's embarrassment at Chinese-S. Korean normalisation. In this sense. 
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President Roh was adopting a more flexible Policy towards N. Korea than any 
previous S. Korean leader had dared. He was wisely encouraging the US and other 
Western countries to be more flexible towards Pyongyang in an effort to end 
N. Korea's long isolation. Since the Olympics Seoul had enjoyed closer ties with the 
USSR and the Eastern European countries, and N. Korea was also improving its ties 
with the US and Japan. It was hoped that these new and unprecedented trends 
would stimulate Peking to improve its relations with Seoul. 
Meanwhile. in order to push ahead with its unification policy on Taiwan. 
China also needed to flne-tune its foreign Policy towards S. Korea. China had come 
to support the notion of "one country, two systems" as a formalisation of the status 
quo, pointing to both Taiwan and Korea as being amenable to the same solution. As 
far as the Taiwan Issue was concerned. if Peking was to improve Ues with S. Korea on 
the basis of cross-contacts or any other scheme. it was conceivable that a Chinese 
precondition for such a step might be for S. Korea to break Its diplomatic ties with 
Taiwan. 
president Roh used his address to the UN In October 1988 to outline his 
-Hwa-hapui-Si-dael' [New Era of Reconciliation]. Reiterating his six-point policy on 
reunification, president Roh urged the USSR and China to contribute to the opening 
of new era of progress for the whole region by expanding their relations with Seoul. 
He proposed a multinational conference to discuss the reduction of nuiltary 
confrontaUon in the areas where Russian, Chinese. Japanese and N. Korean and 
s. Korean borders meet. A further initiative was his suggestion for a consultaUve 
conference to be attended by the US., the USSR. China, Japan and the two Koreas. 
the aim of which would be to pave the way for a "permanent peace settlement", as a 
step towards "cross recognitiorf'(32). 
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7bus. S. Korea clearly Invited the US and its Western allies to renew contact 
and trade with N. Korea(33). Seoul openly advocated the de facto Japanese and 
American exchanges with Pyongyang'as a quid pro quo for S. Korea! s exchanges with 
China and the USSF; L, To foster an atmosphere conducive to improving S. Korea's 
relations with China it was necessary to expand the area of what has been called 
cross-'contact. Then it might possible to reach an agreement on cross-recognition 
and thus bring N. Korea out of its isolation and in to the international 
community(34). One leading S. Korean scholar made it quite clear that S. Korea was 
ready to renounce its "one Koreaý'pollcy on the Korean peninsula(35). 
There had been several secret meetings between high-ranking officials 
responsible for the Korean peninsula in the department of Asian Affairs of China's 
ministry of foreign affairs and N. Korean embassy officials in Peking(36). It was well 
known that China no longer opposed the strategy of cross-contacts, indeed Peking 
had been taking the initiative In pursuing better relationships between N. Korea and 
the US. 
In December 1988 and January 1989. N. Korean and US diplomats met in 
Peking to discuss the alleviation of tension on the peninsula. this being the first 
direct talks between the two countries since the Korean War(37). It was also 
reported that'. during his second visit to Pyongyang, in April 1989. Zhao Zlyang 
expressed the Chinese desire that 
Pyongyang, Seoul and Washington would hold 
negotiations on Korean reunification. and that the US. as one of the parties Involved 
in the Korean issue. would upgrade its level of representation by means of an 
earnest dialogue with N. Korea(38). 
This was interpreted as a response to S. Korea's diplomatic efforts to improve 
relations with China. not to mention N. Korea. The shifting US-N. Korean relationship 
required peking to take more varied or even neutral foreign-policy postures towards 
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S. Korea. Washington also asked Peking to use Its influence with Pyongyang to 
encourage meaningful relationships between Seoul and Pyongyang. Chinaýs moves 
towards S. Korea were parallel to the progress made In the N. Korean approach to the 
US. S. Koreaýs cross-contact strategy. without raising the issue of the official 
establishment of diplomatic relations. was being favourably received by China, and 
the situation looked promising. 
This approach was damaged. however. by the 4 June crack-down on China's 
pro-democracy movement. in Peking's Tianam-nen Square In 1989.7be incident 
strongly affected the cross-contacts strategy for upgrading political implications 
between, China and S. Korea and its role in establishing American contacts with 
N. Korea(39). 7be Peking massacre cast a pall over Sino-American relations. and also 
over N. Korean-American- relations as a consequence of Pyongyang's support for 
Peking at the time. 7be US and N-Korea had originally agreed not to publish the 
content of their fifth meeting, held in mid-1989 in Peking. 7be US State Department 
broke this agreement and its decision was bitterly criticised by N. Korea on November 
9,1989, according to N. Korean sources(40). 7bis deterioration between the US and 
N. Korea had poured cold water on the progress of S. Korea's efforts to establish 
formal relations with China. 
Mie Manamnen crack-down was quickly and wamily applauded by 
pyongyang(41). Kim 11-sung's subsequent visit to Peldng. an unexpected event in the 
light of the increasingly positive relationship between China and S. Korea. gave rise 
to speculation that the "Ideology-flrsV' movement in China might possibly succeed in 
shifting the eidsting pragmatism in policy towards s. Korea into a more rigid I 
policy(42). BE reported the visit as follows: 
During their talks and meetings, both sides briefed each other on 
their domestic situations. They also exchanged views on furthering the 
friendly relations between the two parties and two countries and on the 
international situation and other Issues of common concern. Their options 
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on these issues were identical. ... Both sides expressed their deterniination to 
persist in Party leadership and the socialist road(43). 
After the Tianannien incident. 'when Jiang Zemin paid his first visit to 
Pyongyang since taking the position of General Secretary in the CCP. China was 
apparently making an effort to shore up their bilateral relations in the midst of 
"Imperialist aggressiorf' around the world(44). The vice-prenlier and foreign minister 
of N. Korea. Kim Yong-nam, subsequently paid a brief visit to Peking in April 1990. 
Shortly afterwards it was revealed that a PLA, delegation, headed by Chinese Defence 
Minister, Chin Jiwel, was visiting N. Korea(45). I 
I 
Seoul's thus-tar successful "New Northern Diplomacy#, of seeking govenunent- 
to-government relations with Peking. at least in regard of its "CrOss-contact6" 
strategy. appears to have faltered somewhat as a consequence of the Tianarimen 
incident. it is noteworthy that IM, October 30-November 5,1989, commented on 
S. Korea's political crisis by criticising Roh's New Northern Diplomacy(46). 
The Impact of the CoUapse of the East European Communist Countries 
During- 1989 and 1990 both China and S-Korea observed. with contrasting 
views the general collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. As changes took place 
in Eastern Europe. the relations between S. Korea and the East European countries, 
which had been frozen for 40 years, began to thaw. As one S. Korean scholar pointed 
out, the collapse of the Eastern European countries freed S. Korea from the fear of 
communism(47). The fa of the Berlin Wall on November 9.1989, and other 
dramatic events of this era allowed progress to be made by S. Korcaýs New Northern 
Diplomacy. both with respect to the East European countries and also in Sino- 
S. Korean relations. 
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When the East European countries adopted pluralism and shifted towards 
market economics this was a move with far-reaching Implications for Seoul's 
relations with them. At the forefront of the improvement In S. Korcan-East European 
relations was Hungary. the most economically reformist of the East European 
countries. In March 1988 a Hungarian trade office was opened In Seoul shortly 
before the Olympics and this was linked with the S. Korean decision to sign a 
contract with Budapest for the provision of the electronic sign board for the Olympic 
stadium in Seoul. Seoul and Budapest agreed to, exchange permanent trade 
missions. and the two countries subsequently established full diplomatic relations 
at the ainbassadorial level in January 1989(48). 
From the late 1980's onwards the expansion of S. Korea! s diplomatic horizons 
to include the rest of the East European countries appears to have provided a 
positive boost for S. Korea's efforts to make diplomatic Inroads into China and nudge 
Peking out of its comer. As one S. Korean scholar pointed out, '"Mey need us more 
than we need them". S. Korea! s success in establishing diplomatic relations with the 
former Socialist Bloc countries led China, always diplomatically ambivalent towards 
the "revisionist" East European countries and the Soviet Union. to reallse that 
Peking would have to display more flexibility if its declining International image was 
to be propped up(49). 
7be dramatic changes in Eastern Europe during 1989 were percetved. by an 
authoritative analysis in the a& as a new challenge to the Asian conimunist 
countries' fidelity. Provided, 
however. that the East European countries were less 
ready to recognise Taiwan than they had been to recognise S-Korea. the Chinese 
leadership no longer saw any reason to fear a swift growth of relations between 
s. Korea and East Europe(50). 
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As Peking pondered how to react to the far-reaching changes taking place In 
Europe and awaited the normalisation of relations with the West. Chin; aýs "first. 
make-good-friends" agenda prompted her to take an even more fle-Nible stance 
towards third countries(51). This was not good news for N. Korea and Kim II-sung 
made a secret visit to Peking In November 1989. According to Uodo citing "an 
influentlal Chinese source"., during Kim 11-sung's visit to Peking to seek support. 
following some East European countries' recognition of S. Korea in November 1989, 
Deng Maoping reportedly sympathised with Kim by pled" to keep the PRC's Ues 
with S. Korea at unofficial, levels. but said that China was not in a position to 
influence East European countries and the USSR on their policies towards 
S. Korea(52). Furthermore he turned down Kim's request for US$270 million in 
military assistance, in line with China! s growing interest in regional stability. being 
concerned about the effect that China! s assistance might have of bolstering the 
hardliners in N. Korea(53) 
most importantly. the Chinese leaders reallsed that China might lose its 
influence on the peninsula If it continued to disregard S-Korea's enthusiasm for 
enhanced official links with China. The development of S. Korea's relations with the 
USSR and East European countries implied an increasing influence by other powers 
on the Korean peninsula. There was. for example, a new movement towards cross- 
contacts between the two Koreas and the four major powers on the Korean 
peninsula. Frorn this time the US State department allowed N. Koreans from 
cultural, sporting and academic circles to pay unofficW visits to the US. In addition. 
the Japanese Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita bluntly stated. "It is time for Japan 
to improve relations with N. Korea"(54). 7bus, given these repercussions of the 
changes, the development of S. Korea's relations with Eastern European countries 
came to exert an increasing influence on the further development of Sino-S. Korean 
relations. 
190 
Soviet-S. Korean NormaRsation 
7be 71ananmen incident also led the government of President Roh to 
temporarily shift its strategic efforts away from China, towards the USSR and other 
communist countries in Eastern Europe. 7be most important benefit from cross. 
contacts was Mely to come from the USSR. It was the USSR that had sought to turn 
over a new leaf in establishing its relations with S. Korea. Just as the Chinese moved 
closer to N. Korea, in the wake of the Mananmen incident. at the same time Moscow 
was moving surprisingly closer to S. Korea. 
one of the most significant by-products of the changing international climate 
of security was the thaw that had already taken place In relations between the USSR 
and S. Korea. Gorbachev's speech at Krasnoyarsk in September 1988 stressed the 
political significance of the Seoul Olympiad when he cited it as one of the factors 
which had promoted closer Soviet relations with S. Korea. in the context of Ahe 
proposed multilateral discussions on Asian-Pacific region. After the Seoul Olympics 
two Soviet officials, Georgiy A. Arbatov. director of the Institute for US and Canadian 
Affairs and an adviser to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev on external affairs, and 
Mikhail Kapitsa, former Soviet deputy foreign minister and subsequently director of 
the Soviet Institute for Oriental Studies, had visited Seoul to discuss economic 
cooperation. At this time they suggested the possibility of a political relationship 
between the two countries(55). In April 1989 the USSR opened its first trade office In 
Seoul, and in the same month an agreement was concluded to create a direct 
shipping route between the port of Pusan and two Soviet ports. Following this, Seoul 
and Moscow signed an agreement providing for the opening of consular relations in 
December 1989(56). 
The Soviet-S. Korean rapprochement redu ced the strategic importance of 
pyongyang and paved the way for S. Korea and China to approach the establishment 
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of diplomatic relations now that China! s links with N. Korea-although they remained 
important in the wake of the Tiananmen incident of June 1989-were much less 
constrained by ideological considerations than had previously been the case. 
ironically Ziang Zemin's visit to Pyongyang on March 14 1990 coincided with Kim 
Young Sam's invitation by the Soviets to talk about expanding economic links. On 
March 19,1990. he paid his second eight-day visit to Moscow. holding discussions 
with the Soviet Union's leaders Intended to promote economic Ues between the two 
countries(57). 
At the, same time. the S. Korean Foreign Ministry Put forward a decisive 
principle regarding its ties with China, building on the revolutionary changes in 
relations between the USSR and S. Korea(58). The Northward Policy Promotion Team 
of the S. Korean Foreign Ministry. the so-called "Oye-mu-bu-ffin. " led by Hong Soon 
young, Assistant Foreign Minister, and Min Hyoung KI. Director-General of the 
department of East-Asian Affairs, became stubbornly insistent on the principle of 
,, Chung_kyurjg-hqp-it'jcombined economy and politics]. 7be essence of this principle 
is that economic cooperation between China and S. Korea must be accompanied by 
political concessions on the part of China: 
On the one hand, the Soviet leaders are keen on some tangible results 
from their conunitment to perestrolka and glasnost. which played an 
irnportant role in the expansion of economic cooperation with S. Korea. 
" On the other hand, China is hoping to reallse her old dream of 
blocking a potentW Soviet advance towards the Asian Pacific basin through 
, promoting a relationship with 
S. Korea. For this purpose Peking is trying to 
bring the Korean issue on to the International stage (i. e. seeking a solution 
through a multinational conference or the UN) by which means they may 
automaUcally enter the Asian-Pacific arena(59). 
In effect, S. Korca took a clear position that political concessions were needed 
before the normallsation of the relationship between the two countries. One of the 
S. Korean officials insisted: "It is China who is in desperate need of economic 
cooperation from S. 
Korea. lberefore if we wait, they are bound to come to the 
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negotiating table with a bigger deal such as an official relationship at consular or 
ambassadorial level. "(60). 
Soviet-S. Korea normalisation reinforced the S. Korean insistence on the 
principle of Churtg-kyung-hap461). On June 4.1990. an unprecedented meeting 
took place between President Gorbachev and President Roh in San Francisco. The 
discussions held centred on the prospective economic co-operation between S. Korea 
and the'USSR. in spite of Moscow's vagueness about the timing of full recognition. 
their commitment to the slogan "to close the past, and open the future, " had a 
knock-on effect, causing China to resume its efforts to promote its relations with the 
South(62). 
. The Roh-Gorbachev meeting enhanced the recognition of S. Korea as a political 
force in region. On September 30,1990, S. Korean Foreign Minister Choi Ho Joong 
and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze signed a declaration establishing 
ambassador-level diplomatic relations. - and issued a joint communique after their 
talks at the UN headquarters in New York. China regarded this principally as an 
attempt by the USSR to overcome Its sluggish economy through economic co- 
operation with S. Korea. Chinese specialists no 
longer viewed Moscow's policy 
towards S. Korea as a threat to China's national security(63). 7bey believed that if 
China shifted towards N. Korea. she would be the loser. Consequently China began 
once again to pursue a more pragmatic attitudes in its economic relations with 
S. Korea. 
Although Peking denounced the establishment of diplomatic Ucs between the 
tiSSR and S. Korea as a "betrayal sought and bought with dollars. " S. Korea's 
presidential offlcials and newspaper columnists remained optimistic that gtven 
Peking's sour relationships with the West after the Tiananmen incident, and gtven 
also the "desperate need" of the Chinese to acquire hard currency they could only 
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move to improve relations with S. Korea. As one S-Korea newspaper editor remarked: 
"Peking should understand that the close Interdependence of world society today 
brings enormous disadvantages to a country which tries to Isolate itself'(64). 
Although the establishment of relations with Moscow was welcome. the 
S. Korean Foreign Ministry still pursued. as a primary objective of the New Northern 
Diplomacy. the recognition by China of S. Korea. Moscow's Initiative to establish 
diplomatic ties with Seoul had a strong effect on China's position because both 
Moscow and Peking had portrayed themselves as having a crucial role In reducing 
tensions on the Korean peninsula. During President Roh's visit Moscow on 
December 13.1990. the "Moscow DeclaratiorP was issued. 7bis was a joint 
declaration on general principles pledging "good-neighbourly" relations. joint efforts 
towards ending the Cold War in Asia. a relaxation of tension on the Korean 
peninsula, and eventual reunification of South and North Korea(65). This clearly 
gave China little comfort. Furthermore. when S. Korea decided to apply for 
membership of the UN by itself. with Moscow's tacit acquiescence. the Chinese 
leaders believed that high-level exchanges between China and N. Korea might lead 
the international community to isolate China as N. Korea was effectively isolated(66). 
China's Quasi-Official Relations with S. Korea 
After the Tiananmen incident of June 1989 China. diplomatically shunned by 
rnost Western countries and ambivalent in Its 
dealing with "revisionist-, East 
European countries and the USSR. was emphasising ties with a number of countries 
which it did not officially recognise, including S. Korea. China's desperate efforts to 
reestablish its open-door and reform Image 
by any means lent extra weight to 
S. Korea's New Northern Diplomacy(67). 
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S. Korea was worried that a paranoid China would become more dangerous, 
and that the economic advantage of its trade with China Might be lost. and was 
consequently unwilling to be pushed into sanctions by the same Western countries 
that were complaining about S. Korean trade surpluses. Official contacts between 
Seoul and Peking before Tiananmen had been occasional. limited. and discreet. It is 
therefore difficult to determine whether the incident caused any hiatus in relations; 
certainly by early 1990 officials from the two sides were talking--at the beginning of 
February 1990. Seoul opened a tourist office In Peking. and China was preparing to 
set up a "semi-official trade office" in Seoul, under the auspices of the China 
Chamber of International Conunerce'(Hereafter CCIC). that was to serve as a de 
facto consular mission(68). 
The Eleventh Asian Games, held In Peking between September 22 and October 
7.1990, was an opportunity for Seoul and Peking to Improve their bilateral ties. For 
China the Games was an important occasion to show'the world that the 1989 
Tjananmen Incident was now in the past. and that normalcy had flnally returned to 
China. Peking sought to carry off the games without incident, since they attracted a 
large number of international spectators and tourists--inclu ding many from S. Korea. 
s. Korea! s government and industrial circles seized on the Games to press their 
efforts to secure diplomatic and commercial relations with China. 7be 1990 Asian 
Games in Peking provided an opportunity to exhibit S. Korea's newly acquired 
economic prowess and diplomatic status. 
Additionally. in an age of cultural and sports diplomacy, S. Korea's support for 
the Peking Asian Games exerted pressure on China to downgrade her relationship 
with N. Korea. it was reported that in response to Kim 11-sung's offer. in early 
September, to visit Peking for an important consultation. Jiang Zemin Instead chose 
the northeastern city of Shenyang to meet him, and also rejected some of Kirns 
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requirements(69). China was clearly well awam of the political and diplomatic 
ramifications of S. Koreaýs participation in the Games, particularly with regard to 
China! s relations with N. Korea. 
Chinese offlcials said that they wanted to use the Asian Games to help 
promote detente. by bringing both Korcas to the conference table. China allowed a 
senior Seoul official, Sports Minister Chung Dong Sung, to visit Peking to talk with 
his N. Korean 6ounterparts on a range of problems. mostly concerned with, the 
organisation of a single team to represent Korea(70). In a joint press conference on 
September 22, Choi Man-Lip. vice president of the S. Korean Olympic ConuTittee. 
and his Northern. counterpart. Kim Hyung-jin. announced an agreement between 
their respective sports authorities(71). A single supporters group was also orgarilsed, 
for the first time. for the Peldng games. 
S. Korea was hoping that such quasi-officW diplomatic arrangements could be 
expanded into full official recognition. For example. Kim Hak Joon. one of President 
Roh's special influential aides on the New Northern Diplomacy. expected that Seoul 
and Peking would exchange trade offlces with consular functions following the 
games(72). In this new surge of political flexibility between China and S. Korea. Park 
Chul On. a senior official in S. Koreaýs most powerful think tank for the New 
Northern Diplomacy, was permitted to visit Peking to talk with Chinese leaders to 
explore the possibility of transforming S. Korea's sports office into a trading mission 
after the Peking Asian Garnes(73). 
I S. Koreaýs participation in the Asian Games was an Important signal of support 
for China; still subject to widespread international condernnation and sanctions. 
and grateful for any help available to project an image of normalcy after the 
Tiananmen incident. Immediately after the opening of the games S. Koreas 
attendance was rewarded with an agreement to set up trade oMces, which were also 
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empowered to handle consular affairs, and this would prompt the nonnallsatIon. of 
S. Korea's diplomatic links with Peking over the next very few years(74). One China- 
Watcher in Seoul conunented that this breakthrough represented a notable success 
for S. Korea's principle of "Chung-kyung-hap-C'(75). 
It was not altogether surprising that China and S. Korea signed an accord to 
swap trade offices with de facto consular functions. apparently moving the two 
countries one step nearer to full diplomatic relations(76). S. KDrea's relations with 
the USSR and Eastern Europe were expanding rapidly, and China was unwilling to 
permit such links to squeeze her out of the picture - S. Korean capital and 
technology were vital to China's modernisation. Just before S-Korea established its 
defacto embassy in Moscow. with Gong Ro-myung as the first Ambassador to the 
USSR, Zheng Hongye. chairman of the CCIC, and Sunki Lee, president of KOTRA. 
signed an agreement on October 20 1990 in Peking to exchange representative 
offices on behalf of their own organisations, which were also to represent their 
respective countries' oMcial positions on foreign trade. Under the agreement, offlces 
were to be established in both Seoul and Peking. Building on the success of the 
Seoul Olympics in 1988, which created the initial non-political state-to-state 
relationship. the Peking Asian Games in 1990 developed this quasi-oMcial 
recognition much further, and resulted in concrete gains for S. Korea. 
There were, however, indications of discrepancies between the Chinese and 
S. Korean interpretations of the establishment of trade offices in Peking and Seoul. 
iFor Instance. whereas S. Korca wished to set up an offIcial mission with consular 
functions, China sought merely to establish a civilian-level omce with no diplomatic 
implications. China insisted on keeping the trade OfIlce separate from diplomatic 
activities and instead suggested sending a delegation of consular officWs to Seoul to 
handle the large volume of S. Korean tourists expected to visit Peking for the Asian 
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Games in September 1990(77). Subsequently limited diplomatic functions. notably 
the issue of visas, have been carried out by the permanent trade offices in Seoul. 
inter-Korean Dialogue 
If the period 1988 to 1990 saw a notable new mood of cooperation in relaUons 
between China and S. Korea, it witnessed an even more remarkable inter-Korean 
dialogue developing between the North and the South. From the Chinese point of 
view, if relations between the North and the South were to be gradually improved 
this would contribute to the attainment of China! s desire of a peaceful settlement on 
the Korean peninsula. 7be Peking Asian Games, besides demonstrating that 
normalcy had finally returned to China. was also a useful opportunity to highlight 
the technical problems that would arise as a result of normallsation of Sino- 
S. Korean relations, and allowed some headway to be made In the resolution of the 
N. Korean problem inasmuch as an unified Korean team participated. 
The further development of relations with S. Korea had been inhibited by the 
Chinese old guard's ideological ties with their N. Korean counterparts. Gerrit W. 
Gong has argued that the long-standing person-to-person ties between, for example. 
Deng XiaoPing, Yang Shangkun, and Kim 11-sung. limited the speed and scope of 
establishment of formal relations between the two countries(78). China continued to 
affirm its relationship with N. Korea by restricting relations with S. Korea to a low- 
profile unofficial liaison office. 
Editorial writers and journalists in Seoul suggested that the improvement of 
the South's relations with the North would give Peldng more room to conduct a more 
flocible foreign policy towards S. Korea, even opening up full diplomatic relations 
with Seoul(79). 7bere were also criticism of S. Korea's New Northem Policy as 
apparently moving too fast, resulting in N. Korea! s Isolation. It was necessary to 
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consider the implications for future relations between the two Koreas. Soon-sung 
Cho. chief foreign policy spokesman of the main opposition Party for Peace and 
Democracy (Hereafter PPD), criticised that S-Korean government for using its New 
Nofthem Diplomacy to defend and justify its domestic affairs. He also suggested 
that the objective of the New Northern Diplomacy should be focused not only on the 
formal diplomacy with China. but also on the political implications with N. Korea(80). 
An editorial in a leading S. Korean monthly magazine also criticised the government's 
New Northern Diplomacy, for granting economic assistance to the East European 
countries in return for the normalisation of relations, judging the cost to be too 
high (8 1) - 
S. Korea came to acknowledge that Inter-Korean reconciliation was its last 
outstanding task for obtaining fully-fledged diplomatic relations with China. Seoul 
wasted no more time in attempting to get closer to the North. As a result of improved 
bilateral relations between Seoul and Moscow. Pyongyang was willing to participate 
in a series of North-South dialogues. On August 30,1990 the two Koreas agreed on 
details for talks between their prime ministers. the highest-level contact between the 
two governments since 1945. On September 4.1990 they met together in Seoul. 
They concluded two extraordinary days of talks without narrowing their historic 
disagreements, but both sides hailed what they said was a new atmosphere of 
tolerance that could lead to progress(82). 
From the Chinese point of view, the trend towards reconciliation and peace 
contributed not only to their Interests on the Korean peninsula. but-also to the 
peace and security of Asia as a whole. and indeed to that of the world. When the 
Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen held talks with his Soviet counterpart Eduard 
Shevardnadze on September 1.1990 in the Chinese city of Harbin, he stated that 
China firmly believed the dialogue between North and South Korea to be essentw 
for the easing of tensions. also he earnestly hoped that the Ongoing meeting of the 
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prime minsters of the two Koreas would achieve positive results(83). China's position 
was made clear by the remarks of Wu Xueqian on October 24 1990 at a banquet 
hosted by N. Korean Ambassador to China. Chu Chang Jun, and commemorating 
the 4oth anniversary of the day when the CPV crossed the Yalu River and joined the 
Korean War. 
... Recently several eye-catching changes have appeared in the north- 
south relations of Korea. Prime Ministers from both sides have held two 
rounds of talks and reached agreements on Issues concerning the 
improvement of bilateral relations. ... China hopes that dialogue between the 
north and south will lead to a relaxation In the tension of the Korean 
Peninsula. and create favourable conditions for the reunification of an 
independent and peaceful Korea. ... We are gratified at, and welcome. this 
development(84). 
At about the same time. an editorial in RMRB, commemorating the 45th 
anniversary of the N. Korean Communist Party, stressed the importance of high-level 
exchanges and policy coordination in North-South dWogue(85). 
S. Koreaýs reunification policy. based on the Principle of a "dwided nation 
without- tension", was acceptable to the Chinese, leading them to compromise 
between, China's recognition of S. Korea and China's reunification policy towards 
Taiwan. Chinese leaders attempted to apply their principle of "one country, two 
systems!, to the Korean peninsula7s two govcnunents--claiming that Hong Kong 
would remain unchanged even beyond the fifty years promised in the Sino-British 
joint declaration on Hong Kong after it returns to Chinese rule in 1997(86). 
Peking believed that in the longer term N. Korean communism would be 
seriously threatened by Pyongyang's 
failure to introduce economic reforms. China 
was also concerned to show that N. Korean communism was different from that of 
the Eastern European socialist countries. 7bus when S. Korean Foreign Minister, 
Choi HO JOOng- revealed that Seoul had made preparations to apply for separate 
entry into the UN, it was reported that China would not veto S. Korea! s application 
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for UN membership(87). One of the S. Korean officials added that Seoul had been 
encouraged by a report that Peking had rejected a demand by Kim 11-sung for China 
to conunit itself to vetoing any S. Korean application tojoin the LTN(88). 
The sudden advance in inter-Korean relations came about because China 
sought greater regional security for Northeast Asia. S. Korea was happy to move In 
the direction that was desired by the Chinese because the continuing threat of 
conflict on the Korean peninsula was acknowledged by Seoul as major impediment 
to full-diplomatic relations with Peking. There also existed In S. Korea a popular 
enthusiasm for any progress possible towards unification. N-Korea came to the table 
in response to the improvement in USSR-S. Korean relations. It, was now the only 
option available, other than a descent into deeper isolation. and Peking encouraged 
Pyongyang to, put its best foot forwards. fearing the collapse of N. Korean 
communism unless economic reforms were instituted. With signs all around that the 
S. Korean government informed China of the real motives behind her initlatIves 
towards reconciliation with N. Korea. it was less difIlcult for China to develop 
relations with S. Korea to the point where it would be appropriate to make a bridge to 
fully-fledged diplomatic ties, In the same way as the USSR had done. The 
culmination of S. Korea's success came with the appointment. In November 1990, of 
Roh Jae-Won, former Deputy Foreign Minister of S. Korea. and ranked "veteran 
diplomaV. as KOMs representative in Peking, and de facto ambassador to 
China(89). 
s. 2 Economic Relations 
only one country in Asia does not OMcially trade with China directly. namely 
s. Korea. During this crucW period, as China graduallY gained International 
recognition as one of the most 
dynamic trading nations in the world, S. Korea and 
China, became ever more economically interdependent. A growing economic 
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regionalism developed. based on more favourable conditions for promoting econornic 
cooperation: the consolidation of direct trade; the growing exchanges between the 
northeastern local provinces of China and S. Korea: the fostering of joint-industrial 
commercial ventures with all their advantages arising out of the aggregation of 
capital. technology. manpower and natural resources between China and S. Korea. 
The trade between China and S. Korea provided a timely support for the S. Korean 
government's Chung-kYung-hqp-il principle in its New Northern Diplomacy. , 
Economic relations and trade ties between the two countries increased by 
leaps and bounds in the latter part the 1980's. Two-way trade was gradually growing 
with direct shipments of mostly Chinese raw materials, across the Yellow Sea from 
the Northeast provinces of China to S. Korea. though Indirect trade via third 
countries remained importýnt. Trade during 1988 
is believed to have totalled at least 
uS$1 billion. According to S. Korean Trade and Industry Ministry (Hereafter'MTI) 
statistics, S. Koreaýs trade with China, which amounted to US$3.14 billion In 1989. 
nearly ten times the value of Peking's trade with the North, stood at US$3.84 billion 
in 1990 including more than US$2 billion in the import of coal and grain from 
China, and more than US$1.5 billion in the exportation of steel, etc.. to China(90). 
Although Peking's opening-ul) to Seoul has been slower than that of Moscow 
the actual volume of S. Korea's trade with China was larger than that with the USSR. 
F. Xports to the USSR in 1990 were up 40% while imports rose 128%. and both 
exports and imports'with Eastern Europe almost doubled compared with the same 
period of the previous year. but S. Korea! s trade with China was four times larger 
than trade with the USSR and Eastern Europe(91). in 1090. trade with China 
increased 22.4% to US$3,84 million. Exports climbed 9.9% to US$1.58 billion. led 
by synthetic fabrics, leather. paper and raw materials for processing: and imports 
reached US$2,268 million, up 33%. headed by bituminous coal. crude oil, petroleurn 
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products and cement(92). Professor Young Whan Kihl reckoned that China 
accounted for 50/6 of S. Korea's exports by 1990(93). 
The Growth of Regional Economic Cooperation 
Two discernible features have emerged in the 1980's which have global 
ramincations: one is the so-called "new detente, " proceeding far beyond even the 
boldest expectations. 7be other Is a quiet but persistent trend towards the 
regionalisation of International economic relations as witnessed in both the 
European Community and the US-Canada Free I[Yade Agreement. In the Asian- 
pacific region as well, there are some Indications of sub-regionalisation. 
With the general relaxation in international relations the countries of the 
Northeast Asian region became more relaxed about threats to their security. viewing 
security in very comprehensive terms and opening up to economic cooperations of a 
multifaceted character. Countries in the region chose to replace their old alliance 
structures entirely. seeking to achieve a new equilibrium based on a complex 
framework of cooperation which emphasises forbearance. concessions. and above all 
a continuous process of consultation. It 
became possible to engage in multiple 
economic linkages with surrounding nations, seeking a new kind of modus vivendi 
that transcended differences of social or political organisation. Such a system of 
multiple linkages was fundamental to the changing 
face of Northeast Asia, based on 
the growth of regional economic cooperation(94). 
Even though there was no Incipient regional Integration near at hand. nor 
were all members of the Northeast 
Asian community equally excited about the 
extent or the nature of their 
increasing regional economic cooperation. the 
expansion, of these patterns into a comprehensive regional Organisation began to 
arise as a tentative possibility; deepening and spreading the economic network to 
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encompass all those nations which partake of the common heritage of either 
Chinese Confucianism or neo-Confucianism, whenever the trend of political 
relaxation in the region initiated by Sino-Soviet detente pemiits it. 
A commonality of interests became steadily more prevalent in the region: with 
the exception of Japan, all of the free market economies of the region depended on 
regional markets for more! than 50% of their trade: Intraregional trade and 
investment were growing rapidly; China devoted her primary energies to expanding 
channels of contact and conununication with S. Korea and Taiwan; S. Korea and 
Taiwan as financiers in their own right were active In building up new regional 
economic cooperation; finally. the other two communist countries in Northeast Asia. 
N. Korea and the USSR. like China. were anxious to trade with the non-communist 
countries. which hinted at the future levels of economic relations between the 
peninsula's two very different econon-des. 
Taking all these factors into account it is clear that there are important 
reasons to pay close attention to what was taldng place in the relations between 
China and S. Korea. Based on the development of such shared interests and 
common patterns of exchange in the region, both China and S-Korea could be 
expected to play an active role in the growth of regional economic cooperation. 
There was a rapid growth of trade between the two countries arising from a 
,, macroeconomic!, transformation in which labour-intenstve Manufacturing moved 
frorn s. Korea to China. Chinese light Industry. agriculture and abundant labour 
adrrgrably complement the S. Korean 
heavy and technology-intensive industries. and 
their Capital- technology and managerial skills. China and S. Korea, shared an 
understanding of the potential advantages 
from taking part In regional economic 
development; resulting in policies in both China and S. Korea designed to bridge 
their gap in economic development between them. 
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S. Koreaýs "Northern Policy" towards China had created a favourable 
atmosphere for such economic cooperation. Soon after the Sixth Republic of S. Korea 
made expansion of trade with China one of its central priorities. the goverrunent of 
S. Korea showed considerable enthusiasm for the creation of some forum of 
economic cooperation based around the Pacific basin, studying the formation of 
such an institution with Japan and Australia(95). Regardless of the success or 
failure of plans for a Pacific Basin organisation, S. Korea was in a good position to 
encourage the communist countries into closer association with the region's free- 
market economies. 
China also appeared to be considering some version of a sub-regional 
economic development as part of the strategy towards regional economic 
cooperation-ý ChIna! s economists and , research institutes were increasingly 
concerned with the concept of "Northeast Asian Economic Community"(96). The 
Chinese leaders therefore attempted to improve economic relations with S. Korea by 
advocating the "principle of cooperations". i. e., mutual benefit. flexibility, voluntary 
participation, economicAlversification. and an open system(97). China announced 
ambitious plans to open the Dalian, region, an important window to China's 
Northeastern Provinces of Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang(98). These provinces. 
towards which S. Korea has shown less interest compared to other coastal regions 
such as Guangdong and Shandong. began to take on an increasing role in the all 
over economic intercourse between the two countries. These provinces are rich in 
natural resources and 
have solid industrial bases, Particularly Shenyang. 
Heilongliang and Jilin. These areas are of potential interest to S. Korea Interested in 
multilateral economic cooperation. 
After 1988 with the Chinese de facto recognition of S. Karea and the 
establishment of official conunercial links with China a wider geocconomic 
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cooperation in Northeast Asia became possible, with the increased openness of 
trading and the establishment of dlrectý transportation, links, so that econon-Lic 
relations between China and S. Korea expanded. 
Equal Treatment for S. Korean Businessmen 
China-watchers in Hong Kong began to detect a genuine readiness. on the part 
of China, to treat S. Korea on an equal footing with other foreign countries(99). There 
are several pieces - of evidence which support this view. Firstly. in early 1988 a 
foreign investment promotion team from Guangzhou, the capital city of Guangdong 
province. gave a briefing on business conditions In the city to more than forty 
S. Korean businessmen stationed in Hong Kong(100). At the briefing session, which 
lasted one-and-a half hours. Lin Bing. vice chairman of Guangzhou city foreign 
economics and trade committee, and NI zhian. deputy chief of the Guangzhou 
customs office, said that existing conditions for trade between the two countries 
were characterised by many difficulties, but the situation could be expected to 
Irnprove graduany. s. Korean businessmen in China would be able to enjoy equal 
treatment with other foreign businessmen, and China was adopting the same 
attitude towards trade with Seoul. Kim Pu-ld, researcher at the Foreign Ministry's 
Institute of Foreign ý Policies and National Security, suggested that S. Korean 
enterprises should look to Guangdong province. which had established over 700 
foreign trade companies in Hong Kong, Macao and other Chinese provinces rather 
than Shandong or Liaoning peninsula(l 0 1). 
Second, a Chinese court in the Port Of Qingdao ruled in favour of a S. Korean 
shipping company. which constituted a major 
breakthrough In Sino-S. Korean 
shipping relations. Qingdao maritime court. in accepting a claim by a S. Korean 
company, the Sewon shipping company. as represented by a Shanghai law firm. was 
the first court in China to recognise the legal standing of a S. Korean company. 7be 
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court ruled that a ship docked in Qingdao and owned by the Indonesia-based 
company Ghama-sentosa. which was in debt to Sewon, should be auctioned off. The 
ruling was made despite the fact that neither S. Korea. nor Indonesia had diplomatic 
relations with China. Qingdao's recognition of the S. Korean claim was the result of a 
series of moves by China towards treating S. Korea as an equal trading partner. in 
the view of international lawyers, the court's move also represented a step forward in 
China! s professed aim of adhering to the rule of law. and to international standards 
for ports. JI Guizhi. the acting marshal for the auction. confirmed that the Sewon 
had applied directly through a lawyer In Shanghai but declined to give the name of 
the law firm(102)., , 
Third. S. Korea! s leading electronics manufacturer Goldstar Co. I. Ad. held an 
exhibition of its goods in Shanghai, China, under the title "Made in Korea7. in a bid 
to establish a foothold for much greater trading Inroads into China. Goldstar 
exhibited about 2,340 items. including home appliances and semiconductors. from 
May 23-25 1988, at the invitation of the Shanghai Instrumentation and Electronic 
Import Export corp. It marked the first time that a S. Korean home appliances 
manufacturer had held an exhibition in China at the Invitation of a Chinese 
corporation. During the exhibition, Goldstar also planned to hold two seminars on 
electronics technology. inviting Chinese engineers to participate. according to 
Goldstar officials. They were negotiating with Shanghai city officials to set up a 
permanent Goldstar exhibition Centre in Shanghal(103). According to the S. Korean 
Ministry of Trade and Industry, electronics exports to China almost quintupled to 
uS$783 million in 1988. Goldstar alone shipped US$400 million worth of electronic 
products to China in that year. accounting for 15% of the company's total 
exports(104). 
Fourth, China was seeking to Protect the industrial PrOPertY rights of 
S. Korean businesses. According to business sources In Seoul. a private firm in Hong 
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Kong. designated by Peking as Its agent for the registration of industrial property 
rights of foreign concerns in China, had been empowered to handle the registration 
of such rights for S. Korean firms. Novel Technology Development of Hong Kong 
asked the S. Korean government to introduce S. Korean firms interested in registering 
their industrial property rights in China. S. Korea for its part was also protecting the 
industrial property rights of Chinese businesses, as shown by the case of China 
Patent Agent (Hong Kong) which filed an application with the S. Korean government 
for the registration of a Chinese concern's industrial property(105). 
The Consolidation of Direct Trade 
It was necessary for China and S. Korea to establish direct transportation and 
communication networks between them. coordinating these with the principles of 
industrial development which had been mutually established: non-exclusion of 
Northeast Asian countries. respect for one another's sovereignty, the redress of 
imbalances in economic development, and cooperation based on equal 
partnerships(106). 
Although it is difficult to determine the precise time at which direct trade was 
fully established, it would seem that 1988 saw the consolidation of the linkage. At 
the end of 1980's direct trade accounted for more than half of the total bilateral 
trade of US$3 billion(107). 
A number of complementary political factors encouraged the establishment of 
direct trade between China and S. Korea. The continued gradual relaxation of 
tension on the Korean peninsula allowed the two countries to address the 
opportunities 
for trade directly, without reference to N. Korean sentiments. and go on 
to consolidate the direct trade between them. 
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Concerning Japan; China saw the expansion of Sino-S. Korean trade as a lever 
to encourage more Japanese investment in China. Moreover, the Chinese had been 
trying to persuade Japan to transfer more technology to China. and were disturbed 
by the continuing deficit in their trade with Japan. The S. Korean economy grew by 
12% annually between 1988 and 1990. Indicating that S. Korea might expect to join 
the ranks of the advanced industrial countries within three to five years. China 
therefore perceived S. Korea, as a more promising source of Investment and 
technology than Japan had proved to be. and one with whom trading might be 
pursued on a more balanced basis(108). At a meeting of the advisory council for the 
coordination of government economic policy Professor Kim Song-hun. of Chungang 
University in Seoul. asserted that China seemed to have the intention of checking 
the Japanese exploitation of the Chinese market by means of its approach to 
s. Korea. He suggested that both China and S. Korea were in need of an improved 
bilateral relationship based upon their practical economic interests(109). 
Concerning N. Korea: the development of the budding relationship between the 
two Koreas enhanced the prospect of direct trade between China and S. Korea. 
Describing S. Korea! s New Northern Diplomacy as "something of the past. and we are 
now looking forwards, " President Roh gave a strong indication of Seoul's readiness to 
improve its acrimonious relations with Pyongyang(l 10). President Roh described the 
situation as I 
,, very paradoxical: The two sides want to strengthen their cooperation 
and develop their trade. But. because of political considerations. we are 
progressing much more slowly than we ought. .... Our trade will continue to 
increase. particularly after the Olympic Games. The problem of N. Korea 
continues to overshadow our cultural. historical, and economic perspectives. 
so we will have to move gradually. "(1 11). 
Following the S. Korean government's Promulgation of new guide-lines for 
North-south economic exchanges. there were several instances of covert trade 
between N. Korea and S. Korean businessmen(l 12). On 14 December 1988 Samsung 
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Corporation agreed to import 1000 tons of deep sea fish from the North through its 
trading partner in Japan(i 13). Also. on 1 February 1989 the Hyundai Group 
revealed that It had agreed to ajoint-venture development of N. Korea's Mt. Kumgang 
into an international tourist spot. and had also agreed in Principle to participate 
with N. Korean companies in the USSRs Siberian development programmes(i 14). 
"4 
7bese developments helped remove the embarrassment of Peking in engaging 
in direct trade with S. Korea. 7be leadership of China and its high-ranking officials 
maintained a very prudent attitude In consideration of N. Korea. Hu Qili, one of the 
five members of the Politburo Standing Committee. stated in January 1988 "If 
N. Korea agrees, of course direct trade can be pursued"(1 15). Hu's statement was 
quite forward-looking. and was obviously Indicative of the foreign policy directions 
Peking was pursuing to open its door to S. Korea. Moreover. in April 1988 Peking's 
Deputy Premier Tian ityun was quoted as saying that China might develop direct 
trade with S. Korea(l 16). Tian Jiyun and Shen Jueren, assistant ministers of foreign 
economic relations and trade respectively. made strong and positive remarks in 
March 1988 on the possibility of direct trade between S. Korea and China. thus 
indicating that economic exchanges between the two countries would soon move 
forward another step. 
Finally. concerning the USSR: closer economic relations between the USSR 
and S. Korea provoked some concern in Peking. 
Although more limited than Sino- 
S. Korean trade there was clearly much potential for the development of Soviet- 
S. Korean exchanges. The Soviets already were trading with many of the major 
S. Korean companies including Goldstar. Samsung. Sunkyong. Daewoo. Jin-Do. and 
Lucky Gold Star. arnong others(I 17). Encouraged by President Roh's New Northern 
Diplomatic Policy, there had been many signs of increased contacts. and, the 
planning of trade and 
investment between the two countries. including joint 
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ventures. The Chinese feared that S. Korea! s capital and technology would be 
diverted from China into the USSR. 
China considers Chinese-S. Korean economic cooperation to be not only 
mutually beneficial but also geographically convenient. Thus. a network of trade 
links has been developed. and the resulting economic momentum has generated a 
strong growth in direct shipments between Chiras east coast and S. Korea's ports. 
The upsurge in trade during 1988 led S. Koreaýs private sector to expand direct 
trade relations with China at the private level of company-to-company agreement 
through de facto private liaison offices in China. For example. the Federation of 
S. Korean industries (Hereafter FFM inaugurated. in 1988. a consultative body 
consisting of representatives of businesses already engaged in indirect trade With 
China(I 18). 
Business sources said on June 7.1988 that the S-KOrean companies 
Samsung Co. Ltd.. POSCO, Ssangyong Corp., Sunkyung, Hyosung Corp.. Ssangma 
Textile Co., ýHyundai Motor Co., and Daewoo Corp. had also been operating via 
liaison offices in China(l 19). Chu Baotai, deputy director of the Foreign Investment 
Bureau of Chinaýs MOFERT. also referred to such offices when he spoke to Japanese 
and Chinese businessmen on 
4 November 1988. saying: "So long as the two sides 
intend to develop economic and trade ties, it is necessary and natural for them to set 
up representative oMces"(120). 
A Chinese trade office in Hong Kong played a parallel role. Ironing out 
difflculties in China's trade with S. Korea. and also issuing entry visas for S. Korean 
businessmen wishing to visit China. according to the instructions of the Chinese 
Commission for the Promotion of International Trade (Hereafter CCPM in 
Peking(l 2 1). 
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7be S. Korean Exchange Bank set up correspondent bank relations between its 
Hong Kong branch office and the branches of two Hong Kong banks. the Hong Kong- 
Shanghai Bank and the Standard Chartered Bank, both located in Shenzen. China. 
to assist S. Korean businesses engaged in direct trade with China. S. Korean 
businesses and Chinese firms could now settle their trade accounts directly. and 
receive financial advice., In another development, a delegation Of S-Korean bankers 
travelled from Hong Kong on July 29,1988 to Peking. for discussions with Chinese 
banks on boosting business exchanges and trade between the two countries: they 
also studied the financial situation in China(122). 
Having moved towards direct trading In preference to trade via Intermediaries. 
the Chinese agreed to establish direct transportation links with S. Korea. For 
example. the indirect air route via a third country requires a six-hour journey. 
compared with 90 minutes for the direct route over the Yellow sea. 71'e costs on the 
direct route are only one-fifth of those for the indirect routes. 7bere was also the 
disadvantage of paying an unnecessary 10-15 percent commission to the 
intermediaries. mainly Hong Kong. Singapore, and Japan. For some types of trade 
they demanded -3 times the average conunission, In consideration of the dangers 
involved(123). 
S. Korea! s Chunkyung Shipping Co. Ltd. began a direct shipping service 
between S. Korean and Chinese ports around the end of july 1988. Containers were 
placed on the occasional line between the S. Korean Ports Of Pusan and Inchon and 
the Chinese ports of Shanghai and Tianjin. The service employed Chunkyung 
Tramps chartered by a Hong Kong shipping company(124). 
,, S. Korean shipping company executives visited China to discuss setting. up 
direct services between the two countries, holding discussion with the Chinese 
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Ocean Shipping Company (Hereafter COSCO). the Chinese state-run shipping 
company. Direct shipments between the Chinese ports of Dalian and Qingdao. and 
Pusan in S. Korea. began in September 1988. using a charted Hong Kong flag- 
carrier. the Jasmin Prince(125). 7be problem of Chinese ships coming to S. Korea 
was solved, according to an offlcial from Heung-a shipping company, by the use of 
flags of convenience, such as those of Panama or Liberia. likewise the problem of 
s. Korean vessels entering Chinese ports(126). 
other shipping companies. including Dongnarna shipping Co. Ltd. and 
Hyundai merchant marine Co. Ltd., opened direct lines to and from China. Hong 
Kong-s Vigour Une Shipping Enterprise Ltd. provided a direct service between 
s. Korea and China through its S. Korean general agent. Sejin shipping Co. IAd.. 
while Fair Weather Steamship Co. Ltd.. another Hong Kong shipping company. 
offered the same service through Pan Asia Corp.. Its S. Korean agent(127). 
There were significant savings to be made by shipping directly between China 
and S. Korea. both from reduced 
fuel costs and from cutting out the intermediaries. 
No agreement was reached on regular air services, however. though Cho Choong 
Kon, president of KAL. and Ko Chung-sam. the carrier's executive managing director 
for international affairs, visited CAAC In Peking to discuss the possibility of KAL 
launching services from S. Korea directly to some Chinese cities, and also of other 
M flights passing through Chinese territorial airspace(128). They also discussed 
cooperation regarding CAAC 
flights into to S. Korea during the Seoul Olympics. 
When. in May 1988. China dispatched a five-member delegation to Seoul 
headed by He Gungwel. vice chairman of the China Tourism Administration to 
participate in the 18th session of 
the World Tourism Organisation Commission for 
; ast Asia and the Pacific (Hereafter WM-CAP). S. Ko a had already discussed th E re Wi 
China ways to fly directly to Seoul over the Yellow sea(129). 
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The Growth of Local Trade 
S. Korea's trade with Chiras northeastern provinces Increased significantly 
from 1988. Geographical closeness was the principal reason for S. Korea! s interest in 
this region. and the presence of Korean-speaking minorities was also useful for 
S. Korean companies. During the previous one and half decades of rapid trade 
growth. the decentralisation of Chinaýs trading system led to strong development of 
its northeastern provinces. such as Shandong. Liaoning. and Jilin, which began to 
play a role in the regional economic cooperation between China and S. Korea. in 
effect, the middleman role of Hong Kong in indirect trade between China and 
s. Korea was replaced by unofficial direct trade between China! s northeastern 
provinces and S. Korea's west coast ports. 
S. Korea planned to invest several billion dollars to develop industrial sites and 
harbours along the country's western coast, and with this in mind Minister Moon Hi 
Gob, the former Vice Minister of EPB and Presidential Assistant for Economic 
Affairs, organised the International Policy Coordination OMce (which has a staff of 
25 divided into three departments) to coordinate the nation's overall economic policy 
towards China(130). These plans were welcomed by the Chinese Foreign Minister 
Qlan QIchen, when he was interviewed by LiaowanLi magazine. He indicated that 
China would promote links with S. Korea on the basis of direct trade despite the 
absence of diplomatic relations, such trade being expected to expand during 1988. 
iie also pointed out that direct trade between them was in line with China's strategy 
of establishing economic zones along its coast as Part Of ChInWs open-door 
policy(131). 
From a pracUcal stand-point. China was more interested than S. Korea in 
having the best possible economic relations between them. In Peter Ferdinand's view 
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the leadership in Peking was surprised by the extent of the difficulties encountered. 
when the doors were opened wide to trade, in sustaining the fraught and complex 
relations between the centre and the provinces. and also among the provinces. 
Economic asymmetries between central and provincial governments. as well as 
between the various provinces, required a variety of appropriate regional foreign 
policies according to the differing geographical and economic advantages enjoyed by 
the different provinces. Tbus growing regional econornic cooperation was the engine 
by which China hoped to redress the imbalance of provincial economic development. 
pooling the strengths of various regions for the sake of cornmon prosperity; and this 
resulted in increasing autonomy for the provinces, better horizontal links among the 
provinces. and the development of closer ties between border provinces and their 
neighbouring countries. 
The Chinese central govenunent deliberately insisted on more dealings with 
the local provinces. putting S. Korea on the same level as a local govemment In 
China. provincial Chinese leaders. especially those of Shandong and the three 
northeastem provinces, were very interested In promoting economic relations with 
s. Korea in order to redress the existing Imbalance in development between their 
foreign trade and domestic economic reform(132). 
If Guangdong and Fujian provinces could be successful in promoting links 
with Hong Kong and the West. a similar course of development also seemed possible 
in the northeastern provinces of Liaoning, Jilin, Shandong. and possibly 
fieilongjiang. S. Korea's investment and trade links are strongest in these provinces 
because of their favourable location for direct trade with S. Korea. All of them are 
rnuch larger than S. Korea. attracting S-Korean technology and investment. and 
taking in new technology. in exchange for the export of resources(133). Such a 
process was already under way in Shandong and Liaoning. whose economy was 
becoming ever more closely intertwined with that of S. Korea. According to 
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7-heLIg=-d [Contentioni, China had opened the northern coastal areas to the West. 
and especially to S. Korea. Shandong, Liaoning and Jilin provinces which had so far 
attracted relatively little investment from Hong Kong. Japan. or the West, were 
actively encouraging direct trade. with S. Korea(I 34). Shandong province in particular 
is just 300 miles away from S. Koreaýs ports across the Bohai sea. From the Chinese 
point of view. all such developments contributed to the regulation of relations 
between the central government and the provinces, and between different and 
unbalanced provinces. 
A S. Korean 7V network reported on July 25.1988 that a private S. Korean 
trade mission. which visited China from June 15 through to early July. had 
exchanged a memorandum of agreement on direct trade with the Shandong province 
of China. The memorandum was signed by Kim Woo Choong. chairman of the 
Daewoo business group and head of the S. Korean mission. and the chairman of the 
provincial chapter of CCPTI. Among the members of the S. Korean trade mission was 
Kim pok-tong who was a director of the International Private Economic Council of 
South Korea (Hereafter IPECK). created in October 1988 as a non-governmental 
Organisation to assist S. Koreaýs various private enterprises In their business with 
non-market economies. The memorandum also called for the opening of direct 
shipping routes linking the two countries. the exchange of trade offices. and the 
establishment of banks, an Insurance firm. and a shipping company. 7bey also 
agreed to issue entry visas to those wanting 
to visit the other side for direct 
trade(135). In addition, the memorandum set Out details of S. Korean firms, 
participation In the 
development of electric power and Industrial water supply 
facilities at Qingdao, a port in Shandong. 
, 
In practice. as S. Korea expanded its sphere Of influence in China. the nearly 2 
rnillion Chinese-Korcan Inhabitants of 
the northeast provinces, compared with other 
rninority nationalities in 
China who have little connection with their homelands. 
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created for the S. Koreans a significant advantage in China. The Chinese government 
espoused a long-range policy to realise total Integnation of the'so-called Chosen 
minority who were the descendants of refugees originating fm both reas the rO Ko in 
early 1940's. Notwithstanding the Chinese Policy S. Koreas gained significant benefit 
from the common culture, language. and emotional affinity with these Chinese- 
Koreans. Despite their initial inclination towards N-Korea as a result of Peking's 
ideological relations with Pyongyang, the economic Infrastructure of China's Chosen 
people has expanded rapidly. Their markets enjoy an enormous variety of goods 
from Japan, both Koreas, and the West. not to mention China. compared to other 
predominantly rural areas in China. When. from 1988 onwards. Improved economic 
relations between China and S. Korea opened the doors to tourism and family visits. 
many enterprising Chosen began to capitalise on their bicultural upbringing. Many 
S. Korean companies were taking advantage of the harmonious Chosen-Chinese 
relations by employing the Chosen as company representatives in China's large 
coastal cities in Manchuria and in Shandong province. Over 50 S. Korean companies 
also showed long term Interest in northeastern 
China-, being geographically close to 
s. Korea, this area, with Its Korean-speaking minority provided a unique opportunity 
to establish close contacts between China and S. Korea(136). A number of dLfferent 
trading companies in Seoul, including General Trading Company (Hereafter GTC), 
Daewoo Corp., Samsung Co.. Lucky-Goldstar. Sunkyung Ltd., and Hyundai Corp.. 
worked out strategies to enter the 
Chinese market. beginning In the northeast local 
provinces, in advance of the advent of 
direct trade with China(137). They expanded 
their branch offices and trained employees for deployment In China. 
An economic delegation from Jilin province visited S. Korea in loss. Hong 
Kong having acted as a go-between in conveying their InvitatIon(138). 7bis visit was 
the first well-publicised agreement between China and S. Korea to trade directly on 
private level. A senior oMcW of 
Shenyang visited S-Korea to tour Industrial facilities 
and discuss ways of promoting 
trade between them. He was quoted as saying: "I 
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would like to set up a private trade representative offlce In Seoul"(139). 7bere were 
various exchanges between S. Korea, and the Northeastern provinces(140). Direct 
trade was being augmented by direct South Korean investment which resulted in the 
establishment of private offices in Chinese provinces. that in Shandong being the 
most important(141). 
On behalf of a private SZOrean trade mission Kim Woo Choong, chairman of 
the Daewoo business group, signed. with the chairman of Shandong province 
ccprr. a memorandum of agreement concerning direct trade between S. Korea and 
Shandong. topics covered included direct shipping. the exchange of trade oMces. 
11nancial matters, and the issue of visas(142). 
iia Peiguo, head of the Foreign Trade 0111ce in Longkou. Shandong province. 
was reported as saying that "we welcome investment from S. Korea. " This was the 
flrst time a Chinese provincial official had spoken so clearly and directly on the 
subject of economic links between China and S-Korea. It was announced that 
similar industrial zones would be set up in several other Shandong cities. including 
the capital, Jinan, Qingdao, Yantal and Weihai(143). Rong Wen. chainman of the 
China International Trust and Investment Corp (Hereafter CMC) stated: "We prefer 
direct exchanges, including trade and investment". He also revealed that CMC had 
a direct relationship with 
S. Korean llrins(144). By late 1988. discussions between 
Peking and Seoul offlcials over the establishment of permanent trade oMces and 
direct sea links between S. Korea and Shandong province were under way. 
The growth of economic relations between China and S-Korea was greatly 
assisted by the implementation of 
the so-called "Enterprises Law". put forward by 
Zhao Zlyang which ruled that all business operations of enterprises are legal unless 
they run counter to the state-owned enterprises law or other relevant laws. Zhao 
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Zlyang stated: 'The gist of the law is'the separation of ownership from managerial 
authority in state-owned enterprises"(145). 
For S. Korea. with the global economy allowing ready access to an international 
marketplace. ' labour has become a commodity in economic relations with 
China(146). Between'1972 and 1982, real wages in the S. Korean textile industry 
rose by 103 percent, while labour productivity went up by only 40 perccnt(147). 
Moreover. in'Spring 1989. the average cost per hour of a textile operator in S. Korea 
was US$2.87, compared to US$0.40 in China(148). 7bus, with production costs 
increasing in S. Korea, many S. Korean companies planned to move their production 
facilities into'China as political relations eased turning to Original Equipment of 
Manufacture (Hereafter OEM) production(149). 
Most of the joint ventures between China and S-Korea took the following form: 
The Chinese side provided the major part of the factory buildings. wages for the first 
few months, a budding site and raw materlals, while the S. Korean side provided 
equipment, machinery and skills. In a series of press briefings held in early 1989. 
the ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Mrade outlined the principal features 
of China's S. Korean trade policy: 
Although China has no offIcial political or trade relations with South 
Korea. it is reported that South Korea is keen to develop stronger economic 
ties. Already some South Korean companies have asked for direct 
negotiations with Chinese foreign trade companies. and China's reform 
programme has put a lot of decision-making power Into the hands of export. 
oriented enterpriSes. These enterprises now have the right to select their own 
co-operattve partners according to the needs of their business(I SO). 
in May 19s8. jingil Ribao (Hereafter JJRB) confinned for the first Ume that 
China's coastal provinces would develop trade relations with S. Korca(151). China 
was creating at Longkou a 
"processing zone for direct trade between China and 
S. Korea in the form of joint venture enterprises"(152). Ibis was the first Ume that a 
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high Chinese official had spoken directly of a possible joint venture plan with 
S. Korea. An economic and trade delegation from the city of Dalian visited S. Korea In 
july 1988. discussing investment and the establishment of joint ventures in 
Dallan(153). A delegation of S. Korean businessmen had already been to 
L, ongkou(154). There were the first steps towards the creation of an infrastructure to 
welcome S. Korean capital to the province closest to S. Korea. 
According to Business Week. by early 1988. about 50 S. Korean companies had 
oper-dy established trade and investment with China, setting up various types of 
joint ventures(155). 7bese included Daew(x)'s US$2.57 million refrigerator plant in 
Fujian province; Goldstar's US$15 million colour TV plant: an agreement to 
Manufacture melarnine dinnerware in Liaoning province. signed by the S-Korean 
plastic Industry Cooperative (Hereafter KPIC); and joint ventures to expand S. Korean 
exports of cigarettes and red ginseng. already worth US$280.000 during 1987(156). 
1 
S. Korea was prominent in middle East constructlon Projects. but In the wake 
of the war between Iran and Iraq operations were diverted to China. for example 
ssangyong's involvement in a three-party international consortium to rebuild Dalian 
port in Liaoning province(157). The first Chinese-S. Korean joint venture based In 
s. Korea was set up by Orion Electric of the Daewoo group. in Gumi city, to make 
three million colour TV tubes annually-, mostly for export to China(158). Sarnsung 
was particularly active in arrangingjoint ventures. collaborating with the CMC. the 
Hong Kong-based Well Youth Co. and Flake Electric Appliance Corp. among others. 
Their investment included US$5 million required for a VCR manufacturing plant in 
Zhouhai(l 59). They also built a colour TV plant in Shenzhen. and laid optical cables 
connecting Shanghai. Tianjin and other clUes(160). Samsung's exports to China 
included telephone exchanges, word processors. fax machines. telephones and other 
telecommunications equipment--some of these Items being required for the 1990 
Peking Asian Games(I 6 1). 
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The expansion in the number and scale of joint ventures between the two 
countries were not. however. without setbacks and controversy. S. Koreats 
enthusiasm for, its joint venture with China waned as S. Korean businessmen 
discovered the realities of doing business In China. DiMculties resulted from the 
different objectives of China and S. Korea. Whereas Seoul viewed China principally 
as a huge potential market for the export of consumer goods. Peking saw S. Korea 
primarily as a substitute for Japan, which had shown little Interest in the 
technology transfer which Peking sought. China had decided to attract technology 
and investment from S. Korea, rather than importing finished consumer goods for 
the domestic market. Han Kyuhuan. a professor of Harbin Technical College. also 
warned that it would be dangerous for S. Korea to view its joint ventures with China 
only as a potential market for expanding S. Korea's exports(162). 
An example illustrating the difficulties involved with joint ventures Is the case 
of Kia. who planned to build an car assembly plant with an annual production 
capacity of 50,000 units in China's Shandong province. 7be arrangement fell 
through because the Chinese side asked for cash worth almost 70 percent of the 
deal. Kia was also suspicious of the quality of the Chinese workers, who had been 
isolated from the outside world for a long time. S. Korea hoped to set up a base in 
China that would enable the manufacture of cars at low cost for the Chinese market. 
When a plant was eventually established by IUa there were further problems. In the 
fall of loss. the Chinese government limited the Import of foreign automobiles and 
automobile parts due to the country's shortage of foreign exchange at that time. 
parts for the Kja joint venture in China piled up at Pusan port in S. Korea. They 
could not be transported to China without an import licence even though they were 
badly needed on the Kia production line In China. Moreover. the Chinese 
government had promised to permit the exchange of Reminbi for US dollars. and 
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also -to give preferential treatment on Import taxes. but these promises were not 
honoured, and ultimately the venture collapsed(163). 
China's underdeveloped economy was hardly conducive to S. Korea's joint 
ventures. In some cases it was even necessary to install electricity and water. Roads 
were poor and there were often no rail links to markets. Other problems concerned 
salary, personnel ý skills, employment laws, and foreign exchange dLMculues 
preventing the repatriation of profits. The Chinese domestic market was very tightly 
controlled: although Chinese laws specify that joint ventures must agree to export 
70% of their production, targeting only 30% of their output on the Chinese dom(mtic 
n2arket, the Chinese local provincial governments often insisted on the export of the 
entire production(164). in these circumstances S. Korean China scholars have 
warned that S. Korean joint ventures in China are unlikely to earn profits from the 
domestic markets in China(165). - 
Critics in S. Korea said that many S. Korean businessmen were better at 
snifflng out joint ventures with China than at managing them, hoping to persuade 
the government to lend them funds on long-term loan packages(I 66). Joint ventures 
between the two countries remained controversial, even though China promulgated 
a new law called "the Provisions of the State Council of the PRC for the 
Encouragement of Foreign InvestmenC. S. Korean businessmen believed the Chinese 
were treating S. Korean businesses in a way which was designed to exact the 
rnaxilnurn amount of money in the shortest possible tirne(167). Feasibility studies 
were clearly necessary before businesses could be launched in China based on the 
Chinese domestic market. which was still weak. with little likelihood of a sharp 
increase in demand for commoditles like cars in the near future. 
Many S. Korean companies planned to move their Own Production faCIBUes Into 
China, turning to OEM production because of continuing demands for big wage 
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increases. and labour disputes which had reduced output in S. Korea. Critics of the 
growth in joint ventures included business leaders, having already seen their profits 
flattening, they expected worse to come as a "boomerang" effect hit S. Korea's light 
industries(168). 
The S. Korean government was somewhat bewildered by S-Korean newspaper 
exaggerations concerning joint venture projects with China. 7be S-KOrean prime 
Minister. Lee Hyun-Jae, warned about the impatience of the S. Korean press. which 
exaggerated both the existence of and the prospects for economic Ues. in particular 
joint ventures, between China and S. Korea, noting that any niagnfflcaUon of the 
actual condition of ties with China or other communist countries made It diMcult for 
the government. to carry out its China policy prudently(169). 
On the eve of the Mananmen Incident, S. Korea's business Investment In China 
had reached US$30 million for 13 major joint venture projects. while 50 more 
projects were under negotiation including US$5 million by Gold Star Electronics to 
produce colour televisions in Zhouhai. US$3.5 million by Dae Young Fishery for 
fishery products in Huilal, US$2.75 million by Samick Music to manufacture pianos 
in Harbin, and US$3 million by Samyang Food to produce noodles in Gingdao(170). 
Even though the Chinese Foreign Minister QIan Qlchen. in an April 7.1988 press 
rneeting, said that China's participation In the Seoul Olympic Games did not signify 
a rnove by Peking to establish 
diplomatic relations with Seoul. the Olympics had 
clearly conferred International prestige on S. Korea. Seoul was confident that her 
economic connections with China had great strategic usefulness as part of the New 
Northern Diplomacy. pressing China further along the road to the establishment of 
forrnal relations with S. Korea(l 7 1). 
The Impact of the Tiananmen Incident 
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Despite the political implications of the Tiananmen incident. S. Korean 
attitudes towards China began with "limit the damage" and "Wait and see. " and 
moved to "business as usual. " 
In the first half of 1989 China was S. Korea's largest trade partner with imports 
of US$119 million, an increase of 55% compared with the previous year, and exports 
worth US$380 million, an increase of 39.6%. S. Korea wanted to maintain this scale 
of trade(172). 7be fundamental interests of S. Korea. and especially the requirement 
for an adequate supply of raw materials rendered essential the continuation of the 
Chinese trade. 
S. Korean Foreign Ministry offlcials and newspaper columnists remained 
optimistic that Sino-S-Korean trade volumes would not change. S. Korean business 
people had been permitted to visit China and the S. Korean government was allowing 
citizens to travel to China again, saying "tranquillity has 
been restored"(173). When 
the Fourth Plenum of the Thirteenth Party Central Committee of the CCP convened 
in June 1989 it pledged to continue the implementation of the principles and 
policies laid down since the 
historic Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Central 
Corrunittee in December 1978. Speaking at a meeting on June 20 1989 of the 
S. Korea Chamber of Conunerce and Industry, Choi Ho-chung predicted stability 
would return "quickly" to China 
because Deng Xiaoping was in full control. He 
stated: -out of political consideration for social stability, 
China will leave open the 
possibility for improvement of relations with us". and he added that S. Korea would 
continue to work for improved relations both on the governmental and private 
levels! '(174). it was also reported that just after the Tiananmen incident the 2.455 
ton container ship Melissa left Inchon on June 17. calling at Tianjin. Dalian and 
Shanghai. with 120 containers on board full of electronics and texUles(175). 
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The First International Fair. the largest such exhibition in China since the 
founding of the PRC. was held at the China International Exhibition Centre in 
Peking in July 1989 and provided S. Korea with a good Opportunity to reduce the 
impact of the Mananmen incident on trade with China. It was the first Ume that 
representatives and businessmen from S. Korea. most of them officials of KOTRA. 
had taken part in a such a large-scale trade event in China. The most important 
S. Korean stand displayed personal computers(176). S. Korea maintained its 
investments In China. which amounted to US$14.3 million on 18 projects In 1989, a 
similar amount to the previous year(177). 
Nevertheless. domestic critics were more cautious after the Tiananmen 
incident. Professor Kim Se-won of Seoul National University warned against any 
excessive optimism among S. Korean ftnns regarding business opportunities in 
China. He pointed out that no Western countries, not even the US and Japan. had 
been successful in their business dealings with Chinese. despite the boom in the 
1970's. He also urged S. Korean enterprises to limit their business In the region to 
efforts to diversify markets, rather than attempting to win massive projects or trade 
deals(178). 
Moreover. when the CCPrr requested that IPECK postpone (but not cancel) a 
mission to Peking scheduled for September 5-12 1989 to negotiate the 
establishment of trade offices, because Seoul had refused Peking's request to return 
a Chinese defector, handing him instead to the International refuge Camp In Rome. 
Seoul expressed a markedly more cautious attitude towards Peking than in recent 
years(179). Chung Joung-Wook of Seoul National University suggested that It was 
still too early for safe economic relationships to be established because the S. Korean 
government's Chung-kyung-hap-il strategy of the New Northern Diplomacy had 
distorted the balance between economic exchanges with China and their political 
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Implications. as a consequence of the overheated competition between departments 
in government and companies In the private sector of S. Korea(180). 
I Goldstar was requested by Its Hong Kong-based subsidiary to postpone 
shipments of electronic products to China(181). In article in the official RMRB on 
September 16,1990, Yuan Mu said that the austerity measures In effect since the 
June 1989 incident should continue for at least two more years. and this proposal 
was adopted at the Seventh Plenum of Thirteenth Central Committee In the CCP in 
October 1990(182). As a consequence Samsung decided to Urnit the scale of its trade 
with China saying: "If China wants to deal with us, we are willing to do business 
with the stock at hand". After the Mananmen incident the company had dissolved its 
department on Chinese Affairs(183). Suffice It to say that S. Korea's approach to 
China was on a smaller scale and moved more cautiously than had previously been 
the case. 
The Establishment of the First OMcial Trade Offlce, after the Peking 
Asian Games 
For S. Korea the 1990 Asian Games in Peking provided an opportunity to 
exhibit its economic muscle and diplomatic standing. Having Itself successfully 
hosted the 1986 Asian Games, as well as the 1988 Seoul Olympics, S. Korea had 
much to offer China by way of useful experience. S. Korea was eager to render the 
necessary assistance to China. both technical and financial, to make the Peking 
Asian Games a success. and Peking relied on the help given by Seoul. it was 
officWly reported In the IM that Zhang Baifa. vice chainnan of the Aslad Orgazilsing 
Committee and deputy mayor of Peking. had several times visited S. Korea with his 
aides. to draw upon S-Korea's experiences In constructing sports facilities and to 
discuss the management of the games(184). 
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Following Peking's soured relationships with the West after the Tiananmen 
incident China desperately needed to concentrate on medium-term economic 
relations with S. Korea(185). The suppression of the democracy movement and the 
associated shifts in the leadership in China had weakened its effectiveness In 
promoting econornic reform and development, so that China was obliged to appeal 
for financial and technological assistance from Seoul in staging the games in 
Peking(186). Even though they were some Indications that the "conservative camp" 
was gaining power both at the central and regional level. China's leadership was 
obviously convinced of the fact that economic performance was an important 
guarantor of political stability(187). China continued to actively pursue its open door 
policy in the area of econornic development. 
Peking was walking a careful line, as Indicated by a high-ranking official at the 
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade who said. on the economic 
relationship between China and S. Korea, that there was as yet no omcW 
relationship In either economics or politics, but he did not deny governmental 
economic contacts between the two sides: "Our on-going reforms have made it 
possible for individual enterprises to have much more autonomy, and they are 
entitled to find their own co-operation partners according to their needs"(188). It was 
also reported that early in 1990 Deng Pufang made an unannounced visit to Seoul 
to discuss business deals with S. Korean companies(189). 
Two s. Korean firms, Samsung and Lucky-Goldstar. spent about US$i5 million 
for billboard space advertising S. Korean products. Hyundai Motor Company donated 
400 cars and coaches to help transport the athletes at the Peking Asian Games-(190). 
These vehicles had originally been offered to N. Korea as a goodwill gesture. but had 
been rejected. It Is therefore striking that despite Peking's Ideological closeness to 
Pyongyang the vehicles were accepted by Peking without any political d0culty. 
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Peking wanted the games to go smoothly. demonstrating to the world that the 
1989 Manarimen incident was now in the past and that normalcy had finally 
returned to China. Thus the games provided a perfect opportunity to apply the 
principle of Chung-kyung-hcq)-I A delegation from IPECK, led by chairman Lee 
Hahn-been and adviser Kim Pok-tong. visited Peldng to negotiate on the possibility 
of establishing an offlcial trade offIce in China. This followed reports that the 
Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin had told a visiting 
Japanese delegation that China would exchange official trade missions with S. Korea 
within the year, apparently in deflance of strong objections by N. Korea(191). As of 
the end of 1990. '65 S. Korean firms had launched projects in China or had been 
permitted to established ventures there, and another 15 prcjects were on the waiting 
list(192). 
Stunned by the establishment of diplomatic relations between Moscow and 
Seoul in 1990'. China found it difflcult to set up the econon-dc deals she wanted with 
Seoul without making concessions on official recognition. It prompted a more 
positive response by the Chinese to S. Koreaýs Chung-kyung-hap-d principle of the 
New Northern Diplomacy, and gave a big boost to the opening of trade oMces 
between China and S. Korea. 
Expanding trade and economic ties between China and S-Korea after the Asian 
Games at last bore fruit: on October 20,1990. Seoul and Peking announced that 
they would exchange trade offices before the end of the year. 
5.3 Conclusions 
China continued to have difficulty in distinguishing its policies towards 
N-Korea and S. Korea. but a series of imaginative policy Initiatives by President Roh, 
set forth during the first year of his presidency, in particular his overtures towards 
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N. Korea, led to substantial improvements in S. Korea's relations with China. This 
was only made possible. however, by the improvement in Sino-Soviet relations, 
effectively marginalising N. Korea. and a general agreement among the superpowers. 
including the US. to work together to reduce tension on the Korean peninsula. In 
this context, it became clear that S. Korea! s New Northern Diplomacy had led to 
China finally accepting the reality of S. Korea's existence-- there was a convergence 
in actions and policies between China and S. Korea that S. Korea assiduously 
culUvated and China was unable to decline. The Seoul Olympics and the Peking 
Asian Games. which both countries were careful to keep free of ideology. provided 
China with an opportunity to make a clear distinction between her policies towards 
N. Korea and S. Korea. As a consequence China was enabled to reconsider her old 
ideology-oriented relations with N. Korea, recognising that the establishment and 
maintenance of quasi-official relations with S. Korea was the most expedient means 
to ensure a peaceful environment for the Korean peninsula. In a new spirit of 
pragmatism China began to afford equal treatment to S. Korean businessmen, and 
ultimately agreed to the exchange of official trade offlces. 7be two sides continued to 
hold differing interpretations of the role of these Institutions, and there were similar 
differences over the many joint industrial-commercW ventures established during 
this period. S. Korea considered its Churtg-kyung-hap-d principle to apply with equal 
utility to China as to the USSR and East European countries. 
With Pyongyang denied the opportunity to play off Moscow and Peking against 
one another by the altered strategic environment. the constrictions imposed by 
ideological ties were no longer important, especially after the Tiananmen incident of 
June 1989. China gradually moved away from obstructive approaches and towards 
constructive policies. permitting an active exploration of open and transparent trade. 
as well as formal relations with S. Korea. China's attitude towards S. Korea became 
much less hesitant encouraging expectations of a continuing progress towards 
improved relations between China and S. Korea. 
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During the period 1971-1990 there was a signIficant thaw in relations between 
China and S. Korea. 7bis was attributable to a complex interaction of political, 
strategic and economic factors which posed many new chaUenges and opportunities. 
;-'' 7be first factor relates to China7s domestic situation. Since the late 1970's, 
under the slogan of the "Four Modemisations. " China increasingly turned its 
attention to domestic reform and economic development. Insofar as it pertains to 
relations between China -and S. Korea, this commitment required an alleviation of 
international tension--what the Chinese call a "peaceful, environment"--so as to 
enable China to turn its energies inwards to economic and technological 
development. It also required an opening-up to the outside world--especWly to the 
West'-for trade. investment, and access to modem technology. War in Korea. or even 
heightened tension and instability. could easily prevent these from happening. a fact 
. which informs the changes in 
Chinese politics towards the Korean peninsula. 71be 
general demise of ideology and greater emphasis on pragmatism in 
China has come 
out of this awareness. 
At the same time. S. Korea came to have a new weight In Chinese eyes. both as 
: ari attractive trading partner and--to some 
extent--as a model for the PRC's own 
ý-deýcjoprnent- This new weight was evident In the attention paid to the S. Korean 
economic experience. as weH as in 
the increasing openness with which China 
- conducted it. 4 so-caUed 
"unofflcial" relations. 
The second factor concerns trends on the Korean peninsula Itself. N. Korea lost 
-the economiC competition with S. Korea, and risks 
losing its military edge as weH in 
tbe'not-too-distant future. It made no 
headway in undennining S-Korea! s effort to 
lInprove its relations with China: on the contrary, these have been considerably 
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strengthened. It had no success in containing S. Korea's so-called "NorqpoUtik. " as 
reflected in Pyongyang's failure to enlist Its two allies' support for its various 
proposals on reuniflcaUon. 
Pyongyang's relations with China became increasingly formal. with Chinese 
leaders pressing for N. Korea to undertake economic reforms or suirer further 
rnarginalisation. The Chinese leadership of the day remained Ideologically 
preoccupied with N. Korea's President Kim 11-sung, with whom they had had a long 
association since World War Il. but It became less and less likely that Peking would 
revert to a highly disruptive position in Northeast Asia because that would go 
against China's interest by disturbing the stability of the region. Although the 
Chinese leaders eventually acknowledged S. Korea's enthusiastic approaches, they 
rnade clear over the years that they also had many other priorities--not the least of 
which was avoiding war between China and the West, not to mention S-Korea. Even 
as China continued to support Its N. Korean ally in public, Its relations with S. Korea 
blossomed in silence. 
The third factor relates to China's regional view of itself and its long-term 
strategic aspirations. Although China has undergone sharp swings on POUPY and 
cycles of alignment and isolation, the centre of gravity of modern Chinese politics 
has been a commitment to strategic "Independence". 7be Chinese see themSelves as 
a global actor, and they define their security In global terms. The long-terTn Chinese 
objective. exemplified by their current emphasis on an independent foreign policy. is 
to carve out an independent position alongside the two superpowers. 
. 
For this reason. becoming more confident of their own Position. the Chinese 
no longer approached N-Korea as an unwinnable game with the USSR. and did not 
see N. Korea as a major obstacle In 
developing Its relations with S-Korea. If N. Korea 
- rno-ýed 
too far towards the USSP, the Chinese were capable of adjusting both the 
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specd'and scope of their opening to S. Korea. S. Korea strongly desired contacts, 
trade and ultimately formal relations with China, but without Isolating N. Korea. 
China was In a position to help "brokee' an accommodation between N. Korea and 
S. Kýrea--a mle that was critical to N. Korea given its past track record, Its dismal 
economic prospects, and the widespread suspicions in S. Korea of N. Korean 
intentions. 
7be fourth factors came to prominence during the 1980's. and is concerned 
with the Chinese willingness to co-operate with the USSR over the Korean 
peninsula. Such co-operation has no historical precedent. Both powers were 
publicly committed to promoting peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. and 
china maintained an active interest both in the overall Korean situation and in 
specific developments in S. Korea. perceiving opportunities to use them as part of the 
process of dynamic normallsation of relations between China and the USSI; L 
China remained unconvinced. however. by the USSIVs initiatives an the 
]Korean peninsula. Until the dramatic recognition of Seoul by Moscow. which took 
advantage of the changed atmosphere in the region resulting from President Mikhail 
Gorbachevs perestroika, Chinaýs ability to deal with the USSR was less. Indeed, the 
Chinese leadership was quite embarrassed by the diplomatic benefits accruing to 
the USSR, not to mention the economic opportunities deriving from a step which, to 
0 clilnese eyes, was an abandonment of Moscow's ideological obligation t and 
-f ýfflendshlps with Pyongyang. Since then, for the first time in her history. China 
I began to work more closely with 
the USSR to deal with the N. Korean threat to the 
rnajoj geopolitical alignment surrounding 
the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia. 
This was particularly true In China itself. where N. Korea may now be considered to 
II, ý have lost its influence in constraining the development of relations between China 
-1 1 1- 
gind s. Korea. 
PekinErs co-operation with Moscow extended to include Chinese 
support for Seoul's 
Northern policy, even though this was most disturbing for 
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Pyongyang. Relations between the two superpowers, both political and econon-dc, 
have continued to draw closer since the normalisation, but China has remained 
aloof, from S. Korea. with the latter quite incapable of taking independent initiatives. 
. 
With China now playing the role of pcace-broker. however. It appears that the stage 
is set for further normallsation of relations between China and S. Korea. 
In discussing the relations between China and S. Korea It Is necessary to take 
note of the age-old rivalry and lingering bitterness between them. and this historical 
heritage has continued to constrain relations between the two countries until recent 
times. Since the Korean War there have been no formal diplomatic relations. and it 
appears that, with the passage of time, but the e3dgencies of the modem world 
pressing for reform, a mood has now arisen to pern-dt the old quarrels to be left 
behind. 
-There are 
both political and economic factors underlying the improved 
relations between China and S. Korea. Politically. the initial moves towards better 
relations are generally agreed to be 
bound up with China's changing stance towards 
the superpowers. S. Korea could not simply jump on the bandwagon after Sino- 
American mpprochement. however. because China's rivalry with the USSR obliged 
her. to sustain good relations with N. Korea, thus precluding any corresponding 
rapp- rochement with S. Korea--or so it seemed at 
that time. S. Korea declared an open 
policy towards China in 1973 
but in practical terms there was little to show from the 
step. 
Despite limits set by the N. Korean factor, however, China was able to slowly 
cUsentangle her ideological relations with 
N-Korea from the demands of pragmatic 
politics. The repeated 
S. Korean overtures were met with a cautious response by the 
Chinese; some subtle cooperations 
developed on potential areas of disputes, leaftg 
to Incremental changes 
in relations. 
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Unanticipated crises. most notably the 1983 hijacking of a Chinese airliner, 
and the 1985 torpedo boat incident., gave rise to discreet official contacts. In the 
former case direct negotiations took place in Seoul, and a memorandum of 
cooperation was signed. Sports events held in Peking, Seoul. and third countries 
provided further opportunities for a subtle but significant Improvement of relations. 
Sports related exchanges between the two countries began In the early 1970's. but 
certainly the most important events were the 1986 Seoul Asian Games, resulting in 
a defacto recognition of S. Korea by China; the 1988 Seoul Olympics. after which 
substantial political. and especially economic. progress was made. and the 1990 
peking Asian Games. at which Seoul demonstrated her commitment to continued 
partnership with Peking subsequent to the Mananmen square repression. 
,, _ -policy-makers 
In Seoul were quietly gratifled by the growth of such non- 
poltUcal exchanges. which resulted in the two countries no 
longer being strangers to 
one another. The Chinese. in particular, 
developed a much more differentiated view 
of the S. Korean system. Hand-in-hand with 
this process came closer economic 
relations. The two countries avoided acrimonious public exchanges, placing 
economics above politics. and proceeded 
to quietly improve their business 
relationships. Both countries Implemented 
modernisation and reform policies In 
wihich the value systems of society-at-large. 
and their perception of the outside 
world underwent dramatic changes. 
This permitted a cooperative economic 
partnership to develop 
from which both countries benefited. China principally in 
direct economic terms. but S. Korea derived significant political advantages thereby. 
- With the general relaxation 
in international tensions. and especially the Sino- 
soviet detente the muonale behind the Chinese Identification with the N. Korean 
position, already weakened 
by a number of terrorist Incidents perpetrated by 
rj. Korea. became much less obvious. 
During the period covered by this study, 
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however. this linkage has been a dominant factor, causing the Chinese to seek to 
limit the Improvement In relations with S. Korea to the economic sphere, whilst 
S. Korea has strtven to upgrade both economic and political ties. China conducted a 
delicate balancing act. trying to reassure N. Korea of continued support. whilst 
becoming ever more dependent on economic links with S. Korea. which were 
essential to China's modernisation programme. By the end of the period China was 
convinced that. in the longer term. N. Korea must take the painful step of reaching a 
genuine accommodation with the non-communist world. including with S. Korea. 
With China no longer concerned about N. Korea aligning itself with Moscow against 
her. the situation no longer offers any significant. constraint precluding China from 
continuing to improve its relations with S. Korea. 
China's overall policy towards the Korean peninsula experienced a shift that 
de-emphasized the importance of her relationship with N. Korea. and separated the 
issue of China's own reunification from that of Korean reunification. China's foreign 
relations are somewhat different in several areas. most notably with the US after the 
Tiananmen niassacre. but the basic contours of relations between China and 
s. Korea have not changed from their pre-Tiananmen outline. 
Suffice it to say that China has been moving away from the reactionary 
policies of the 1950's and 
1960's. and towards a more balanced course of diplomacy 
in, the 1970's and 1980's. China continued 
to maintain Its long-held friendly 
relations with N. Korea while adjusting 
to changes in the international order, and 
pursuing a more practical and pragmatic course 
in its relations with S. Korea. While 
diplomatic relations are not yet feasible both sides have good reason to be well 
content with Progress so 
far- 
-, The most 
dramatic improvement in Sino-S. Korean relations has 
unquestionably 
been in the economic arena, where ChIna! s ideology-oriented policy 
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has been succeeded by one of international economic Integration, with all that this 
implies for China's sense of domestic stability. Although the maintenance of a firm 
ideological line was to remain a guiding feature. China began to reassess Its attitude 
towards the'intemational market economy and saw a new role for developing states. 
Chinese trade with S. Korea Increased substantially during these two decades, 
economic factors playing an essential role in the shaping Of SinO-S-Korean relations 
over the period. Non-offlcial business-based "economic diplomacy' between 1971 
and 1990 helped to ease the political tensions resulting from China'a rapprochement 
with the US. While trade was still subject to changes in the Political tide. links were 
forged which facilitated the cautious political responses of the early 1970's. paving 
the way for the rapid growth seen from the late 1970's onwards as secret trade 
picked up momentum. 
1ýý Trade has become ever more open and direct, and the two sides' economies 
have grown steadily more Interdependent. The trend towards improvement of 
relations between China and S. Korea. including integration of their respective 
economic policies, and pronounced regional economic co-operation, has fostered 
complem . entary economic development in the region. 
China's vast size, significant political influence. huge market potential and 
-ibundant supply of labour dovetailed nicely with S. Korea's capital and advanced 
technology. At the same time. its relative economic weakness means that China is 
unlikely to turn Into a powerful competitor for the S. Korean economy. S. Korean 
capital. concentrated mainly In Shandong province and the three Northeastern 
provinces of China, as well as the Southeastern coastal areas. is a strong influence 
for transformation. Ultimately the benefits accruing from regional development 
might lead even the N. Koreans to approve of these investments. Direct trade and 
244 
joint industrial-commercial ventures were continuing to grow strongly at the close of 
the period under study. 
China's approach to S. Korea, has been conditioned by her domestic needs: 
during the early 1980's the Chinese leadership paid a great deal of attention to the 
S. Korean economic model. seeing it as the most relevant example to emulate for the 
development of the Chinese economy. As a consequence China's foreign relatIons 
came to stress the business-like advancement of foreign trade. On the other hand. 
when conservative forces briefly dominated China's internal political landscope aRcr 
the Tiananmen incident. ChInXs foreign relations with the West and even with 
S. Korea became much colder. 
on the other hand. despite mutual economic Interests between China and 
S. Korca economic relations were influenced by non-economic. Le.. political. factors. 
From the economic point of view the main constraint Is not N. Korca. but the 
diMculUes arising out of China's own problems in achieving m0dernisAtion. 
Enhanced economic co-operation was Impeded by large-scale institutional 
ossification and bureaucratic resistance dcrtvtng from cherished conununist goals 
such as price stability and equality of income distribution. 
There were signs that economic reform and the open-door policy were losing 
dynamism under the new regime In Peking. Even though Chinese leaders repeatedly 
confirmed their willingness to pursue reform policies. they were faced with Serious 
economic problems, the most Important being high Inflation. In the 1080's. which 
marked 10 years of successful econondc reform. China experienced an Swerage 
inflation rate of 36%. Efforts to cool down excess demand and Introduce tight 
monetary policy resulted in stagflaUon. China's government flierc[ore Introduced 
measures to reduce the autonomy of the local governments and restrict 1ndtMual 
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11MIS' importing capacity. In other words, "market" has often been Influenced and 
substituted by "plan. " 
-This economic malaise has caused difficulties for S. Korea's exports to China. 
especially in consumer goods and light industrial products. Since 1989 s. Korea-s 
trade with China has exhibited an increasing deflcit. Furthermore China has levied 
ta. riffs of 5-35% on Imports from S. Korea. while other countries enjoyed preferential 
tariffs in their trade with China. This was possibly the main economic factor causing 
the problems between China and S. Korea. 
I S. Korea's economic ties with China was initially based on an economic 
rationale during its early stages. While economic engagement was an essential 
element of S. Korea's policy towards China vis-a-vis socialist countries. it was 
"legitimate" for the S. Korean government to utillse economics as leverage in Its 
policies and diplomacy. demonstrating the so-called Chung-kyung hap-ij principle of 
--Northern policy. " Chinese officials, meanwhile, feared the economic co-operations 
between China and S. Korea might "de-ideologise" Chinese Policy towards N. Korea. 
This political implication of bilateral economic relations between China and S-Korea 
was another factor limiting economic development between China and S. Korea. 
Further diffIculties facing joint ventures include instabilities associated with 
china's political situation, widespread corruption. a generally dellcient 
U-1frastructure. and a shortage of skilled manpower. investors seeking alternative 
Inarkets in China are hampered by the lack of diplomatic relations. making it 
exceedingly difficult for Seoul to negotiate agreements on legal ProtectJon for 
investments. exemption from dual taxation, the repatriation of profits. or the 
resolution of disputes. Furthermore, S. Korean businessmen are unable to obtain 
visas for China in their own country. nor are they permitted to take direct flights 
t. here. In August 1989 HAL made one symbolic flight to Shanghai. to carry an 
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athletic team, but negotiations on the opening of a direct service failed to make 
further progress. 
Notwithstanding the problems facing S. Korean businessmen in actually 
rnaking a profit from dealing with China, S. Koreaýs Increased economic strength has 
1jrought. its Northern policy remarkable diplomatic success in its policy towards 
China. When the USSR and the East European countries became Interested in 
economic relations with S. Korea. the Chinese leaders displayed more flexibility in 
the normalisation of political relations with S. Korea. employing a carrot-and-stick 
r, tance towards N. Korea. Assuming that the process of economic reform and political 
clemocratisation in other socialist countries exerted pressure on N. Korea to move 
towards the same direction. and so far as N. Korea was ready to follow the Ude. 
political relations between China and N-Korea have been con-elated with economic 
Irelat. ions between China and S. Korea. 
For the first time since 1948 the two countries have established trade oMces 
in Seoul and Peldng. This has provided an Impetus for more constructive relations in 
the political sphere. which will surely reduce the psychological barrier for China's 
ft, 11 recognition of S. Korea, and should contribute greatly to full normallsation of 
diplomatic relations between China and S. Korea. 7be two countries successfully 
placed economics ahead of politics, providing a valuable 
intermediate step. whereby 
China was able to explore the prototypes of a defacto relationship when diplomatic 
r, ecognition was not yet practicable. 
Gradually, a policy of economic pragmatism moved to the forefront. ideological 
issues lost their importance. and a realistic approach to 
foreign policy gained 
ground. leading initially to the 
development of economic relations. and then on to a 
-by-step political rapprOcheMent. 
In the 1970's and early 1980's political and , tep 
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strategic factors dominated the mainstream of the relationship; in the mid 1980's 
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